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Andrew Jackson
assurances, the fifth-columnists and military resources
The initiation of the 1728  
Musin rebellion
View of Sangdang mountain fortress, (Sangdangsansŏng) seized and held by Yi Injwa’s rebels in 1728
1 I would like to thank Anders Karlsson, James Lewis, Martina Deuchler, Don Baker, Lars Laamann, Kim Byŏngnyun and Peter Kilborn for their help with this paper. This research could not have been carried out 
without the financial help of the Korea Foundation. 
The CenTral Problem: The Timing of The 
musin rebellion In 1728, a rebel organization launched the largest mili-tary rebellion of the eighteenth-century in an attempt 
to overthrow King Yŏngjo’s 英祖 government.1 During the Musin rebellion 戊申亂 (Yi Injwa’s rebellion 李麟
佐의亂), the government lost control of thirteen county 
seats to the rebel organisation, including Ch’ŏngju 淸
州 and Sangdang sansŏng mountain fort 上黨山城 in 
Ch’ungch’ŏng province, and other parts of Kyŏnggi and 
South Kyŏngsang provinces. In these areas, the rebel organisation killed local officials, installed their own magistrates, and expanded its army thanks to local popular support. Despite a short period of gains, the rebel challenge was brutally crushed by government suppression forces within three weeks.
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The rebel organisation was led by extremist members of Namin 南人 (Southerners) and Chunso 峻少Soron 少
論 (Young Disciples) factions.2 The political links of the rebel organisation are strong evidence that the roots of the Musin rebellion lie partly in the bloody court factional 
conflicts that erupted between 1689 and the late 1720s. 
These conflicts arose over whether Kyŏngjong 景宗 or 
his younger half-brother Yŏngjo was the most suitable candidate to succeed their father Sukchong 肅宗; later 
clashes arose over Kyŏngjong’s controversial death.3 The 
Musin rebellion erupted just a few months after the 1727 removal of the Noron 老論 (Old Disciple) faction from 
political power and the restoration of the Soron to office 
(Chŏngmihwan’guk 丁未換局4); Yŏngjo’s attempt to mol-
lify the type of factionalism that had afflicted his brother’s court.5 Many Soron, removed from office or exiled, were restored to military and civil posts in the capital and provinces. The 1727 Soron restoration means that many Musin rebels were, in fact, rebelling to seize power from their own faction.6 But factional conflict is not the whole story; something more was required for violence on such a level. Factionalism had often been bloody, and there 
had been periodic crises; for example the 1659 and 1674 rites disputes.7 However, this is one rare example where 
factional conflict, which had dominated the Chosŏn court for over two centuries, broke down into open and wide-
spread armed conflict.8 
sCholarly undersTanding of The  
musin rebellionMost scholars recognise that the Musin rebellion was more than an extension of factionalism and account for the eruption of violence by emphasizing, not a unitary politi-cal crisis in court, but a dual political and structural crisis. The explanations of these scholars are remarkably simi-
lar to those found in Chalmers Johnson’s structural (sys-tems/value-consensus) theory of rebellion. According 
to Johnson’s theory, balanced societies have values that 
synchronize and ‘routinize’ the population into coherent roles and maintain order.9 However, the equilibrium of 
institutions and values in society are significantly desta-
bilised after some form of ‘shock’ to the system or crisis point. These shocks to the system can occur as a result 
of internal conflict, or external threat.10 The result of the 
crisis is an increasing sense of ‘disorientation’ amongst members of society.11 In order for a successful rebellion to develop there needs to be a movement centred around ideologies containing ‘programs of action intended to 
achieve resynchronization,’ and en masse recruitment of followers.12 In other words, a successful rebellion is cre-ated by an ideological movement. ‘Disequilibrated con-
ditions’ make ‘men receptive to ideologies,’ and without 
ideology the various rebel groups will fail to influence 
directly the ‘social structure.’13 The systems/value-con-sensus approach also stresses the self-preservation abil-ity of political systems to respond to systemic changes; in other words, governments can correct imbalances in 
2 In addition to the extreme Chunso, the Soron had a more moderate sub-faction Wanso 緩少. For major differences in their attitudes towards opposing factions, see Andrew Jackson, “The causes and aims of 
Yŏngjo’s Chŏngmihwan’guk,” in BAKS (British Association of Korean Studies) Papers 13 (2011) pp.17-34
3 In this article, for the sake of convenience I use the posthumous titles of Kyŏngjong and Yŏngjo rather than other titles. Different factions clashed over the successor to Sukchong. The Namin and Soron supported 
Kyŏngjong and Noron supported Yŏngjo, and the different factions attacked the legitimacy of the chosen candidate of rival factions; the idea was that if their candidate took the throne they would be in a favourable 
position in government. Kyŏngjong died after eating crab and persimmon allegedly sent by his brother, who was implicated in Kyŏngjong’s death.
 Yŏngjo had also been implicated by pro Kyŏngjong factions in plots to kill and overthow his brother; notably, the Lady Kim memorial (Kim Sŏng gung’inso 金姓宮人疏); for more indepth analysis of this conflict 
see Jackson, “The causes and aims Yŏngjo’s Chŏngmihwan’guk.”
4 Chŏngmi refers to the year 1727 and hwan’guk means change of administration.
5 When Yŏngjo took the throne in the eighth month of 1724, he was immediately jettisoned into a problematic relationship with the Soron and Noron and their vendetta politics that threatened the stability and 
legitimacy of Yŏngjo’s rule. The 1727 Soron restoration has to be understood in the context of an ongoing attempt by Yŏngjo to reduce factionalism. The 1727 Soron restoration was probably a short-term means 
(a temporary exclusion of the Noron) to a long-term end (a joint Noron-Soron administration). Yi Chaeho claims the aim was to split the power of the Noron and Soron. Yi Chaeho 이재호, Chosŏn chŏngch’i chedo 
yŏn’gu 조선정치제도연구 (Seoul 서울: Ilchogak일조각, 1994): p., 229). Yŏngjo probably also hoped to win the cooperation of the Soron, prevent attacks on his legitimacy, and stabilise his throne. This 
was a rational attempt to make government function in both the short and long term.
6 The Soron loyalists who fought on the government side were mainly Wanso like O Myŏnghang, while many in the rebel side were Chunso Soron. There were kinship links between some of the Soron fighting on 
opposite sides of the conflict. This fratricidal aspect to the Musin rebellion is mainly significant because many Soron loyalists were never able to shake off their association with rebels. 
7 Mark Setton, “Factional Politics and Philosophical Development in the Late Choson,” The Journal of Korean Studies 8 (1992) pp: 37-79. For in-depth analysis See JaHyun Kim Haboush, “Constructing the Center: The 
Ritual Controversy and the Search for a New Identity in Seventeenth-Century Korea,” in Culture and the state in late Chosŏn Korea, edited by J. K. Haboush, and Martina Deuchler (Cambridge: Harvard-Hallym, 1999) 
pp.46-91
8 The other example was the overthrow of Prince Kwang’hae by the predecessors to the Noron faction, the Sŏ’in or Westerners faction, in 1623, see Andrei Lankov, “Controversy over Ritual in 17th Century Korea,” 
Seoul Journal of Korean Studies 3 (1990) pp. 49-64.
9 Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (London: Unipress, 1968): p.35.
10 Ibid., p.61.
11 Theda Skocpol, Social revolutions in the modern world, Cambridge studies in comparative politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): pp. 104-5.
12 Ibid., p.84.
13 Johnson, quoted in Skocpol, Social revolutions in the modern world, p.105.
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systems to prevent occurrences of violence.14
1980’s minjung (oppressed peoples) movement scholars, Yi 
Chongbŏm, and Chŏng Sŏkchong carried out the most in-depth analysis of the Musin rebellion.15 Yi 
and Chŏng stress key aspects of the systems/value consensus theory including the notion of a systemic breakdown, an increasing sense of disorientation and the ideological movement.16 These scholars see various reasons for the structural crisis: an extrinsic structural shock, internal political and social conflict during a period of economic and 
agricultural development. Chŏng 
Sŏkchong believes the 1592-8 
Hideyoshi and 1627-37 Manchu invasions set in motion this period of destabilisation.17 
Yi Chongbŏm identifies political imbalances, particularly 
the 1710 rise of the Noron, which resulted in increasingly 
vicious Noron/Soron factional conflict. Factionalism paralysed government and failed to prevent social dislo-cation.18 During economic expansion, conditions actually worsened for the minjung who became discontented and disorientated. The total result of these social changes, according to scholars, is systemic change, or the ‘break-
down of feudal society.’19 For these scholars, the Musin rebel organisation was led by a coalition of elites, some of whom had forward-thinking ideas and were able to 
mobilise ‘disorientated’ elites and non-elites.20 The structural approach is persistent because it answers the question of why the rebellion was more than 
factional conflict, and it is consistent with a teleological 
view of Korean history. Such an approach positions the Musin rebellion in the context of the development of Korea 
towards modernity. For Yi Chongbŏm, the Musin rebel-lion is important, not so much for the fact of the rebellion itself, but for what the rebellion says about the direction in which an increasingly destabilised Korean system was heading. The rebellion failed because it came at an immature stage of development; the ideology of rebel leaders was not forward-thinking enough and non-elites were not sufficiently disorientated. The Musin rebellion is a temporary bridging stage to a later time when more 
effective challenges could be mounted by the minjung movement.21 This time comes in the nineteenth century, 
which sees increasingly violent rebellions (1811, 1862, 
1894) that contribute to the eventual collapse of the 
Chosŏn dynasty.22 The fate of the Chosŏn dynasty system 
View of Sangdang mountain fort, with ch’ŏngju in distance
14 Barbara Salert, Revolutions and revolutionaries: four theories (New York: Elsevier, 1976):p. 11.
15 The minjung movement privileged the role of the minjung in leading late Chosŏn society to modernity.
16 These scholars never acknowledge Johnson, so it appears that they have arrived at their own version of Johnson’s theory through their own research. Many other Musin rebellion scholars like Cho Ch’anyong
조찬용, 1728 nyŏn Musinsat’ae koch’al 1728 년 무신사태 고찰 (Seoul서울: iolive, 2003) and Kŏch’anggunsa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe 거창군사 편찬위원회, Kŏch’anggunsa 거창郡史, 
(Kŏch’anggun, Kŏch’anggun munhwawŏn 거창군문화원 1997):558-613, argue for a regional dynamic behind the violence, but all largely adopt a structural approach in their analysis.
17 Chŏng Sŏkchong 정석종, “Yŏngjo Musillanŭi chinhaenggwa kŭ sŏngkyŏk 영조 무신란의 진행과 그 성격,” in Chosŏn hugiŭi chŏngch’iwa sasang 조선후기의 정치와 사상’ (Seoul 서울: 
Han’gilsa 한길사, 1994): pp.119-171.
18 Yi Chongbŏm 이종범, “1728 nyŏn ‘musillan’ŭi sŏngkyŏk 1728 년 무신란의 성격,” in Chosŏn sidae chŏngch’i saŭi chaejomyŏng 조선 시대 정치사의 재조명 edited by Yi Taejin 이태진 (Seoul: 
T’aehaksa 대학사, 2003) pp. 228 & 283-9.
19 Susan Shin, “Economic Development And Social Mobility in Pre-Modern Korea: 1600-1860,” Peasant Studies 7 (3) (1978) pp.187-97.
20 Chŏng Sŏkchong, “Yŏngjo Musillanŭi chinhaenggwa kŭ sŏngkyŏk,” pp. 164-5. George Rudé uses the term ‘forward-thinking’ to indicate ideas of social emancipation or the rights of man. George F. E. Rudé, The Crowd 
in History : A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England, 1730-1848 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1985): p.234.
21 Ibid. 1997, p.209.
22 The 1811 Hong Kyŏngnae 洪景來 rebellion, the 1862 Chinju 晋州 rebellion, the 1894 Tonghak 東學 rebellion.
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was inevitable because the government is incapable of correcting the destabilised system.23 There are notable problems with this approach; for example, there is much rebel testimony in the sillok and other sources, but scholarly explanations for the initia-tion of the rebellion are barely supported by rebel tes-timony.24 While there may have been a structural crisis, rebels never discuss an unravelling class system, an eco-
nomic crisis, or a lack of confidence in the government. In other words, there is little in Musin rebel testimony that might lead us to conclude any kind of structural crisis caused violence in 1728. Another problem is the notion of the extrinsic shocks to the system; with many inter-
vening incidents between the 1592/1710 crisis points 
and the rebellion, it is difficult to link the crises and the 1728 violence. In addition, if systemic breakdown and permanent social disequilibrium resulted from certain crisis points, and structural scholars deny the ability of the government to correct the imbalances, then why was there a sole outbreak of violence in 1728, why not after? Finally, very little in rebel words (either spoken or in propaganda) or deeds can lead us to assume the rebels had a forward-thinking agenda and scholars struggle to present a convincing case that the Musin rebel leadership was progressive. Rebels expressed their discontent with 
the incumbent king and expressed their suspicions over 
the demise of Kyŏngjong, but there is no evidence of a plan for the radical overhaul of society.25 The focus in rebel discourse is organizational; in other words, rebels dis-cussed how they were organising to take power, how they would recruit, how they would defeat the government. I analyse textual evidence from government records 
using Charles Tilly’s political conflict approach, which is well-suited to answering the question of why the Musin rebellion occurred in 1728. Tilly developed many of his ideas partly as a response to perceived failings in 
Johnson’s systems/consensus explanation of rebellion, 
ideas Tilly continued to develop until his death in 2008. 
The political conflict approach begins with the assump-tion that rebel contenders for power are ever present in political systems, and that the central problem of inter-pretative frameworks is to explain when, how and why 
contenders escalate political conflict into violent conflict. Rather than focussing on abstract notions of systemic change to explain the outbreak of violence, the political 
conflict approach can be used to examine organisational variables like mobilisation that are essential to the ini-tiation of rebellion. In my analysis, I focus on testimony about the composition of the rebel leadership, their 
plans for a military assault on Yŏngjo’s court and con-sider this information in relation to the political context around 1728. I use government records such as the sillok, 英祖實錄, Kamnannok 勘
亂錄, Musin yŏgok ch’uan 戊申逆獄
推案 and unofficial histories like the Yakp’amallok 藥坡漫錄. These sources are rich with information about rebel military strategy, recruit-ment drives and links between rebels since these were essential concerns of the government interrogators.26 Overall, my analysis suggests a different reason for the initiation of violence. 
View of P’yoch’ungsa shrine to officials killed by Yi Injwa’s rebels in ch’ ŏngju
23 Yi Chongbŏm, “1728 nyŏn ‘musillan’ŭi sŏngkyŏk,” pp. 216. Chŏng Sŏkchong and Yi Chongbŏm differ from Johnson in their belief that governments are incapable of ‘resynchronizing’ society and averting revolution-
ary situations. They also emphasize the importance of a growth of a resistance consciousness amongst the minjung in creating rebellion.
24 Scholars very rarely take their evidence for structural change from the mouths of Musin rebels. See Yi Chongbŏm, “1728 nyŏn ‘musillan’ŭi sŏngkyŏk,” pp.215-228.
25 For more on Musin rebel ideology see Andrew Jackson, “Rebel ideology in the Musillan rebellion of 1728,” Cahiers d’études Coréennes 8 Mélanges offerts à Marc Orange et Alexandre Guillemoz (Institut d’études 
Coréennes, Collège de France, 2010) pp. 221-31.
26 This information was vital because an understanding of how the rebels mobilised, and prepared for battle may have helped the government prevent further outbreaks of violence. The rebel testimony I analyse 
is found in heavily edited official sources like the sillok (veritable records) and the Kamnannok (the official record of the rebellion), but also the Musin yŏgok ch’uan (Trial record of the Musin rebels) that contain 
‘unfiltered’ interrogations of rebels. The Yakp’amallok is a Noron-penned diary of the period.
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oPeraTional seCuriTy, The 
rebels and assuranCesAn analysis of rebel testimony reveals a curious contradiction in rebel strategies over secrecy. There are many examples of absolute secrecy between rebels at rebel meetings; for example, rebels confessed that at meetings rebel leaders concealed their names, and some only used their childhood appellations (cha 字) to disguise their identities.27 In addi-tion, under interrogation one rebel claimed he had only known the iden-tities of a few other rebels and had been warned not to reveal the names of his brothers.28 Senior rebel leader 
Yi Sasŏng 李思晟 also talked about a rebel strategy of not revealing the identities of fellow conspirators at meetings.29 However, rebels also testified that at other meetings rebel leaders openly revealed apparently sen-sitive information. Testimony A reveals how one rebel 
came to join the rebel organisation’s military campaign:
Testimony A …Chŏng Seyun 鄭世胤 is my cousin, and 
this year in the third month, he came to my house claim-
ing to be in mourning... While we were sleeping, four 
men all eight ch’ŏk (over two metres) tall and carrying 
big swords came into the room from somewhere, and I 
got scared. Chŏng Seyun said, ‘We have certain plans, 
and if you don’t do as we say, then we will kill you.’ I 
replied, ‘How can you say something like that?’ Chŏng 
said, ‘We have plotters working in the capital [inside 
court] and in the provinces, and you shouldn’t be the 
least bit worried or suspicious. The court plotter is Nam 
T’aejing 南泰徵 and Yi Sasŏng is plotting in the prov-
inces, and we are going to win. I’ve come with agree-
ments from the T’aein 泰仁magistrate [Pak P’ilhyŏn 朴
弼顯] …’ 30
There are other such examples of testimony where rebels deliberately dispensed with good operational security and revealed sensitive aspects about their plotting. One rebel confessed he was threatened 
with a sword, told the T’aein (north 
Chŏlla province, Pak P’ilhyŏn) magistrate was raising troops, and 
encouraged to join the rebellion.31 In testimony B, we are told that one rebel leader had boasted about the important and powerful people who were involved in the rebellion:
Testimony B: At the time I was in 
T’aein, there was someone called 
Chŏng with a big face, whiskers, and 
hair turning grey at the temples, 
and he called himself licentiate 
Chŏng from Karwŏn 葛院. He visited me and said, ‘Nam 
T’aejing, Yi Sasŏng, Pak P’ilmong 朴弼夢, his son and Yi 
Yuik 李有翼 are all in on this [rebellion] as well as the 
commander of the Northern Approaches Kim Chunggi, 
since he is related to Yi Yuik 李有翼 by marriage.’ 32
There are commonalities to these interactions between rebels in terms of the function of these exchanges and their content. Rebels appear to be offering assurances of victory to other rebels and reveal sensitive details about the identity of those men who would be playing the most 
significant roles in the victory. In other words, rebels offered other rebels assurances of success in the rebel-lion by revealing their trump cards- the identity of senior rebels who would be leading the attack. 
Elizabeth Perry, in her study of both pre-modern and modern regional rebellions in China, states that assur-ances are a very important way rebel leaders ready rebel 
organisations for conflict. One of the primary tasks of rebel leadership is to solidify and expand the rebel organ-
27 Yŏngjo sillok 英祖實錄 (hereafter YS) 42 04/05/01 (sinhae) 18:1b-3a, edited by Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe 국사편찬위원회 (Seoul서울: Tonggukmunhwasa 東國文化社, 1955) pp.52-3 (which 
refers to the forty-second volume of the modern day printed set of the Yŏngjo sillok edited by Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, which is from the original sillok volume eighteen, the fourth year of Yŏngjo’s reign, the 
fifth month, the first or sinhae day, ‘1b-3a’ refers to the folio number and position on the page. This can also be found on pages 52-3 of the modern version). 
28 Cho Tonggyu 趙東奎; YS 42  04/05/09 (kimi) 18:9b-10a, pp.56-7/.
29 YS 42  04/03/25  (ŭlhae) 16:27b-29a, p.27-28. In addition, rebel leaders with loose tongues were criticised by other rebels Musin yŏgokch’uan 戊申逆獄推案, in Kaksa tŭngnok 각사등록75, edited by Kuksa 
p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe 국사편찬위원회 (Seoul 서울: Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, 1994):p.154-5, hereafter, Musin yŏgokch’uan 75, 04/03/25 pp.154-5.
30 Sŏng Tŭkha’s 成得夏 confession; YS 42 04/05/09 (kimi)  18:10a-b, p.57.
31 Yi Hanch’o ‘s 李漢楚 confession; YS 42 04/05/09 (kimi) 18:10a-b, p.57.
32 The rebel leader is probably Chŏng Seyun; YS 42  04/05/21 (sinmi) 18:17a-b, p.60.
Interior of P’yoch’ungsa shrine to officials killed 
by Yi Injwa’s rebels at ch’ŏngju  
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isation by bolstering the confidence of success of poten-tial members. Rebel leaders need to help create the condi-
tions in which rebels find ‘it in their individual interests 
to allocate resources to their common interests…;’33 so leaders use assurances, incentives, or coercion.34 Perry’s research indicates assurances are effective strategies employed by rebel leaders to transform locally based groups into rebel organisations capable of operating on a larger national scale.35The exposure of sensitive information about the iden-tity of senior rebels appears to be evidence the Musin rebel leadership was providing assurances to convince other rebels of the imminent success of their plans. Even when rebel leaders dropped their guard there was a deliberative, purposeful aspect to the widespread expo-sure of names and information about the military strat-egy as in testimony C:
Testimony C: Me (Im Hwan 任環) and Yi Yuik knew 
each other. Yi Yuik lured me into this evil plot. As for the 
kind of person he was, if he didn’t drink alcohol he was 
strong-willed and coarse, and he didn’t say much. But 
when he drank his favourite alcohol, and he was with 
people who felt the same, then he revealed his inner-
most feelings, and he always talked about Nam T’aejing 
and Yi Saju 李思周 who were plotting in court (in the 
capital).36 
Even while drunk, the rebel leader above revealed the names of senior rebels to lure other rebels deeper into the plotting. Assurances are often used in slightly different contexts; for example, as a recruitment device in testimony A. This rebel was coerced into committing to the rebel organi-
zation’s violent ambitions with a mixture of threats of violence and assurances of senior rebels. In addition, assurances were used between rebels when one lacked 
confidence as in testimony D: 
Testimony D: Around the second or third month, Han 
Sehong 韓世弘 came to the house of Yi Yuik and said, 
‘We don’t have enough troops on the inside [in the 
capital] what are we going to do about it?’ Yi Yuik said, 
‘Commander Yi and General Nam are enough. We don’t 
need that many.’ After Han Sehong left, because I had no 
idea who Commander Yi was, I asked Yi Yuik, and Yi Yuik 
replied with a laugh, ‘It’s Yi Saju.’ Yi Yuik said Yi Saju 
was related to Lord Milp’ung 密豊君, and had just been 
made the commander of the elite palace guard.37
The timing of this incident, which was just prior to the 
takeover of Ch’ŏngju, suggests last minute nerves about the commitment of rebels to the rebellion. But in the 
majority of cases, higher ranking rebels used the names of senior leaders to assure lower ranking rebels. What is common to all these uses of assurances is a desire to reassure rebel misgivings about what was a dangerous enterprise. This use of assurances can help explain the apparent contradiction in the rebel practice of opera-tional security.
rebel leadershiP and The fifTh-ColumnisTsThe frequent use of assurances amongst rebels explains how sensitive information about the identity of the lead-ership and the military strategy was widespread amongst even lower ranking rebels. When arrested, tortured and interrogated, many rebels revealed names and rebel strategies to their interrogators. Betrayed in interro-gations were rebel leaders whose names have become 
synonymous with the rebellion like Yi Injwa and Pak 
P’ilmong. All of these men were Namin or Chunso mar-ginalised elites, men from famous clans excluded from power because of factionalism. However as can be seen in the above examples, in addi-tion to these marginalised elite rebels, frequently men-
tioned were military and civil officials occupying senior positions in court and the provinces. These men were operating undercover within government and therefore 
acting as fifth-columnists,38 and they include central gov-
ernment officials Yi Sasŏng, Nam T’aejing, Kim Chunggi, 
33 Elizabeth J. Perry, Rebels and revolutionaries in North China, 1845-1945, (Stanford: Stanford University Press,1980): p. 253.
34 Daniel Little, Understanding peasant China: case studies in the philosophy of social science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989): pp. 145-50.
35 Elizabeth Perry, Rebels and revolutionaries in North China, pp.175-80.
36 YS 42  04/05/01 (sinhae) 18:1b-3a, pp.52-3.
 In addition, Yi Yuik claimed that Yi Saju would be involved on the rebel side YS 42  04/05/02 (imja) 18:4a, p.54.
37 Im Hwan’ s任環 confession YS 42  04/05/02  (imja) 18:4a, p.54.
38 The term was originally used in relation to the Spanish Civil War; Nationalist general Emilio Mola Vidal said he had four columns of a rebel army attacking government forces, and a fifth-column of clandestine rebels 
inside government. Although a very different temporal, geographical and political context, ‘fifth-columnist’ seems the most appropriate term to describe rebels clandestinely using their official positions to aid a 
rebel challenge to government.
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and Yi Saju.39 Yi Sasŏng was P’yŏng’an 平安 army com-
mander, a powerful military official charged with defence 
against northern invaders. Nam T’aejing was Chief of the Capital Gendarmes. Kim Chunggi occupied the most powerful position of anyone accused of collaboration with the Musin rebel organization. Kim was commander of the Northern approaches and in direct command of an army responsible for protecting the king, court, and 
capital from outside attack. As an official he gave advice on the suppression of the rebels; he was close to the king 
and the inner circle of officials during the 1728 crisis and 
was present in the king’s emergency council when details 
about the rebellion were first revealed to the court. Yi 
Saju served as general of the elite palace guard, a key posi-tion responsible for protecting the king and the capital.40The above confessions also reveal the names of pro-
vincial officials like Pak P’ilhyŏn the T’aein magistrate 
(Chŏlla province), Shim Yuhyŏn 沈維賢the Tamyang 潭
陽 magistrate (Chŏlla province), Nam T’aejŏk 南泰績 the 
T’ongjin 通津 (Kyŏnggi province) magistrate, Nam Su’ŏn 
南壽彦 the Ch’ip’yŏng 砥平 magistrate and Chŏng Sahyo
鄭思孝 the Chŏlla province governor. Many were associ-ated with the higher echelons of the central rebel leader-
ship; for example, Pak P’ilhyŏn was a founder member of the rebel organisation. There were also a large number of 
more minor provincial officials implicated, and used as assurances by rebels. These men were not those oppor-
tunists who switched sides and joined the rebels when it was evident the rebels were in the ascendancy at a local level.41 These men were implicated as provincial fifth-columnists prior to the start of the rebellion and included Shin Husam 愼後三, Cho Munbo 趙文普, and Han Saŏk 
韓師億.42 According to rebel leaders, all of the above 
regional fifth-columnists had pledged their support to the rebellion. The above information means that the rebel organisa-
tion had a small but significant group of fifth-columnist rebels allegedly working undercover in both military and civil posts, in central and provincial government, and this information was widely known by rebels throughout the rebel organisation prior to the outbreak of violence. 
The miliTary Plan
These fifth-columnists are frequently mentioned in assur-ances with regard to the military plan as in testimony A, B, C and D. The main crux of this plan involved the creation 
of a diversion, so fifth-columnist military generals like 
Yi Sasŏng could attack the court. Rebel troops planned 
to create a ‘disturbance’ in a strategic location near the 
capital. Yi Sasŏng would then mobilise his government troops in the name of the king to crush the disturbances, 
but in fact, Yi Sasŏng’s troops would be diverted to the 
capital to join with other rebel troops and seize control of court.43 In addition to Yi Sasŏng, Nam T’aejing would be playing a vitally important role in the rebel military take-
over. Lower-ranking rebels testified that the Chief of the 
Sangdang mountain fortress, near ch’ŏngju, captured by rebels
39 The charges that Kim Chunggi, Chŏng Sahyo and Yi Saju were fifth-columnists were never universally accepted. However, the names of these officials were used by rebels as assurances guaranteeing success in the 
rebellion. Kim Chunggi is identified as a rebel fifth-columnist in other sources, see Musin yŏgokch’uan 75, 04/03/25 p.167; the Yakp’ammallok mentions that Kim Chunggi’s name appeared in rebel confessions and 
then he was arrested and replaced Yakp’ammallok p.6 lines 68-9 (author’s pagination).
40 Records indicate that Yi Saju was made the general of the gendarmes on the fifteenth day of the second month of 1728, but it is unclear when he took up his post.
41 Musin yŏgokch’uan 75, 04/04/17 p. 599
42 Like Shin Manhang 愼萬恒 the Samga 三嘉 deputy magistrate (Chwasu 座首) who chased the magistrate out of town and sided with the Hapch’ŏn 陜川 rebels; YS 42 04/03/27 (chŏngch’uk) 16:35a-36a, 
p.31.
43 See YS 04/06/17 (pyŏngsin)  18:26b, p.65/42 & YS 04/04/10 (kyŏng’in) 17:13a-b, p.41/42 & Musin yŏgokch’uan 75, 04/04/16 p. 580. Further testimony that Pak Pilhyŏn as magistrate mobilised his T’’aein govern-
ment troops for the rebels can be found in Musin yŏgokch’uan 75, 04/04/07 pp. 392-3. Pak P’ilhyŏn is also described as a rebel leader in Kamnannok 勘亂錄 from Chosŏn Tangjaeng kwangyeja charyojip 朝鮮
黨爭關係資料集 accessed online at http://www.krpia.co.kr/pcontent/?svcid=KR&proid=68   [accessed 1st May 2012]:p. 48a-b.   
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Capital Gendarmes Nam T’aejing was charged with the task of seizing the capital.44 Rebel leaders confessed that Nam would be leading the capital rebellion and would 
hold the capital to give Yi Sasŏng time to bring his govern-
ment troops down from P’yŏng’an Province.
Testimony E: Shin Yunjo will enter from Tongdaemun
東大門 gate, and Yi Sasŏng will come from the western 
road, and Nam T’aejing’s troops will rise up from inside 
the city and start firing.46
There are some variations; for example, one rebel leader predicted disturbances in the capital as well, which Nam 
T’aejing would pretend to suppress.47 This means both 
Yi Sasŏng and Nam T’aejing would crush ‘disturbances’ inside, and close to the capital. It is unclear who would be causing these capital disturbances; however, rebels men-
tioned a plan to infiltrate the capital at night by sabotag-ing a gate.48
The use of diversion and the Yi Sasŏng/Nam T’aejing assault on the capital appears to have been the basis of 
the rebel organization’s strategy. There is evidence that the rebels attempted to implement this military strategy. 
When Yi Injwa seized the town of Ch’ŏngju, he attempted 
to activate the ‘government’ response of Yi Sasŏng. Yi 
Injwa’s first action after the takeover was to send out 
appeals for support from Yi Sasŏng, and other rebel lead-ers as we see in Testimony F:49 
On the evening of the fourteenth, I arrived at Ch’ŏngju. 
Kwŏn Sŏryong and Yi Injwa had led their troops from 
town and stationed them in a valley around five li away. 
On the evening of the fifteenth day, Yi Injwa was made 
commander and Chŏng Seyun vice-commander, and 
they led the troops into Ch’ŏngju, killing the military 
commander. [...] When I was with the rebels, I drew 
up three rebel appeals (kyŏksŏ 檄書). One was sent to 
Chŏng Hŭiryang鄭希亮 in Kyŏngsang Province. Im 
Kungnyang, who was a strong and robust man from 
the P’yŏng’an commander-in-chief’s camp and acting 
as Yi Injwa’s lieutenant, was ordered to take another 
dispatch to Yi Sasŏng. Another one was sent to Honam 
to Na Manch’i 羅晩致.50
Further evidence that the rebel organization was seri-
ous about this plan can be seen in Yi Sasŏng’s confes-sion where he admitted his intention had been to use rebel movements as an excuse to mobilise government troops.51 Other fifth-columnists are also mentioned in relation to rebel military success; particularly Nam 
T’aejŏk, Kim Chunggi and Yi Saju.52 Rebels are sketchy 
about both Yi Saju and Kim Chunggi’s precise military involvement, or the resources they would be contrib-uting to the rebellion; there are no details about their involvement in the plan, or whether units of their men would be mobilised. Testimony only indicates that these men would be involved in some way, and acting as gen-
erals. Overall, the names of Yi Sasŏng and Nam T’aejing are the most frequently betrayed names during the main 
period of government interrogation. Yi Sasŏng and his 
rebel activities are mentioned in twenty-five different 
sillok confessions; Nam T’aejing is mentioned by fourteen different rebels in confessions, mostly in relation to their assault on the capital.53
44 See YS 42  04/04/22 (imin)17: 26b- 28a, pp. 47 – 48 & YS 42 04/04/22 (imin) 17:26b-28a, pp.47-8 & Musin yŏgokch’uan 75, 04/04/14 p. 531. Testimony of Yi Sasŏng’s military plans can be found in other sources 
Musin yŏgokch’uan 75, 04/03/18 pp.71-2. Further evidence that Yi Sasŏng’s planned mobilisation was used as an assurance can be found in Kamnnannok p.27b. One rebel indicated that Yi Sasŏng’s troops would 
be disguised as Ching troops, but it is unclear why; perhaps to give the impression that the rebels had Ching backing, see Musin yŏgokch’uan 75, 04/04/16 pp. 579-80.
45 Yi Ha 李河 claimed he was aware that Nam T’aejing was involved Musin yŏgokch’uan 75, 04/03/18 pp.75-6, and Yun Hŭigyŏng 尹熙慶 claimed capital plotting was organised by Nam T’aejing YS 42 04/03/29 
(kimyo) 16:41a, p.34. Other sources provide testimony about Nam T’aejing’s involvement: Musin yŏgokch’uan 76, 04/05/01  p.103 
46 Cho Myŏnggyu ‘s 趙命奎 confession YS 42  04/06/03 (imo) 18:21a, p.62. Rebel leader Na Sungdae also revealed this information Musin yŏgokch’uan 75, 04/04/06 pp. 386-7. Also Yi Injwa revealed that Nam 
T’aejing was involved in the capital plotting YS42 04/03/26 (pyŏngja) 16:31b-33a, p.29-30. Han Sehong confessed Nam would be mobilising gendarmes YS 42 04/04/09 (kich’uk) 17:11b-12a, p.40. Shim Yuhyŏn 
also had information about Nam T’aejing’s proposed movements YS 42 04/05/08 (mu’o) 18:8b-9b, p.56. It is difficult to find any more information about the case of Nam T’aejing because Nam was one of the few 
rebel leaders who refused to confess during interrogation.
47 YS 42 04/05/01 (sinhae) 18:1b-3a, pp.52-3.
48 Several different plans were devised by rebel leaders to open the capital gates. For example, Yi Ha claimed that Pak P’ilhyŏn that the gates of Tonhwamun 敦化門 and Hong’hwamun 弘化門could be opened 
using rockets YS 42 04/04/09  (kich’uk) 17:11b-12a, p.40.
49 Unbeknownst to Yi Injwa, Yi Sasŏng and Nam T’aejing had been arrested.
50 Wŏn Manju ‘s confession. YS 42 04/05/24 (kapsul)  18:18a-b, p.61.
51 Although Yi confessed his government troops would really suppress the rebels, and not attack the crown YS 42 04/03/25 (Ŭlhae) 16:27b-29a, p.27-28.
52 Nam T’aejŏk was a frequently betrayed fifth-columnist. For example, Nam was betrayed by Yi Pae李培 who alleged that Nam T’aejŏk was one of the capital plotters alongside Nam T’aejing and Yi Sasŏng Musin 
yŏgokch’uan 75, 04/03/27 pp. 186-7. Nam T’aejŏk was also betrayed by Kim Chungman 金重萬 and Shin Kwang’wŏn 愼光遠 YS 42 04/03/18 (mujin) 16:14a-b, p.20, Pak P’ilhyŏn YS 42 04/03/19 (kisa) 
16:15b-17a, p.21, Pak Migui 朴美龜 YS 42 04/05/08 (mu’o) 18:8b-9b, p.56 and Yi Injwa YS 42 04/03/26 (pyŏngja) 16:31b-33a, p.29-30.
53 YS 42 04/03/25 (Ŭlhae) 16:29a, p.28. Both Yi Sasŏng and Nam T’aejing were mentioned in relation to their activities as fifth-columnists in a variety of sources also; for example, Kamnannok p31b-32b, Yi Sasŏng is 
also identified as a fifth columnist in Musin yŏgokch’uan 75, 04/04/10 p. 463 and Musin yŏgokch’uan 75. 04/04/10 p 469 & Musin yŏgokch’uan 75, 04/04/24 pp.681-2
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As can be seen from the above tes-
timony, Yi Sasŏng and Nam T’aejing are invariably placed at the centre of the strategy, and this is particu-
larly significant for two reasons. First, it appears that a large number of rebels were familiar with the Yi 
Sasŏng/ Nam T’aejing section of the plan; whereas none had any idea of the proposed movements of ordi-
nary rebel leaders like Yi Injwa, or 
Chŏng Hŭiryang (who were eventu-ally more successful in the rebellion). This is an important detail because it 
means the Yi Sasŏng/Nam T’aejing assault was widely associated by the rebel leadership as the strategy that would bring victory in the rebellion.54 Second, there is a 
degree of consistency about the centrality of Yi Sasŏng 
and Nam T’aejing to the military plan across rebel tes-timony. This was testimony induced under duress and compiled by government scribes with a vested factional interest in disparaging the rebel case.55 However, many rebels corroborate the evidence of other rebels about the 
participation of the fifth-columnists. The ‘overlapping’ of these essential details lends some credibility to the infor-mation in the records.
miliTary resourCes of The  
fifTh-ColumnisTs
To understand the central role of the rebel fifth-column-
ists in this plan, it is important to bear in mind the signifi-
cant military resources rebels believed fifth-columnists 
would be contributing to the rebel cause. Official figures 
indicate that Yi Sasŏng would have commanded up to fourteen thousand able-bodied troops.56 Rebel testi-
mony reveals that Nam T’aejing commanded around four hundred troops.57 Nam T’aejŏk was supposed to commit three hundred troops.58 Rebels confessed Pak P’ilhyŏn in 
T’aein led eight companies (almost eight hundred men) 
from T’aein.59 
Other fifth-columnists used in these assurances also 
commanded significant military resources. Kim Chunggi was in charge of between seven thousand and twenty thousand troops.60 Yi Saju may have commanded any-thing between seven hundred and a thousand troops. 
There are also several minor provincial officials like Shin 
Husam and Han Saŏk61 who were planning to mobilize unclear numbers of troops.62 
It is easy to see how the fifth-columnist led military plan would appeal to many rebels as a powerful assur-
ance. First, many fifth-columnists controlled powerful military resources – resources marginalized, rural rebel 
elites like Yi Injwa could never hope to mobilize. This is 
because fifth-columnists had access to resources of the most powerful resource holder in the land – the state. 
By placing fifth-columnists at the centre of the military plan, rebels were essentially tapping into the power of 
the state. Second, many of the fifth-columnists shared political and kinship links with other rebels.63 For exam-
ple, Nam T’aejing was related by marriage to fellow fifth-
Monument erected in honour of government officials like Yi Pongsang killed by Musin rebel forces 
at ch’ŏngju
54 This may also indicate that the actual rebel seizure of territory was not the intended course of events but a rebel response to contingency.
55  Susan Naquin calls this ‘overlapping information.’ Susan Naquin, Millenarian Rebellion in China (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1976): p. 286.
56 Pipyŏnsa Tŭngnok 國譯備邊司謄錄 27, edited by Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe 국사편찬위원회 (Kwach’ŏn과천: Imun insoe 利文印刷, 2006) YJ 04/05/18 (Mujin) pp.275c-276d.
57 YS 42 04/05/08 (mu’o) 18:8b-9b, p.56.
58 Musin yŏgokch’uan 75, 04/03/28 p.201
59 YS 42 04/03/25 (Ŭlhae) 16:27a-b, p.26-27.
60 YS 42  04/03/17 (chŏngmyo) 16:10b-11a, p.18-19. 
61 YS 42 04/04/10  (kyŏng’in) 17:13a-b, p.41. 
62 YS  42 04/06/17 (pyŏngsin)  18:26b, p.65.
63 YS 42 04/04/10 (kyŏng’in)  17:13b ,p.41 & YS 42 04/04/14 (kap’o) 17:20b-21a, pp.44-5 .
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columnists Pak P’ilhyŏn and Nam 
T’aejŏk.64 Both Shim Yuhyŏn and Kim Chunggi were related by mar-riage to one of the founding mem-bers of the rebel organisation Yi Yuik;65 In addition, Yi Saju had mari-
tal connections to the figurehead of 
the rebellion, Lord Milp’ung.66 These 
bonds amongst rebels and the fifth-columnists were never questioned in testimony.67 Third, there was his-
torical precedent for the fifth-col-umnist led military strategy. A plan 
based on the use of fifth-columnists and their resources had been used in 
the previous century during the Injo 
restoration. In 1623, Sŏin members managed to seize power with around 
seven thousand troops led by Yi Sŏ 
李曙, Yi Chungno 李重老, and with the Military Training commander 
Yi Hŭngnip 李興立 acting as fifth-columnist.68 Prince Kwanghae 光海
君 was toppled and Injo restored in his place.69 Thus, the fifth-column-ist led military plan had a proven track record.70 Finally, many rebels expressed their doubts about the capacity of the ordinary rebel leaders and their troops to succeed in the rebellion, but there is no evidence of any criticism or doubts about 
the capacity of any of the fifth-columnists.71 Overall, there 
is strong evidence that the fifth-columnists and their the military plan was generally accepted as the winning rebel strategy. 
The iniTiaTion of The rebellionThe assurances in testimony A-D are very revealing of 
the identity of influential members of the rebel organi-sation, the military strategy, and the way rebels believed they would succeed in the rebellion. When considered within the immediate political context the informa-tion from these assurances provides vital clues to the 
Map showing county seats seized by Musin rebels
64 Musin yŏgokch’uan 75, 04/03/22 p.106 & Cho Ch’anyong, 1728 nyŏn Musinsat’ae koch’al 1728, p. 156. A similar marriage link was given as evidence that Chŏng Sahyo was involved on the rebel side, since Chŏng was 
related to Pak P’ilhyŏn YS 42 04/04/14 (kabo) 17:20b-21a, pp.44-5 ) In another example, rebel leaders Na Sungdae and Yi Ho stated Chŏng Sahyo and Pak P’ilhyŏn were plotting together to mobilise troops Musin 
yŏgokch’uan 75, 04/04/05 pp. 386-7.
65 Musin yŏgokch’uan 75, 04/03/27  p. 190. Cho Sang confessed that Kim Chunggi’s marriage links to Yi Yuik was evidence of his commitment to the rebellion YS 42 04/04/10 (kyŏng’in) 17:13b ,p.41. See also YS 42 
04/03/26 (pyŏngja) 16:31b-33a, p.29-30 & YS 42 04/03/25 (Ŭlhae) 16:27b-29a, p.27-28. YS 42  04/04/11 (sinmyo) 17:14a, p.41.
66 Rebels planned to put Lord Milp’ung on the throne to replace Yŏngjo and bring legitimacy to the rebellion. Lord Milp’ung was the great-grandson of Sohyŏn, the oldest son of King Injo Yi Kyech’ŏn 2003, 24. The links 
between other more minor fifth-columnists like Shim Husam, Cho Munbo, and Han Sa’ŏk and the rebel organization are vague. One scholar claims there were political links, Yi Chongbŏm claims that they were all 
members of extreme Soron or Namin factions (Yi Chongbŏm, “1728 nyŏn ‘musillan’ŭi sŏngkyŏk,” p. 251) but this cannot be verified in the sources. There could also have been marriage links. It is unlikely that rebel 
leaders would have approached provincial officials they felt were unsympathetic to the rebel organization.
67 In actual fact, the loyalty of many fifth-columnists was not so strong and many reneged on agreements to fight for the rebels. Some like Yi Saju even fought against the rebel organisation YS 04/03/17 (chŏngmyo) 
16:12b, p.19/42. 
68 Yi Hongjik 이홍직, ed. Kuksadaesajŏn 國史大辭典 (Seoul, Minjung sŏgwan 民衆書館, 2007): p. 1139.
69 James Palais, Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions: Yu Hyongwon and the Late Chosŏn Dynasty  (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996): pp. 93 & 6.
70 There is no testimony from the lips of rebels about the Musin rebellion fifth-columnists having used the model of earlier rebels, for example in the Injo restoration. However, the king and his officials compare the 
actions of Nam T’aejing and Yi Sasŏng to rebels from earlier periods, some of whom had used the fifth-columnist model to mobilize troops against the crown, so we can assume that this military strategy would 
have been known by the rebels as well. For example, the king compared the activities of Nam T’aejing and Yi Sasŏng to that of the 1624 Yi Kwal 李适 rebellion. YS 42 04/04/22 (imin) 17:26b-28a, pp.47-8.
71 Yi Yu’ik (YS 42  04/04/29 (kiyu) 17:34b-35b, pp.51 -2), Yi Injwa (YS 42 04/03/26  (pyŏngja) 16:31b-33a, p.29-30), and Yi Sasŏng (YS 42 04/03/25  (Ŭlhae) 16:27b-29a, p.27-28) all expressed their doubts about the 
military capacities of non-fifth columnist rebels and/or their troops.
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initiation of the rebellion. Many of 
the fifth-columnists from the 1728 Musin rebellion had been restored 
to office by Yŏngjo in the 1727 Soron restoration. For example, 
Nam T’aejing and Kim Chunggi were exiled by the Noron around 1725 and 
then returned from exile by Yŏngjo in 1727 and given important military 
posts. Yi Sasŏng was also out of office and restored to a senior post after the 1727 Soron restoration.72 Pak 
P’ilhyŏn’s career went ‘silent’ around 
1725, but he was back in office after 1727.73 The timing of the rebellion, a few months after the 1727 Soron 
restoration when many fifth-columnists were restored to 
office, may be more than coincidence; there appears to be a direct link. The rebel use of assurances gives clues as to why the rebellion occurred when it did. Many in the rebel 
organisation believed that thanks to the fifth-columnists, 
the rebel organisation had acquired sufficient military resources to launch an assault against the largest and 
most powerful resource holder in the land, Yŏngjo’s court. 
ConClusion
Previous Musin rebellion scholars recognise more than a political crisis was required to turn factionalism into widespread military violence. However, most scholars sought answers to the question of the initiation of the rebellion from information extrinsic to the textual data 
and identified systemic crises. In my study of the initiation of violence I focus on rebel testimony. Thanks to the rebel use of assurances, vital data about the military strategy was quickly betrayed to government interrogators, and this information is reveal-
ing about the Musin rebellion. The fifth-columnists were 
widely claimed by rebels to be playing significant roles in the military plan. The rebel organization was using prime 
assets like Nam T’aejing and Yi Sasŏng, as well as other 
rebel fifth-columnists to expand and solidify rebel mem-bership. Many rebels appear convinced that the rebel-
lion would be led by fifth-columnists who could mobilise 
powerful military resources for the rebels. Put simply, the rebel organization initiated the rebellion because it 
believed it had sufficient resources to attack the govern-ment. The rebel organization believed it had acquired suf-
ficient resources because the fifth-columnists had come 
to power, and the fifth-columnists were only in power because of the 1727 Soron restoration. 
Placing fifth-columnists and their military resources at the centre of the rebellion provides a more concrete account of the initiation of violence than structural expla-nations for two reasons. First, this is an explanation that relies on textual evidence from the lips of the rebels themselves. Second, rather than a temporarily remote crisis point that destabilised the system, I see a moment of crisis that fatally unbalanced the political institutions a few months before the outbreak of violence. This is the 
1727 Soron restoration, the moment Yŏngjo unwittingly 
empowered rebel fifth-columnists and the rebel organi-sation. 
But placing the fifth-columnists at the centre of the Musin rebellion also has two important implications. The 
first is the role of Yŏngjo in creating a military challenge to his own rule. Men, who prior to the 1727 Soron res-toration had been in exile or unemployed, were placed in positions they could exploit to launch an attack on 
the crown. Yŏngjo both literally and figuratively handed 
the keys of the armoury to fifth-columnist rebels he had restored in the 1727 Soron restoration. Second, to mount a serious attack on the state rebels required resources of the state; forward-thinking ideology was not enough to initiate rebellion against the government. 
72 Sŭngjŏngwŏn’ilgi 承政院日記35, edited by Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe 국사편찬위원회, (Seoul 서울: Op’ŭset insoeso 서울오프셋 印刷所, 1965-6)  YJ 03/08/05 (Muja) p.148a.
73 Sŭngjŏngwŏn’ilgi 35, YJ 03/11/12 (Kapja) p.562a.
Monument commemorating the government suppression of the Musin rebellion in Ansŏng,  
kyŏnggi province
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This paints a very different picture of the eruption of violence in 1728. Important political interventions/con-tingency like the 1727 Soron restoration and organisa-
tional factors like fifth-columnist involvement, military strategy and resources have been forgotten in the rush to show that systems were moving societies towards moder-nity and that these same systems were sending the rebel participants to an inevitable conclusion. These were not participants being propelled to some inevitable rebellion by systemic forces beyond their control. The forces that 
led to rebellion were firmly in the hands of the partici-pants themselves, in the hands of the rebels and the king.My study also raises an important point about his-torical approaches to the Musin rebellion in particular and rebellion in general. In most historical coverage the 
Musin rebellion is known as Yi Injwa’s rebellion, because 
Yi Injwa played a leading role in the rebel seizures of 
county seats in Kyŏngsang, Ch’ungch’ŏng and Kyŏnggi 
provinces. The problem is the focus on the main ‘action’ of the Musin rebellion provides little or no clue why the Musin rebellion actually occurred in 1728. By focussing on rebel seizures of power, most historical coverage over-looks important forces that lay behind the rebellion; in 
this case, the military plan, the fifth-columnists, their resources, and the 1727 Soron restoration. In this article, I have argued that to understand why the Musin rebellion occurred when it did, we have to look at what the rebels intended to do rather than what they actually achieved. This raises questions about some of our assumptions underlying complex events like rebellions, where it can-not necessarily be assumed that the path taken was the path chosen. Other researchers like Susan Naquin have also remarked upon the phenomenon of ‘unintended 
consequences’ in their studies of eighteenth century Chinese rebellion.74 Historical researchers armed with such awareness may be able to make fruitful inroads into 
understanding the causes of other late Chosŏn rebellions. It is important to note also that the Musin rebellion was not a one-off case and that central aspects of my research can also be seen in different temporal and cul-tural contexts. In particular, one important strategy for resource mobilisation is evident in other rebellions. 
Rebels realised a vital platform for rebellion involved 
having rebels on the ‘inside’ or securing coalitions with 
disaffected members of the polity. In the late Chosŏn 
Hong Kyŏngnae rebellion of 1811, rebels exploited some close connections with local government to mobilise material resources. For instance, many rebels held posi-
tions at the Kwaksan county office and some thirty-nine 
out of forty-three mobilised at Chŏngju were clerks or 
officials in the local administrative structure.75 Some 
of these same officials exploited their position within the administrative structure to mobilise troops for the 
rebels. These fifth-columnist officials were able to iden-tify the able-bodied men of certain villages, and had the administrative authority to mobilise them.76 In addition 
to human resources, fifth-columnist officials used were able to seize material resources like grain from local state granaries to help supply the rebels.77 Thus, rebels exploited local level connections to mobilise government resources against government forces. In the case of the 
period of internal rebellion against the Ch’ing, the White 
Lotus Rebellion of 1796 heralded a long period of seri-ous domestic rebellion. Rebels converted wealthy rural 
elites and also found support within provincial offices 
to the extent that observers believed most officials ‘sup-
posed to ferret out the sect are in fact members of it.’78 In her study of the Eight Trigrams uprising of 1813, Susan Naquin explains that rebel leaders were reliant upon coa-litions with discontents inside court as part of their strat-egy for victory. Leaders cultivated links with eunuchs and 
Chinese bondservants as a way of infiltrating and seizing the Forbidden City.79 In all the above cases, as in the case of the Musin rebel-
lion, the rebel cultivation of links with fifth-columnists as a way of mobilising resources was not a strategy that suc-ceeded, but did form part of a success-oriented strategy; i.e., a strategy that rebels believed would lead to success. 
The notion of the fifth-columnist and the fifth-column-
ist’s ability to mobilise state resources for rebels does not explain all the permutations of rebellion. However, an awareness of these issues can help shed some light upon the mechanics of rebellion not only in 1728, but in East Asian rebellion in general. 
74 Susan Naquin, ‘Millenarian Rebellion in China,’ p.210.
75 Anders Karlsson, The Hong Kyôngnae rebellion 1811-1812 : conflict between central power and local society in 19th-century Korea, (Stockholm: Stockholm University, 2000), pp.156 & 183.
76 Ibid., pp. 161 & 165.
77 Ibid., pp. 191-205.
78 Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and its enemies in late imperial China : militarization and social structure, 1796-1864, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970) ,p.40.
79 Susan Naquin, Millenarian Rebellion in China , p.148.
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Moon Yumi
The AmericAn imAginAries in WArTime coloniAl KoreA, 1931-45
Modern Utopia or ‘Animal Society’? 
1. IntroductIon Historian Iriye Akira writes that a “cold war” took place for several years between the United States and Japan 
before the eruption of the Pacific War on December 7, 
1941. According to Iriye, this cold war did not originate 
in a fundamental disparity of ideology and interests, as in 
the postwar Cold War between the United States and the 
USSR. Rather, the belligerent discourse and antagonism between Japan and the United States belied the deeper 
“undercurrents” of compatible interests and interna-tional vision observed in their relations before 1929.1 
Iriye highlights the inconsistency within wartime Japan’s 
rhetoric and diplomacy for a Pan-Asianist order and its 
ambivalence toward American power, culture, and for-
eign policy. This emphasis on ambivalence provides a 
context in which to understand Japan’s swift reconcilia-
tion with America in the postwar era. But it discounts the 
intensity of the wartime confrontations in East Asia and their historical legacy beyond the postwar US-Japan rap-
prochement.
During the wartime period, Japan’s perceptions of a 
desirable society and world sharply diverged from Amer-
ican ones, and Japan’s mobilization to enforce this vision altered the ideological and political landscape of the region under Japanese rule. Harry Harootunian writes that the anxiety of Japanese intellectuals toward Anglo-
American culture made them acknowledge the war 
as an occasion to criticize “the meaning of modernity” entrenched in Japan since the Meiji era. They assigned 
Japan a “civilizational mission” to “overcome” the prob-
lems of modernity, attached prominently to the “negativ-
ity of American materialism and its superficiality” that 
was collapsing Japanese culture into “mediocrity and triviality.”2 Cemil Aydin calls this alternative worldview 
“Pan-Asianist internationalism” and argues that Japanese 
intellectuals and public figures became receptive to this 
vision after Japan’s conflicts with the League of Nations.3 
How, then, did Koreans under the Japanese conceive of 
this new civilizational mission of Japan and its wartime 
narrative seeking “new moral principles different from 
those that had governed Europe”?4 How did Koreans 
respond to the ongoing imperialization, or Japanization, that Japan undertook so as to change its colony accord-
ing to this Pan-Asianist vision? This article explores the 
Korean imaginaries of America in wartime colonial Korea 
and examines their implications in terms of answering 
these questions. In defining the term “imaginary,” I use 
Charles Taylor’s concept of the social imaginary. Tay-
lor differentiates social imaginary from philosophy or 
social theory because (1) “imaginary” refers to “the way 
ordinary people imagine their surroundings,” which is 
“often not expressed in theoretical terms” but “carried 
in images, stories, legends and other media”; (2) “theory 
is often the possession of a small minority but the social 
imaginary is shared by a larger group of people”; and (3) 
”the social imaginary is a common understanding” that 
makes people engage with common practices invoking a 
shared sense of normal expectations.5
1 Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese American War, 1941-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 1.
2 Harry Harootunian, Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), Chapter 2, pp. 34-94.
3 Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 161-166.
4 Harry Harootunian, Overcome by Modernity, p. 43. 
5 Charles Taylor, “On social imaginary,” 2001, quoted from blog.lib.umn.edu/swiss/archive/Taylor.pdf, pp. 18-19.
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The Korean wartime discourse on 
America included diverse types of 
writing, such as stories, reports on 
events, columns, statistics, miscella-
neous essays of tourists, and imagi-
nary claims about America’s char-acteristics. Although their authors 
were mostly educated élites, they 
seldom supply sophisticated analy-ses of the United States and lack the theoretical coherence to be a subject 
for “intellectual history.” Neverthe-
less, these writings still convey the positions of the authors “interwoven with an idea of how [their society] ought to go.”6 America, in this sense, was the topic via which these Korean authors discussed their ideas and 
desires about a “model society” for 
Korea, or their criticism of the coun-
try’s ongoing “imperialization” with-
out ever mentioning Japan – a realis-
tic approach, given the harsh colonial censorship.
Japan’s Pan-Asianist discourse in the 1930s advocated an alternative 
civilization, or “utopia,” as opposed to Anglo-American 
imperialism at a time when Japan still wanted to avoid the war with the US.7 The Korean wartime narratives on 
America did not endorse this Pan-Asianist turn. On the 
contrary, some authors depicted the United States as an 
“ideal place” and sought a solution for Korea’s problems 
in American experiments. Such Korean narratives made 
a sudden transition in 1941 when Japan, expecting the 
Pacific War, closed down the major Korean newspapers 
and filled the remaining journals with Japan’s wartime 
messages. This shift became acute when the famous 
Korean journalist and Columbia University Ph.D. Chang 
Tŏksu (1895-1947) called America “an animal society” in 
his speeches mobilizing Koreans for the Pacific War. 
This article is a preliminary attempt to identify the 
areas of ideological contention and convergence among 
different élite groups in wartime colonial Korea. The war-
time discourse on America in Korea contains elements 
that revisit the thesis of an ideological schism between cultural nationalists and revolutionaries that Michael 
Robinson analyzed in his work on Korean nationalism in the 1920s.8  Bruce Cumings, the author of The Origins 
of the Korean War, also argues that preexisting schisms 
in colonial Korea were released into a civil war situation 
after 1945 when the formidable colonial administration 
abruptly disappeared from Korea.9  
Such ideological schism in the 1920s changed its char-
acteristics during the wartime period. In their wartime 
discourse on the United States, Korean nationalists and 
socialists indicated not so much contention as agree-
ment, especially in their positive appraisal of America 
under Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945). The sharp-est ideological divide appears between the Japanese 
Pan-Asianist discourse and some Korean narratives on 
6 Charles Taylor, “On social imaginary,” p. 18. 
7 Akira Iriye, Power and Culture, pp. 8-35; Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia, pp. 171-172.
8 Michael Robinson, Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988); and idem, “Ideological Schism in the Korean Nationalist Movement, 1920-1930: Cultural 
Nationalism and the Radical Critique,” Journal of Korean Studies, vol. 4 (1982), pp. 241-268. 
9 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of the Separate Regimes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. xvii-xxix and 3-38. 
Chang Tŏksu and his friends in London, 1930. From left to right: Kim Sŏngsu, the founder of the 
Tonga Ilbo newspaper, Yi Hwal (1907-1986), who joined the Syngman Rhee government after 1945, 
Sin Sŏngmo (1891-1960) and Chang Tŏksu. The photo was taken in 1930 when Kim visited Chang in 
London. The original photo is from Sajin ŭro ponŭn Han’guk paengnyŏn, (Seoul: Tonga ilbosa, 1978), 
Vol. 2, p. 351. 
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America printed before Pearl Harbor. The sources used 
in this article are the essays in Korean-language jour-nals published between 1931 and 1945. I selected the 
four major journals Chogwang (The Morning Light), 
Chungang (The Central Post), Pip’an (Criticism), and 
Samch’ŏlli (The Korean Peninsula), since they voiced the relatively distinctive positions of the cultural national-ists (Chogwang), socialists (Chungang and Pip’an), and Pan-Asianists (Samch’ŏlli). The journals were not strictly 
divided along distinctive political lines, but their general 
editorial directions are distinguishable from one another. 
Some essays from other journals, including Sijo (Trends) and Sahae Kongnon (Cosmopolitans), are occasionally used as points of reference.
2. cultural natIonalIsts:  
amerIcan cIvIlIzatIon as the Future  
oF the human race 
Not America but Europe was central in the Japanese intel-
lectual discourse before World War II, according to Peter 
Duus and Kenji Hasegawa, the editors of Rediscovering 
America: Japanese Perspectives on the American Century. 
Fascinated with European debates on Marxism in the 
1920s and National Socialism in the 1930s, the Japanese 
magazines remained indifferent to America’s New Deal in 
coping with the crisis of capitalism.10 The Japanese essays collected in Rediscovering America include some positive 
observations on America’s modern lifestyle and its global 
influence but never name the country “an ideal land.” In 
contrast, the Korean essays on America in the 1930s and 
early 1940s increasingly acclaim American development. 
Both Korean nationalists and socialists paid close atten-
tion to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s reforms and to the Ameri-can acts to grant independence to the Philippines. A Christian journal Sijo (Trends) found in America a 
“model society” that agreed with the journal’s conserva-
tive ethics. The journal was created by the American mis-
sionaries of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church in 1910, and was widely read by non-Christians due to its cover-age of nonreligious subjects.11 Sijo’s July 1937 edition 
reprints an article from a magazine called Segye chisik 
(World Knowledge). Titled “On Utopia in this World: 
Keene Village, Texas, United States,” the article insists 
that this village has brought into reality all the elements 
that Thomas More imagined in his book Utopia. All the 
residents in Keene, the article says, have occupations and 
carry “peaceful, idealistic, angelic” lives, with no prison, 
police, mayor, or court, and virtually no crime in the past 
42 years, except for a young boy’s theft of snacks from a 
store. The Keene villagers neither join labor movements 
nor receive relief from others. 
Sijo ascribes this utopia to the ethics of the village resi-
dents, who curtail their secular desires and suspend the 
consumption of alcohol, cigarettes, meat, lipstick and 
manicures for women, and so forth. If the villagers violate 
this suspension, they are called to the church council to 
receive some reproach. But this regulation is not force-
ful, the article claims, because villagers are free to leave if they dislike such rules. The article celebrates the fact 
that the village has no houses for gambling, movies, danc-
ing, and no film posters encouraging an “objectionable” 
desire for romance between men and women, or drinking alcohol.12 
While this Sijo article presents the Christian sect’s 
conservative vision and its criticism of the modern life-
style, the timing of the article, 1937, and the location of 
the ideal village, America, represented increasing Korean 
interests in the United States and its material and cultural 
capacities. Many Korean intellectuals, especially cultural 
nationalists, considered America a sensible and non-
Soviet example to emulate in modernizing Korea, and 
recognized a glimpse of “utopia” in America’s develop-
ment. Before Pearl Harbor, the journal Chogwang exhib-ited such an orientation.13 Chogwang covered America’s 
technological and economic advancements, the Ameri-
can decisions on the independence of the Philippines, the 
labor movements under the Roosevelt administration, 
American women, America’s foreign relations and its 
conflicts with Japan, and more. Many authors of Chog-
wang articles on America were meticulous in delivering objective details on the subjects concerned but cautious 
in giving their explicit opinions. Nevertheless, those arti-
cles associate America with images of enormous wealth, 
progress, and power. One of the journal’s most opinion-ated authors depicted the country as representing a 
“future civilization for the human race.” After Pearl Har-
10 Peter Duus and Kenji Hasegawa, eds., Rediscovering America: Japanese Perspectives on the American Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), pp. 4-5.
11 “Sijo,” Han’guk Minjok Munhwa Taebaekkwa Sajŏn, www.encykorea.com. 
12  ijo, July 1937.
13 The Chosŏn Ilbo Company published Chogwang as a monthly magazine between November 1935 and December 1944, and continued the journal even after the colonial government banned the daily newspaper 
Chosŏn Ilbo in December 1940. 
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bor in December 1941, Chogwang’s articles changed tone, 
calling the United States “the enemy,” “the imperialists,” 
and “the racists.” This betrayed the journal’s main conten-
tions between 1935 and 1940, which esteemed America’s 
system and practices as a “standard” or a “destination” 
in reforming the present circumstances of colonial Korea.
Several writers who had studied in the United States set the tone of Chogwang’s coverage of America in the late 
1930s. Han Poyong (1901-?) was a key American expert. 
He was originally from Chŏngp’yŏng, South Hamgyŏng 
Province. After majoring politics in Japan’s Meiji Uni-
versity and graduating from New York University, Han worked as the chief editor of Chosŏn Ilbo’s politics section 
for seven years. After the liberation in 1945, he became 
the mayor of Taegu City in 1946, under the American Mili-
tary Government.14 Another contributor, Chŏng Ilhyŏng 
(1904-1982), published an essay on “American civili-
zation” based on his firsthand experience in the United 
States. Originally from P’yŏngan Province, Chŏng had 
graduated from Yonsei College (current Yonsei Univer-
sity), studied theology and sociology in the United States 
for seven years, and earned a Ph.D. in 1935 at Drew Uni-
versity in New Jersey.15 After returning from America, he 
taught at Seoul Methodist Church Seminary (Kyŏngsŏng 
Kamni Kyohoe Sinhakbu). He joined the American Mili-
tary Government in 1945 as a high-level administrator 
and then became a leading politician in South Korea.16 
A third author, Han Ch’ijin, contributed two articles on 
the foundation of “American civilization,” rendering the 
country’s pragmatic and humanitarian characteristics. 
His family lived in Yonggang, South P’yŏngan Province. 
Han studied in the middle school affiliated with Jinling 
(Kŭmgnŭng) University, established by American mis-
sionaries in Nanjing, China, and received a Ph.D. from the University of Southern California. After his return to 
Korea, Han taught at Ehwa Women’s College but resigned in 1936 due to Japanese objections to his professor-
ship. The Japanese colonial government had recorded 
Han’s profile on a list of “suspicious Koreans” (yongŭi 
chosŏnin) and jailed him in 1944 due to the tenor of a 
speech he gave at a school on Japan’s (probable) defeat in 
the Pacific War.17 In the later issues of Chogwang, between 1937 and 
1942, Ham Sanghun, the editor-in-chief of Chosŏn Ilbo, 
covered the wars in Europe and the Pacific and articu-
lated the significance of American moves for the Japa-
nese empire. Born in Songhwa, Hwanghae Province, Ham 
had graduated from the College of Politics and Economy 
at Waseda University and been the politics section chief 
at Tonga Ilbo before becoming editor-in-chief at Chosŏn 
Ilbo. During the final years of the war, Ham joined vari-
ous pro-Japanese collaborative organizations as a major 
journalist. After liberation, he chaired the Public Rela-
tions Bureau (Kongbobu) of the Korean Democratic 
Party (Han’guk Minjudang). 18 It merits notice that these 
main authors on America were all from Korea’s northern 
region, that Chŏng Ilhyŏng and Han Ch’ijin were Chris-
tians, and that they all cooperated with the American 
Military Government after 1945.
When Chogwang published its first issue in November 
1935, the independence of the Philippines prompted 
strong interest among Korean journalists. The US nego-
tiation with the Filipinos added to America an image of a 
“benign” power, which preempted the Japanese wartime 
messages reiterating the colonial Philippines as evidence 
of American imperialism. When the US passed the Tydings-
McDuffie Act (Philippine Independence Act; Public Law 
73-127) on March 24, 1934, both Korean nationalists and socialists treated this subject attentively. The leftist Pae 
Sŏngnyong published an article in Sahae Kongnon when the Philippines passed its new constitution by popular 
vote following the US Act. Pae spells out the conflicts of interest that the plan for independence could entail for 
Filipinos and Americans alike. He suspects that the US 
wanted to liberate the Philippines for economic reasons 
but could not yet do so from a military viewpoint, given 
the numerous US military bases there. Pae hopes that the 
newly elected President Manuel Quezón will manage the situation well during the ten years assigned before inde-
pendence, and revise the country’s economic terms with 
the United States more to the Filipinos’ advantage. Nev-
ertheless, he sincerely celebrates the agreement, calling 
14 “Han Poyong,” Han’guk Kŭnhyŏndae Inmul Charyo, in Han’guksa Database, db.history.go.kr.   
15 “Chŏng Ilhyŏng,” in Han’guk Minjok Munhwa Taebaekkwa Sajŏn, www.encykorea.com.
16 “Chŏng Ilhyŏng,” Han’guk Kŭnhyŏndae Inmul Charyo. in Han’guksa Database, db.history.go.kr.  
17 “Han Ch’ijin,” Han’guk Kŭnhyŏndae Inmul Charyo, in Han’guksa Database, db.history.go.kr; “Han Ch’ijin p’an’gyŏl sohwa 20nyŏn hyŏnggong che 353 ho,” in Chaep’an Kirok, Kukka Pohunch’o Konghun Chŏnja Saryo-
gwan, http://egonghun.mpva.go.kr/portal/url.jsp?ID=PV_DJ_A012_007.079.000.000; Hong Chŏngwan, “Ilcheha haebanghu Han Ch’ijinŭi hangmun ch’egye chŏngnipgwa minjujuŭiron,” Yŏksa Munje Yŏn’gu, 
October 2010, pp. 159-160. 
18 “Ham Sanghun,” Han’guk Kŭnhyŏndae Inmul Charyo, in Han’guksa Database, db.history.go.kr.; Ch’inil Panminjok Haengwi Chinsang Kyumyŏng Wiwŏnhoe, ed., Ch’inil Panminjok Haengwi Kwan’gye Saryojip, vol. X 
(Seoul: Ch’inil Panminjok Haengwi Chinsang Kyumyŏng Wiwŏnhoe, 2009).
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it “a historic event at the corner of the West Pacific” and hoping that all Filipinos will unite and cooperate for their independence.19 Han Poyong also covered this subject in Chogwang in 
December 1935. His article provides a fuller history of 
the Philippines: the years under Spanish colonial rule; 
the country’s independence movements led by the patri-
ots Jose Rizal and Emilio Aginaldo in the mid-1890s; the 
US occupation of the island during the Spanish-Ameri-
can War; the failure of the Filipino guerrilla movements 
against the US occupation; and the subsequent “Yankee 
imperialism” on the island for thirty years. Despite this 
US aggression, Han argues that US rule was more “gen-
erous” than that of the Spaniards, “achieving much more 
for the islands in thirty years than Spain accomplished in 
its three-hundred-year rule.” Han continues that, right 
after the occupation, US President William McKinley, Jr. 
(1843-1901) had promised the future independence of the Philippines. Filipinos could discuss their independ-
ence in public because the US had already implemented the self-rule (chach’i) of the islands and established the 
Philippine Congress in 1907.  Han then notes that the US politicians had discussed 
Philippine independence, including President Woodrow 
Wilson’s 1912 inaugural speech and the US Congress approval of the Jones Act in 1916 on Philippine inde-pendence. This discussion was suspended under the 
Republican government between 1921 and 1929 but 
resumed during the Great Depression, when Americans 
resented the entrance of agricultural products from the 
Philippines, as well as immigration of Filipinos to the 
United States. President Franklin Roosevelt completed 
the American procedure with his signature on the Phil-ippine Independence Act in March 1935. The Filipinos 
approved the act by plebiscite in May, elected the nation-
alist leader Quezón president in September, and declared 
the foundation of the Republic in November 1935. 20 Han 
introduces the specific contents of the Tydings-McDuffie 
Act and other bills, and the way Americans transferred sovereignty to the Philippines.21 These details informed 
Korean readers of the procedure through which the two 
countries reached agreement, and of the exact terms of 
the conditions that both sides considered significant. 
While Philippine independence distinguished the 
United States from other powers, Chogwang carefully fol-
lowed America’s position on the Sino-Japanese conflict. 
In 1936, a year before Japan’s full-scale war against China, 
Chogwang published several articles on this subject. The 
journalist Sŏ Ch’un, for example, called attention to Presi-
dent Roosevelt’s address on November 11, 1935, quoting 
Roosevelt’s statement, “We are acting to simplify the defi-
nitions and facts by calling war ‘war’ when armed inva-
sion and a resulting killing of human beings take place.”22 
Sŏ comments that this speech offered a new reference 
point in applying the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), which 
objected to the use of a war as a means of solving interna-
tional conflicts. Sŏ interprets the Roosevelt speech as the 
American objection to military acts by anti-status-quo 
countries, projecting the possibility of a second world 
war between the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
the Soviet Union on one side, and Germany and Japan on the other side.23
In the same January 1936 issue of Chogwang, Han 
Poyong discusses “The Crisis of 1936,” which at the time 
had strong currency in Japan. Criticizing the Japanese 
rationale, Han identifies the crisis not as one that was internationally provoked but as a crisis created by Japan. 
According to Han, Japanese journalists assumed poten-tial international retaliation in 1936 in response both to 
Japan’s occupation of Manchuria and to its withdrawal 
from the League of Nations. This might cause Japan to lose 
its Mandate on the South Pacific islands24 and the transfer 
of the Mandate to the United States, the Japanese journal-
ists estimated, and would be a great threat to Japan. They 
also suspected that the British and Americans behind 
the scene were assisting China’s anti-Japanese strug-gles.25 Han criticizes such arguments for the following 
reasons: Japan’s withdrawal from the Naval Conference in 1935 had occurred without serious international con-
flict; Japan’s South Pacific Mandate was not revoked; and 
China’s anti-Japanese struggles were meager. Han esti-
mates that the emergence of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy has further reduced the possibility of international 
retaliation against Japan. The Western powers are less 
19 Pae Sŏngnyong, “T’aep’yŏngyang sange saero tongniphan piyulbin konghwagugŭi changnae: migugŭi kŭktong chŏngch’aege yŏn’gwan haya,” Sahae Kongnon, December 1935. 
20 Han Poyong, “Sin tongnip piyulbin taegwan,” Chogwang, December 1935, pp. 139-146.
21 Han Poyong, “Sin tongnip piyulbin taegwan,” pp. 142-144. 
22 The original excerpt is quoted from Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 289. 
23 Sŏ Ch’un, “Che ich’a segye taejŏnnon,” Chogwang, January 1936, pp. 94-98. 
24 These islands now make up Palau, the Northern Mariana Islands, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands.
25 Han Poyong, “Sinch’un kukche chŏnggugŭi tonghyang: sisa munje,” Chogwang, January, 1936, pp. 306-319.
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interested in solving the problems of the Far East than in 
dealing with Hitler’s violation of the Treaty of Versailles 
and Italy’s military action. 
However, Han writes, the international focus had again 
moved to Northern China in October 1935 because a “so-and-so” country (moguk) had established a “self-rule” 
government in Northern China.26  Due to censorship, Han 
does not name this country, though from the context he is apparently referring to Japan.27 Han thus identifies 
Japan’s actions in Northern China since October 1935 as 
the true cause of the “Crisis of 1936.” While Han recog-
nizes that Japan’s actions have aroused concern in the 
UK, US, and USSR, he doubts that these countries will take 
immediate military action against Japan’s move in North-
ern China. Han concludes that a major international mili-
tary conflict will not occur in 1936, and that the North-
ern China incident will, for the time being, result in what Japan intended. He nevertheless expects that a “self-rule 
government” in Manchuria controlled by Japan would 
cause, rather than solve, a lot of problems in China.28 
After the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 
July 1937, Han published the article updating the potential 
choices of the British and the Americans in the Far East. 
Han still does not think they will intervene immediately 
but pinpoints the signs of America’s more active engage-
ment with China.29 The British feared that their repres-
sion of Japan in North China would force Japan’s expan-
sion in the South Pacific. Thus, Han argues, the British will stand still as long as they are concerned about both the 
South Pacific and China, and restrained by more urgent 
problems in Europe. The US interests in China were not 
bigger than those of the British. But the US had become 
China’s number-one trading partner, and its Open Door 
Policy had helped China preserve its territory. American 
missionaries also wanted to expand their Christian mis-
sion in China. Under such conditions, Han argues, both 
the US government and American citizens were willing 
to help China, as long as such commitment did not come at a great cost to the US. Upon the outbreak of the Second 
Sino-Japanese War, Han notes, the US should have put into 
effect the Neutrality Act (chungnippŏp) between China 
and Japan, but did not do so on the pretext that the law 
could harm the weaker party in favor of the country with 
a strong navy. Han estimates that the US claimed neutral-
ity in word but denied it in action. If a country (America) 
has such a mindset, Han insists, it is just waiting for an opportunity (to act against Japan).30 After this article, for 
whatever reasons, Han’s columns did not appear in Chog-
wang until the end of the World War II. 
While speculating on potential US-Japan military con-
flicts, Chogwang also published a series of essays on the 
nature of “American civilization.” Chŏng Ilhyŏng’s essay 
after his recent return from America voiced his amaze-
ment and dismay about the “grandiosity,” “modernity,” 
“brilliance,” and “decadence” of that civilization. Chŏng 
diagnoses that the “tide of material civilization” is moving 
from London and Paris to New York. At the sunset of those 
European cities, New York has emerged as the capital of 
the “Yankee Empire” and the “Holy Grail (kŭmjat’ap) of 
twentieth-century material civilization.” It is impossible, 
Chŏng asserts, to describe in words the magnitude, lux-
ury, and flamboyance of New York, the “Golden Castle of 
the Twentieth Century” equipped with so many cultural 
facilities, concrete buildings, iron walls, and web-like transportation networks.31 
Chŏng counts “modernism, democracy, and pragmatic 
philosophy” as the essential characteristics of American 
civilization, repeating “modernity” as the thrust of this 
American lifestyle. Just as the Empire State Building sym-
bolizes the essence of modern scientific knowledge, so 
America is a “barometer” of modernism and the “center” 
of modernity, leading the world by the invention of new 
ideas and values. Chŏng acknowledges that this moder-
nity has also brought anxiety and tragedy to the Ameri-
can lifestyle. People in New York, for instance, carry on 
lives that are acutely diversified and intense enough to 
“numb” human nerves.32 Chŏng attributes this life-style 
to America’s “economy of prosperity” founded upon mass 
production, standardization, and mechanization. This 
economy produces wealth but generates social problems 
as it forces people into an artificially restrained lifestyle, 
beset as they are by machines. 
Chŏng appreciates American democracy, as articulated 
in the Declaration of Independence and Lincoln’s 1863 
26 This “self-rule” government seemingly refers to the East Hebei Autonomous Council and the Hebei-Chahar Political Council established by the Japanese at the end of 1935. 
27 Han Poyong, “Sinch’un kukche chŏnggugŭi tonghyang,” p. 319. 
28 Han Poyong, “Sinch’un kukche chŏnggugŭi tonghyang,” pp. 317-319. 
29 Han Poyong, “Ilchi punjaenggwa yŏngmiŭi tonghyang,” Chogwang, October, 1937, pp. 52-59. 
30 Han Poyong, “Ilchi punjaenggwa yŏngmiŭi tonghyang,” pp. 57-59.
31 Chông Ilhyông, “Amerik’a munmyŏngŭi chonghoenggwan,” Chogwang, October 1936, pp. 136-149. 
32 Chŏng Ilhyŏng, “Amerik’a munmyŏngŭi chonghoenggwan,” pp. 139-140.
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Emancipation Proclamation, as a “most remarkable ideo-
logical achievement in modern liberal thought.” He calls 
this idea of democracy the “highest form of American 
nationalist thought” and “the essence of Americanism,” 
guiding the country’s education, the arts, intellectual 
thought, and religion. Chŏng also views this democracy 
as a source of American expansionism undergirding the 
Monroe Doctrine and its transition to pan-Americanism. 
At the stage of pan-Americanism, Chŏng argues, Ameri-
can democracy has lost its authentic characteristics as a 
manifestation of the Puritans’ liberalism, and has been 
transformed into a “liberal expansionism” in pursuit of 
external freedom. Concurrently, this liberal expansion-
ism has directed the US to propose the League of Nations 
and the Permanent Court of International Justice, not to speak of relieving the Philippines of its colonial rule.33 
Chŏng praises some specific features of everyday life 
in America: its wealth, the hygienic lifestyle and con-
venient housing, the transportation networks with their 
speed and size, and the excellent educational system. He 
particularly admires American public education, its “per-
fect” institutions and tremendous scale, and the quality 
of higher education that he observed at Columbia Uni-
versity and other colleges in New York. Chŏng finds an 
“unbridgeable gap” between this US education system 
and the Korean situation, describing American college 
campuses as “euphoric spaces where young men and 
women enjoy their beautiful youth, obtain learning and 
discipline for their future, and experience a cradle for 
romance and love marriage.”34
Chŏng foresees that there will be a “revival of the 
Roman Empire” in the future of American civilization as 
its materialism creates a luxurious life side by side with 
sexual disorders and moral decadence. Nevertheless, he 
anticipates the arrival of an “American era,” placing great 
hope in Roosevelt’s reforms. The “frantic individualism 
and worship of gold” in American civilization, he writes, 
will be corrected with the “birth of a new social system,” initiated by the leadership of President Roosevelt and his 
“fight against big business.” Whether Roosevelt succeeds 
or fails, Chŏng argues his efforts will lead Americans to 
acknowledge the urgency of reforming the country’s eco-
nomic system and encourage cooperation among them. 
Once this American reform succeeds, Chŏng insists, the 
world will see a “morning” when this “Holy Grail of the 
beaming material civilization will renew its face and 
dominate the coasts of the Pacific.”35 
This affection toward the Rooseveltian reforms is also found in other Chogwang essays. The aforementioned 
Han Poyong in his June 1937 article cites the 1936 Peace 
Conference in Buenos Aires initiated by Roosevelt, and 
calls this pan-American assembly of the North and South 
American republics a “ridicule” of the militaristic regimes 
in Europe, which constantly invade each other.36 Han eval-
uates America’s labor movements in the Roosevelt era as 
a non-Communist road to solve working-class problems, 
and contrasts the Rooseveltian “promise” with the “dark 
prospect” of Fascist Europe. Han argues that labor move-
ments are constrained where the “spiritual movements 
couched in statism and nationalism” prevail and antago-
nize foreigners.37 Because of such Fascist oppression, 
Han continues, the working class in Europe, suffering 
from high inflation and no wage increase, never dared to 
conduct labor movements for fear of being labeled “anti-statist” or “anti-nationalistic.” Han sees a very different 
development in Rooseveltian America. The president is 
still making efforts to find a compromise, since the Ameri-
can business class opposed his policies and the Supreme 
Court judged some laws unconstitutional. Despite such 
obstacles, Han reports, the leftist CIO (Committee for 
Industrial Organization) and its leader John Lewis have 
achieved concessions from business on the rights of the 
working class to collective action, a minimum wage rate, 
and minimum working-hours. The Supreme Court has also ruled that these labor laws are constitutional.38  
Han seems to suggest America’s labor movement as an 
alternative to Communist movements. Given America’s 
freedom of the press, he argues, the American Commu-
nists can circulate their official newspaper (The Daily 
Worker) and other publications for the working class. 
However, their radical position is unpopular in the US 
because the life of American laborers is not as miserable 
as that of the European working class. Although the Third 
Communist International has opened a branch in the US, 
33 Chŏng Ilhyŏng, “Amerik’a munmyŏngŭi chonghoenggwan,” pp. 140-141. 
34 Chŏng Ilhyŏng, “Amerik’a munmyŏngŭi chonghoenggwan,” p. 143.
35 Chŏng Ilhyŏng, “Amerik’a munmyŏngŭi chonghoenggwan,” pp. 148-149.
36 Han Poyong, “Sŭngsehan migugŭi nodong undong: CIO ŭi yakchin’gwa AFL ŭi mollak,” Chogwang, June 1937, p. 163. 
37 Han Poyong, ,“Sŭngsehan migugŭi nodong undong,” pp. 163-175. 
38 Han Poyong, “Sŭngsehan migugŭi nodong undong,” pp. 164-165. 
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Han continues, American citizens tended to regard them 
as “alien” or “anti-American.” Han introduces in detail the 
reform proposals of the American Union of Automobile 
Workers (UAW), including a six-hour work day and a min-
imum wage system and the articles of the Wagner Act (the 
National Labor Relations Act of 1935), called the “Magna Carta” of the working class.39
A systematic presentation of America as a “model” 
country is articulated in Han Ch’ijin’s two articles pub-lished in 1940 in Chogwang. In his May 1940 essay on 
American sociology,40 Han defines the discipline as the 
knowledge for constructing the “happiest human society 
on earth.” Distinguishing this knowledge from socialism, 
Han calls American sociology as a philosophy for praxis, 
combining “the utopian ideals of the human race” with 
the Comptian methodology of positivism. According to 
Han, American sociology made a transition from Spen-
cer’s social Darwinism to the theory of Lester Frank Ward 
(1841-1913), who revised sociology from a “psychologi-
cal” perspective. Han summarizes Ward’s theory as argu-
ing that culture is produced by willful activities of human 
beings and that it is constructed not just from individual 
efforts but also from social control and cooperation.41 Han relates this “psychological” theory of culture to 
American idealism and values. According to Han, Ameri-cans are idealists (yusimnonja) rather than materialists 
who consider the mental power of human beings critical 
in their domination of nature and their organization of 
society. He maintains that this “idealism or subjectivism” 
makes “independence” a unique American spirit and the 
foundation for American social life; that the spirit of inde-
pendence in turn promotes democracy and individual-
ism; and that this idealism also encourages positive activ-
ism and makes the US the space where ideas can be most 
easily transformed into actions and politics.42 
Repeatedly, Han identifies American social philosophy 
with humanism, which he defines as the ideas that “human 
beings are the masters of all creatures and the standards 
of all values” and that “humans are autonomous and inde-
pendent, in that they voluntarily reform and control their 
environment.” This humanism leads Americans to think that people can do whatever they want and should never 
surrender to obstacles rising from the environment. Han 
calls Americans the most idealistic of people, who believe 
in achieving tasks that have been considered impossible 
in the past. He relates this “humanism” to Americans’ 
religious belief that men do not belong to any man-made 
state and should revere not the state but God, the sover-eign of the world.43 
Han Ch’ijin published a second article in July 1940, 
making a sweeping argument on “American civiliza-tion.”44 In it he maintains that American humanitarian-
ism is a “savior” of civilization in the then-current inter-
national crisis and that “no country but America” can stop the surreal reality that the people of the world are 
all facing. Readers should understand, Han asserts, that 
there is more than materialism to America’s leadership 
and power, and that pragmatism constitutes the “deeper 
base” of its materialism. Han ascribes the characteristics 
of American civilization to the culture of immigrants. The 
first Americans, as exiles from foreign countries, did not 
fear borrowing foreign ideas and systems, tested the mer-
its of those systems, and evaluated their truth or falsity. 
Han argues that this tradition has made America a “labo-
ratory of the world” and that it has imbued American his-
tory, culture, religion, and ideologies with the conviction 
that “if you have will to do so, you can achieve anything.”45 
Han thus designates pragmatism as the American phi-
losophy, as synthesized by the thinker William James 
(1842-1910). According to Han, this pragmatism prefers 
experiences to abstract theories, domination to being 
dominated, an open and public world to an exclusive and 
closed society, and practicing imperfect knowledge to holding out for its faultlessness. This philosophy values 
outcomes, nurtures “epicurean” attitudes on life, and has 
humanism as its key feature and democracy as its political expression.46 Han defends the contradictions that Korean 
intellectuals found in America between its humanism and 
its racial discrimination, between the country’s wealth 
and the great poverty of the weak, between its isolation-
39 Han Poyong, “Sŭngsehan migugŭi nodong undong,” p. 173. Other short articles in Chogwang published in 1937 and 1940 also reveal this Korean “amazement” at America’s progress. An essay entitled “The Memory 
of Washington Days” indicates that this admiration for America life existed among Korean students. The author of this essay writes that Americans live in a peaceful, secure, and orderly society, create the conveni-
ences of life from scientific knowledge, and enjoy their freedom in the land of liberty. Simdang Hagin, “Wŏsingt’ongŭi ch’uŏk,” Chogwang, November 1938, pp. 60-65. 
40 Han Ch’ijin, “Miguk sahoejŏk sasangŭi hyŏndan’gye,” Chogwang, May 1940, pp. 122-129. 
41 Han Ch’ijin, “Miguk sahoejŏk sasangŭi hyŏndan’gye,” pp. 123-126. 
42 Han Ch’ijin, “Miguk sahoejŏk sasangŭi hyŏndan’gye,” p. 126.
43 Han Ch’ijin, “Miguk sahoejŏk sasangŭi hyŏndan’gye,” p. 128. 
44 Han Ch’ijin, “Amerik’a munmyŏngnon,” Chogwang, July 1940, pp. 146-155. 
45 Han Ch’ijin, “Amerik’a munmyŏngnon,” pp.147-148. 
46 Han Ch’ijin, “Amerik’a munmyŏngnon,” pp.148-150. 
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ism and interventionism in foreign relations, and between 
utilitarianism and vulgarity in American popular culture. 
Han attributes these contradictions to pragmatism itself, 
the overarching American ideology, which accepts the 
conflicts in things and in the world. From this viewpoint, 
such contradictions in American culture are a correctible 
problem and even a source of progress.47
Perceiving America’s contradictions as a source of 
progress, Han is optimistic about America’s future. Since 
Americans have been experimenting with all sorts of 
human ideas and practice, their current culture is a “prod-
uct of what men achieved with their free will in a free land.” 
Thus he is very generous about America’s problems, writ-
ing, “If American culture has a defect, it is because human 
nature has a defect. If there is strength in the country’s 
culture, it proves that human nature has such a charac-
ter.” Han is eager to see how this America will exert its leadership in the future world. Regarding Pan-Asianist 
claims about the relief of Eastern civilization, Han adds 
that American ideals are not simply Christian but con-
sistent with the Confucian theorem in The Analects, “Do not do to others what you do not desire [for yourself].” 
Han concludes that Americans have not yet achieved this 
ideal, and that their global destiny will change depending 
on whether or not they in fact accomplish this vision.48 
It is surprising that some Chogwang authors defended 
America in such bold and optimistic terms while Japan 
intensified its Pan-Asianist propaganda and rapidly 
mobilized Korea for the war in China and, potentially, in 
the Pacific. Approaching the Pacific War, Chogwang began 
printing anti-American essays.49 It is striking how these 
new essays contravene the journal’s earlier recognition 
of America, and indeed admiration of its civilization. The 
new anti-American authors criticize the history of Ameri-
can imperialism in East Asia by recalling the memory 
of the Korean-American War in 1871. They emphasize 
America’s “hypocrisy” on the grounds that America’s 
imperialism in Asia and Latin America violated the coun-
try’s idealistic rhetoric. These anti-American authors also 
appropriate leftist critiques of capitalism in projecting an 
“evil” image of America as the most threatening enemy of 
“East Asian Co-Prosperity.” 
Ham Sanghun, who had generally reported on inter-
national relations in an empirical attitude, was among 
those who transmitted Japan’s justification for the war to his readers. In Chogwang’s December 1941 issue, pub-
lished right before Pearl Harbor, Ham wrote that war 
with the United States was imminent, given the tense 
situation in the Pacific and America’s unyielding position 
toward Japan. After the Second World War broke out in 
Europe, Ham argued that Japan, as a “hegemon of East 
Asia,” “naturally” demanded the areas under the domina-
tion of France, Holland, and the UK, and tried to estab-
lish the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Referring to the 
US-British “ambition for world domination,” Ham writes 
that Americans wanted to connect the British, Dutch, 
China, and the Soviets in a ring, and confine the Japanese 
empire. Ham maintains that only “power” can solve this 
US-Japan conflict, and that Japan should avoid being (use-
lessly) induced to follow the appeasement measures of the United States.50 Although this article delivers Japan’s 
rationale for war with the United States, it is fair to men-
tion that Ham’s wording remains less enthusiastic than that found in other Pan-Asianist articles.
Anti-American essays in Chogwang after 1941 were 
stereotyped replications of Japan’s wartime messages. 
Makino Kōichi (Yi Hongjo), a Tokyo University graduate 
and official of the Yi Royal House Library, published an 
article after Pearl Harbor on America’s imperialist history in Asia. Makino argues that the US dropped its Monroe 
Doctrine after completing the development of the West 
Coast and became a modern imperialist country. The US 
colonized the Philippines and wants to transform China 
into a semi-colony. America has aimed its Open Door 
Policy at preventing other powers (Japan) from obtaining 
exclusive privileges in China, so as to better wield Amer-
ica’s own power there. Because the US fostered its “sinis-
ter ambition” in the East and the Pacific, Makino asserts, 
the Japanese empire smashed Pearl Harbor on December 
8, 1941 (December 7 in the United States). Makino agi-
tates that it is time to “eliminate the invasive footprints of 
Western imperialists in East Asia,” and that Japan will in 
the near future expel whites from the region and estab-
lish the “Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.”51
47 Han Ch’ijin, “Amerik’a munmyŏngnon,” pp. 150-151. 
48 Han Ch’ijin, “Amerik’a munmyŏngnon,” p. 159. 
49 On the 1871 Korean-American War, see Ch’a Sangch’an, “Sinmi tae yangyoran: yuwŏl sahwa,” Chogwang, June 1940, pp. 66-71; Ch’a Sangch’an, “Sasangŭro pon chosŏn’gwa migugŭi kwan’gye,” Chogwang, May 
1941, pp. 98-107. A more critical history of America also appeared; see Yi Myomuk, “Migugŭi ŏjewa onŭl,” Chogwang, June 1941, pp. 64-71.  
50 Ham Sanghun, “T’aep’yŏngnyang t’ŭkchip: migugŭi t’aep’yôngnyang chŏngch’aek,” Chogwang, December 1941. 
51 Makino Kōichi, “Ilmi oegyo p’alsimnyŏnsa,” Chogwang, January 1942, pp. 58-67. Makino Kōichi followed Japan’s name change policy. His original Korean name was Yi Hongjo. 
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Chogwang also printed the public speeches organ-
ized by the war support organizations. The language of 
these speeches is repetitive, reciting the “evil ambitions 
of American imperialism and its hypocrisy.”52 For exam-
ple, Chu Yohan says that America’s “Open Door, Equal 
Opportunity, and Preservation of China’s Territory” slogans are all good lies for its plan to invade Asia. Chu 
declaims that Japan’s war is a “just war” to save Asians 
from this Western exploitation, and that Japan alone is 
fighting the war that all Asians should fight altogether.53 
The journalist Yu Kwangyŏl also attacked America’s Open 
Door Policy a selfish excuse for “sucking China’s blood 
and flesh, while other Western powers wanted to butcher 
China into pieces.” Quoting America’s “New Immigra-
tion Act” against Asian immigrants, Yu argued that the 
US wanted to keep the Monroe Doctrine within America 
but demanded the Open Door Policy in China. He called 
this American contradiction a “nolbu simppo,” referring to the heart of the greedy older brother in the traditional 
Korean tale who says, “What is mine is mine, and what is 
yours is mine, too.”54
Chogwang’s articles after Pearl Harbor thus blatantly 
demonized Americans, naming them “modern barbar-
ians” and “schizophrenic Yankees.”55 One author of such 
articles, Han Hŭkku, used a leftist logic in demeaning 
America’s “greed.” He argued that only a small number 
of “Yankee” millionaires possessed America’s wealth, 
and exploited the proletarian class; more than 85 per-
cent of Americans were living in serious poverty without 
any security measures. As evidence of this inequality in 
America, he quoted excerpts from the literature of Ameri-
can leftists, such as Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle and Carl 
Sandburg’s Chicago Poems. Han argued that America’s 
democracy and freedom were established on a “system coercing the subordination of powerless people” and on 
America’s free media and journalism functioning as an 
“instrument of the powerful.” Han had once lived in the 
United States,56 and his article contains a strong racist 
tenor, describing the “disgraceful” physical appearance 
of Americans, such as their “lax” noses, “flippant” lips, 
and “licentious” eyes.57 This hatred sharply countered the pre-1941 Chogwang discourse on America as an ideal 
country signaling the “future of the human race.”
3. socIalIsts: ambIvalence toward 
rooseveltIan amerIca 
Two tendencies are found in the Korean socialist writ-
ings on America published during the wartime period. 
On the one hand, the leftists apply a Marxian analysis of 
imperialism and predict the inevitable fall of the Ameri-
can capitalism. On the other hand, like some authors in 
Chogwang, the leftists sympathetically observe the New 
Deal of the Roosevelt administration and its impact on the 
working class. While some authors in the early 1930s, in 
parallel with the Great Depression, carried out a typical 
socialist criticism of American society, the articles pub-
lished in the mid- and late 1930s were more ambivalent. The journal Chungang (The Central Post) existed 
between 1933 and 1936. The leftist leader Yŏ Unhyŏng 
(1886-1947) launched this journal as the chairman of 
the Chosŏn Chungang Ilbo Company. Reflecting Yŏ’s own 
nationalism and his broad social relations, Chungang did not strongly advocate a leftist critique but manifested a 
moderate position in its coverage of America. During the 
journal’s short life, Chungang frequently reported the 
progress of the Rooseveltian reform and its prospects. 
For example, Hong Sŏngha’s58 article on the National 
Recovery Administration (NRA) begins with a Marxist 
take on the destiny of American capitalism, yet also intro-
duces the basic details of the NRA and their implications 
for the working class. Hong reports that the government 
reduced the average work week from 50 to 60 hours to 40 
hours, increased the minimum wage, and legalized work-
ers’ collective action. He also explains that the Roosevelt 
government set out to organize advisory committees of 
industries, consumers, and laborers in order to represent 
their interests and opinions in the NRA. In his conclusion, 
Hong expresses skepticism as to whether these commit-
tees can collectively manage the concerned agendas and 
effectively moderate the different interest groups despite 
52 Chu Yohan et al., “Tae miyŏngjŏn’gwa uriŭi kago,” Chogwang, January 1942, pp. 72-74. The names of the speakers are written in a Japanese style following the name change policy. 
53 Chu Yohan et al., “Tae miyŏngjŏn’gwa uriŭi kago,” p. 72. 
54 Yu Kwangnyôl, “Wae miyŏngŭl ch’ina,” Chogwang, January 1943, pp. 37-42. 
55 Han Hûkku, “Munhak sangŭro pon miguginŭi sŏnggyŏk,” Chogwang, April 1942, pp. 142-147.
56 Han Hŭkku wrote his memory of his years in America in “Chaemi yungnyŏn ch’uŏk p’yŏnp’yŏn,” published in Sinin Munhak in March 1936. Han’s recollection of his years in the United States is not negative in this 
essay. 
57 Han Hŭkku, “Munhak sangŭro pon migugiŭi sŏnggyŏk,” p.142. 
58 Hong Sŏngha graduated from Chuo University in Japan and taught at Posŏng College (current Korea University) for 18 years. After the liberation in 1945, he joined the Korean Democratic Party and was elected a 
member of the first national assembly for drafting the South Korean constitution. “Hong Sŏngha,” Han’guk Kŭnhyŏndae Inmul Charyo, in Han’guksa Database, db.history.go.kr. 
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the increased presidential power granted by the NRA.59 
In 1933, an author using the pen name “Chaha Sanin” 
deemed the New Deal the “Fascistization” of the Ameri-
can economy. This article puts forth a bizarre conceptual-
ization yet reveals the mindset of a Korean socialist who applies the analogy of the socialist revolution in under-
standing the New Deal. Mentioning Mussolini’s Fascist 
statement in October 1932, the author associates this 
European event with the election of Roosevelt, calling 
him a “dictator” chosen by the “leftist majority.” Accord-
ing to the author, this event indicates the “transformation 
of American democracy into a dictatorship” and becomes 
“one of the most interesting subjects in world politics.” 
The author still distinguishes Roosevelt’s “dictatorship” 
from other forms because it did not involve a coup d’état, 
received the legal authorization of the US Congress, and 
observed the four-year limit of incumbency.60
The author “Chaha Sanin” thus seems to use the term 
“dictatorship” in order to compare Roosevelt’s social 
control to the USSR’s planned economy. He (or she) intro-
duces the major legal acts of the Roosevelt administra-
tion and calls the “Blue Eagle Revolution” (referring to the 
NRA) a “crucial experiment of world economy” compara-
ble to the Soviets’ development plans. This author defines 
this Blue Eagle Revolution as a dictatorship because it 
takes the form of free choice but involves “psychological 
violence” in reality. The Roosevelt government allocated 
Blue Eagle marks to companies that participated in the 
government program, and organized patriotic campaigns 
urging citizens to buy products with this label. Accord-
ing to the author, such measures embody the essence of 
a “dictatorship” because they force citizens to comply via 
moral and psychological threats. The author identifies 
three types of dictatorship, one in the Soviet Union, one in 
Italy, and one in America. In comparison to the Soviet one, 
the author evaluates the performance of the American 
“dictatorship” as “imperfect” because it mainly depends 
on moral persuasion. Given the strength of the opposi-
tion party, the author argues, the Blue Eagle marks will 
be insufficient to solve America’s “fundamental” social 
problems. 61 
Chungang neither depicted America as a model society 
nor provided unrelenting socialist critiques of the coun-
try as an imperialist country. The journal’s position might be found in its recognition of social progress under the 
Roosevelt government and of America as a useful refer-
ence for reform in Korea. Chungang even published the 
essay of Sŏ Chaep’il, the famous leader of the Independ-
ence Club, on America’s transformation over the 50 years he had lived in the United States.62 Sŏ deems America’s 
change an “incredible evolution” and a “massive social 
experiment for developing an equal and fair society and 
economy” without a bloody revolution. In the past 25 
years, he writes, the United States has transformed itself 
from an agricultural to an industrial society, and its wealth 
has reached the highest level in human history. While this 
wealth is concentrated among a small number of people, he still sees that the growth has provided “good oppor-
tunities to most Americans in seeking prosperity and 
happiness for their families.” If the people are to a degree 
satisfied with such evolution, Sŏ argues, Communism and 
Fascism will not be able to take root in that soil.63 Another Chungang article in 1935 reports on the vic-
tory of Roosevelt in the general election when Democrats occupied two-thirds of the seats in both the US Senate and House of Representatives. The author writes that the 
New Deal failed to garner enthusiastic support among 
the business or working classes, but that this lukewarm 
attitude from both sides functioned as a factor in favor 
of Roosevelt’s victory. The author argues that this vic-
tory would secure Roosevelt’s reelection as president 
and continued Democratic rule until 1940 because the Republican Party failed to propose any constructive 
alternative to the New Deal. This author criticizes the 
idea that Roosevelt is establishing “Fascism” like Hitler 
and Mussolini because he finds Roosevelt exercising only 
partial control in order to maintain the “laissez faire” of 
the entire society, the general character of his country.64 
Chungang’s reports on Roosevelt’s experiment turned 
pessimistic when the US Supreme Court decided in Janu-
ary 1936 that his Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) 
was unconstitutional. Pae Sŏngnyong comments that the 
Supreme Court decision eliminates one of the two pivotal 
measures of the New Deal following its 1935 decision 
59 Hong Sŏngha, “Sanŏp puhŭngbŏpgwa miguk kyŏngjeŭi changnae,” Chungang, January 1933, pp. 23-24.
60 Chaha Sanin, “Miguk kyŏngjech’aegŭi p’asyohwa: ch’ŏngch’i hyŏngmyŏngŭi naeyong kŏmt’o,” Chungang, February 1933, pp. 19-21.
61 Chaha Sanin, “Miguk kyŏngjech’aegŭi p’asyohwa,” p. 21.
62 Sŏ Chaep’il, “Chaeryu osimnyŏn: miguk sahoeŭi tongt’ae,” Chungang, April 1935, pp. 12-14. 
63 Sŏ Chaep’il, “Chaeryu osimnyŏn,” p. 14.
64 Chin Uhyŏn, “Nyu ttŭil migugŭi tonghyang,” Chungang, January 1935, pp. 21-25. 
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that the NRA violated the US Constitution. Pae argues that 
the Court’s decision reveals the serious contradiction 
between Roosevelt’s “control economy” and America’s 
liberal institutions. Although the Roosevelt government 
might devise new policy measures to compensate for the 
loss of the AAA, Pae speculates, it would encounter other 
accusations of being unconstitutional as long as America 
maintains its current institutions and political system.65 
Pae hands down a socialist verdict on the NRA, saying that 
it is impossible to revise capitalism with the methods of 
the middle class or to accomplish the new economy with 
incomplete control. He adds that this would disappoint 
social reformists (in Korea or in the world).66
Another socialist journal, Pip’an (Criticism), was pub-
lished between 1931 and 1940. In comparison to Chun-
gang, Pip’an gave less attention to America. The article in 
Pip’an that was most critical of America was published 
in October 1932. Titled “The Other Side of the Gold 
Country, America,” it describes the poverty of American 
workers in the shadow of the Great Depression.67 The 
author, Kim Hoch’ŏl, sent his article to the journal from 
America, briefing Koreans on the communist movements 
in the Chicago area, the misery of an unemployed worker 
in New York and his death by starvation, and the then-
current labor strikes and racism in the United States. Kim 
quotes the newspaper of the US Communist Party, writ-
ing that twelve million workers were then unemployed, 
living homeless and surviving on food offered by philan-thropists.Another article in an early issue of Pip’an (January 
1932) criticizes American missionaries and their man-
agement of mission schools. The author, Yi Ch’ŏn, appre-
ciates the historical contribution of American missionar-
ies to Korea’s cultural and medical developments. But he 
estimates that the missionaries have become more “reac-
tionary” since the ideological climate of Korea changed in the past several years and youth with anti-religious 
attitudes emerged. According to Yi, in the past the mis-
sionaries considered education a self-sacrificing task for 
God but now they use schools to increase the numbers 
of Christians, attaching material strings to students. Yi writes that one college in Seoul expelled 90 students for a 
trivial reason and kicked out others who made comments 
against Christianity. He calls on missionaries and their 
Korean staff to manage their schools better, by under-
standing Korea’s reality and the ideological sentiments of 
the Korean youth.68
Despite such sharp criticism in the early 1930s, Pip’an 
during the wartime period did not publish many arti-
cles about America. However, Chungang’s coverage of 
Rooseveltian America influenced the agenda for Pip’an 
editors and their readers. For example, the article in 
Pip’an by An Pyŏngju, titled “Where is America headed? 
A debate on Roosevelt,” reveals that the leftists were affected not only by Chungang’s ambivalence toward the 
New Deal but also by Chogwang’s discourse on demo-
cratic America.69 An wrote this article in the form of a 
debate between two critics of American politics. Critic B 
in this article may represent the author’s position.70 An 
scripted the debate under the four topics: America and 
Fascism, the evaluation of New Deal, the personality of 
Roosevelt, and the future of America. 
An’s first topic questions whether or not the 
Rooseveltian reform could be called Fascistization. Critic 
A confirms that Roosevelt established a “presidential 
dictatorship,” disturbing America’s “unique” balance 
of power between the executive, legislative, and judici-
ary branches of government. Critic B disagrees because 
America has no social embryo that could breed Fascism; 
its strong democratic tradition is irreconcilable with Fas-
cism; and a few presidential documents cannot change 
the whole system. In any case, Critic B insists, American 
“Fascism” could be a temporary political regime to sur-
vive the Depression, but has no background for establish-
ing a strong and stable dictatorship. Critic B diagnoses 
that Roosevelt’s reform cannot cure the “fatal disease” of 
its “dying capitalist economy.” 
Critic A rejects this diagnosis, estimating that America 
may prosper more than before, given its abundant natu-
ral resources and Roosevelt’s “luck” as a leader. Critic B 
65 Pae Sŏngnyong, “Miguk nongjobŏp p’ajŏnggwa nyu ttŭirŭi unmyŏng,” March 1936, pp. 38-41. Pae’s negative view is comparable to Han Poyong’s article, “Sŭngsehan migugŭi nodong undong: CIO ŭi yakchin’gwa 
AFL ŭi mollak” in Chogwang, published in June 1937. 
66 Pae Sŏngnyong, “Miguk nongjobŏp p’ajŏnggwa nyu ttŭirŭi unmyŏng,” p. 41. 
67 Kim Hoch’ŏl, “Hwanggŭmŭi nara migugŭi imyŏnsang,” Pip’an, February 1932, pp. 74-76. 
68 Yi Ch’ŏng, “Miguk sŏn’gyohoeŭi chosŏn kyoyuk pangch’ime taehaya,” Pip’an, January 1932, pp. 66-70.
69 An Pyŏngju, “Migugŭn ŏdiro kana: Rujŭbelt’ŭ ron,” Pip’an, September 1937, pp. 18-24. 
70 According to Japanese records, An Pyŏngju was accused of having contacted the USSR Consulate General, as detected by the Seoul Chongno Police Station in January 1938. “Soyŏnbang ch’ongyŏngsagwan 
ch’ulipcha kŏmgŏŭi kŏn,”  Kyŏngchongkyŏng kobi, no. 13087, January 14 and 15, 1938, from Kungnaeoe Hangil Undong Munsŏ, in Han’guksa Database, db.history.go.kr.
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refutes A’s evaluation, referring to the violent strikes at General Motors and other labor struggles in the US. He 
accuses Critic A of being confused by phenomena on the 
surface without understanding the fundamental logic 
(of America’s economy). Critic A does not give in, assert-
ing that Roosevelt has improved the lives of Americans; 
workers and farmers support Roosevelt and reelected 
him as president; and Roosevelt has a very promising 
future. Citing the negative data of the New Deal, Critic B 
comments that the New Deal has only benefitted the big 
capitalists, increased the number of unemployed work-
ers, and added to the burdens on small and middle-sized 
companies. 
Critic A partially admits this but still defends Roosevelt 
and his future, defining him as a “man on the side of work-
ers.” Critic B then responds with long quotes from Joseph 
Stalin’s interview with a British reporter. The article does 
not name Stalin but refers to him as the secretary of the 
Soviet Communist Party. It is unclear whether this inter-view with Stalin actually occurred or whether the author 
of the article crafted it for his argument. The British inter-viewer asks the question posed earlier as to a conver-
gence between the New Deal’s economic control and the 
USSR’s socialist system. The Soviet secretary replies that 
the New Deal attempted to alleviate the Depression with-
out changing the liberal economy whereas the USSR has a 
fundamentally different objective. Critic B finally silences 
Critic A by borrowing Stalin’s authority and his denial 
that Roosevelt could save capitalism. Thereupon Critic A 
asks when the Roosevelt government will perish.71 
From there, the debate takes an interesting turn. Critic 
B answers uncertainly that another depression or an 
international war may cause a moment for great trans-
formation in America. But he also predicts that, due to its 
advanced capitalism, America could manage the disorder 
of the interim period within a very short period of time. 
Alluding to the Spanish Civil War, Critic A questions the 
possibility that a protracted civil war might occur among 
different social, class, and racial groups within America 
or that the government might establish a Fascist regime 
after subduing them. Critic B casts doubt on this scenario, 
arguing that “advanced America” differs from “feudalis-
tic” Spain. Even if Americans experience a temporary dic-
tatorship for a transition, they will quickly terminate this 
process. Critic A’s narrative from here on resonates with 
the notion of democratic America expressed in Chog-
wang. Critic A argues that American tradition would not 
allow Americans to bear a political dictatorship for long. 
Americans are deeply rooted in their passion for free-
dom and equality and their conviction about democracy. 
Therefore, they will quickly eliminate the dictatorship 
and open the final road (for a socialist utopia) for them-selves. 
Critic B is optimistic about a socialist revolution in 
America. He doubts that Americans could survive another 
Depression without creating a “new New Deal,” and 
hopes that this “new New Deal” will be an ideal one (i.e., 
a socialist revolution). Critic B thus expresses his convic-
tion about socialist revolution. But the overall debate 
discloses that the Korean leftists valued the Rooseveltian 
measures for the working class and discussed whether or 
not the American model could replace a socialist revolu-
tion. The leftists shared assumptions about “democratic” 
America with some authors of Chogwang articles pub-
lished before Pearl Harbor. The socialists counted Amer-
ica’s democracy, its active citizens, and its technological 
advancement as good resources for building a “demo-
cratic socialism” for a utopian future. 
4. the Korean Pan-asIanIsts:  
antI-ImPerIalIsm, antI-racIsm,  
and Pro-democracy?
It is not exact to characterize the journal Samch’ŏlli (The 
Korean Peninsula)72 as Pan-Asianist. Samch’ŏlli is also 
a limited source when it comes to studying the war-
time Pan-Asianists comprehensively.73 After the Second 
Sino-Japanese War began, however, Samch’ŏlli accom-
modated Japan’s wartime messages and mobilization. At 
least before 1941, the authors published in Chogwang or 
Pip’an remained reserved in their reporting on the war. 
With less caution, Samch’ŏlli allocated pages to the colo-
nial government’s statements on the war and to the war-
time speeches of pro-Japanese Koreans. But Samch’ŏlli 
also printed many essays for casual pleasure, including 
gossip about élite society. Merging its pro-Japanese tone 
with carefree entertainment, Samch’ŏlli covered Japan’s 
battles in China, Chiang Kai-shek’s whereabouts, and 
even the accounts of Kim Il Sung’s guerillas. In compari-
71 An Pyŏngju, “Migugŭn ŏdiro kana: Rujŭbelt’ŭ ron,” Pip’an, September 1937, pp. 21-23. 
72 Samch’ŏlli (The Korean Peninsula) changed its name to Taedonga (The Great East Asia) and was published in Japanese between 1943 and 1945. 
73 A separate essay would be required to do a comprehensive study of wartime Pan-Asianism.
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son to Chogwang’s “international” perspective, Samch’ŏlli 
focused more on what was going on in the Sino-Japanese 
conflicts on the continent. In this sense, the journal had a Pan-Asianist voice.
Samch’ŏlli’s Pan-Asianism did not establish a clear 
enemy before 1940. America is obscure in the journal 
between 1937 and 1940. The wartime pro-Japanese speeches in Samch’ŏlli sound as though they are insu-
lated from the Korean discourse on America of the same 
period. This “disjuncture” in communication is unlike the dialogue between the authors published in Chogwang, 
Chungang, and Pip’an, who cross-referenced and debated one another despite their different ideological positions. A few ideological threads still penetrated the two dis-
jointed discourses, the wartime pro-Japanese speeches 
and the Korean narratives on the “advanced America.” 
Anti-imperialism, anti-racism, and pro-democracy are 
such underlying themes found in the stereotyped lan-
guage of the wartime Korean speeches. A few speakers 
advocated Japan’s “moral” mission to rejuvenate East 
Asia. But more speakers centered on “universal values” in 
condemning Japan’s enemies. The wartime speeches thus 
failed to offer a stable logic to rationalize the Japanese 
empire when they criticized the British or Americans in 
terms of their imperialism, racism, and hypocrisy in vio-
lation of freedom and equality. 
One Samch’ŏlli article, published in January 1937, 
reveals a cynical Korean response to this ideological pov-
erty of the wartime Pan-Asianist discourse.74 It presents 
a debate between the eminent Chinese intellectual Hu 
Shih (1891-1962) and Nihon hyōron (Japan Commentary) 
editor Murahuse Kōshin (1892-1970). The author Wŏn 
Sehun, 75 who reportedly studied Russian literature at 
Beijing University, translated and edited this debate.76 
Wŏn writes that he simply wants to introduce the debate, 
rather than criticize Hu or Murahuse’s positions or sub-
mit his own viewpoint. However, Wŏn’s clever edition 
renders this debate a critique of Japanese Pan-Asianism. The contents of the debate are sharp in the context of 
early 1937, right before Japan’s full-scale war with China. 
According to Wŏn’s introduction, Hu and Murahuse 
had met in Beijing in the summer of 1936 and agreed 
to exchange their thoughts on Japan-China relations. 
Hu’s article and Murahuse’s counterargument were published in Nihon hyōron in November and December 
1936, respectively, and were also printed in several Chi-
nese journals. In this exchange, Hu asks, first of all, that the Japanese stop talking about “Japan-China friend-ship” (ilchung ch’insŏn). He cannot bear this term when the relationship between the two countries for the past 
four years has been something (here the word is cen-
sored) other than “amity.” Second, he requests that the 
Japanese recognize the Chinese psychology. The Chinese 
people were excited by the Ethiopian resistance against 
Italy, and also ashamed (of their own inaction). Mention-
ing the Japanese slogan of “scorched-earth diplomacy” (ch’oto oegyo), Hu warns Japan not to drive China onto a 
narrow road. If so, the Chinese will fight against Japan like 
besieged animals and with their own strategy of annihila-
tion. Praising the Meiji Restoration as Japan’s glory and a 
miracle for the human race, Hu recommends that Japan 
consider Germany’s rise and fall during World War I as 
a cautionary tale, commenting that Japan’s current move helps neither China nor the world.77
To Hu’s first request (not to mention friendship 
between Japan and China), Murahuse replies that Japan and China should recover trust for each other despite the 
unpleasant events in Manchuria. He claims that Japan 
truly intends to save East Asia and its cultural heritage. 
Chinese intellectuals, including Hu, received the influ-
ence of Western civilization and accepted the idea of 
enlightenment. Meiji intellectuals took the same road and 
buried the heritage of East Asian civilization in the name 
of eliminating reactionaries. Murahuse considers this 
trajectory limited because men (human beings) are not 
free from their geographical environment and historical 
legacy. East Asians ultimately originated from the East 
Asian region’s history and tradition. Although material-
ism, Judaism, German militarism, and British imperial-
ism have left strong influences (in Japan or in the region), 
Murahuse argues, Japan now faces a moment for deep 
self-reflection and self-criticism. He calls this moment 
“the time for a verdict.”78Murahuse insists that Japan is taking on the “burden” 
74 Wŏn Sehun, “Ilchung yangguk aegukchaŭi nonjŏn,” Samch’ŏlli, January 1937, pp. 82-94. 
75 Wŏn Sehun, “Ilchung yangguk aegukchaŭi nonjŏn,” pp. 82-83. 
76 If Wŏn really earned a diploma from Beijing, his years on campus may have overlapped with Hu’s tenure at the university. Wŏn spent his youth in China and Russia and reportedly joined in the Korean Provisional 
Government. After the liberation of Korea in 1945, he participated in the construction of the Korean Democratic Party. “Wŏn Sehun,” Han’guk Kŭnhyŭndae Inmul Charyo, in Han’guksa Database, db.history.go.kr. 
77 Wŏn Sehun, “Ilchung yangguk aegukchaŭi nonjŏn,” pp. 84-86. 
78 Wŏn Sehun, “Ilchung yangguk aegukchaŭi nonjŏn,” pp. 88-80. 
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of this self-reflection because the Japanese nation is now 
pressing a “most advanced step” toward a “golden age 
unprecedented in human history.” He brags that “those 
who curse Japan will be cursed, and those who oppose 
Japan will be crushed to pieces.” Why? Because Japan has 
such power and the Japanese recognize their mission. 
Murahuse blames China for treating Japan with the tac-tic “Constrain barbarians with other barbarians” (yi yi 
che yi) – that is, by allying with America, the “evil” British, 
and the Soviet Union. He asks that the Chinese remember 
their (earlier) suffering and never fall into this (British) seduction.79
Hu sharply repudiates Murahuse’s contention that 
Eastern civilization has been buried under Western influ-ences. Hu argues that the great and valuable cultures never disappear easily. The recent Japanese visitors to 
Beijing worried too much about the loss of Eastern heri-
tage. To Hu’s eyes, they want Eastern youth to read Bud-
dhist or Confucian texts but never become fascinated 
with historical materialism or believe in liberalism. Hu 
never worries that the East Asian heritage will collapse, 
but grieves that Eastern nations barely begin their con-
tacts with the new cultures of human civilization before 
they quickly withdraw to protect their old customs or 
rush to exaggerate about themselves. Most urgently, Hu 
anguishes as to whether or not Eastern nations will cre-ate the ugly scene of killing each other and elicit the ridi-cule of the world. Regarding yi yi che yi – which, translated into a modern 
world, means “Borrow one friendly country’s assistance 
and restrain one enemy country” – Hu calls this a com-
mon practice of nations, and notes that Japan has been 
successfully practicing this in its alliance with the British 
and Americans.80 Hu states that China is not prepared to 
be a friend of others, and even less so to be a friend to an 
enemy of others. With respect to China’s forgetfulness of 
British deeds, Hu quotes the Chinese old proverb, “Don’t be anxious about old evils” (pulgŭp kuak). “Beauty and 
sly seduction” can easily make people forget old pains, 
whereas “armed fists” are the most magical antidote to 
this “amnesia.” If you (Japan) were to fire a cannon today, 
send bombers, and dispatches trains of soldiers, Hu asks, 
wouldn’t this threat wake China from its “amnesia.”?81 
Wŏn cuts the debate here at Hu’s reply and does not add 
any comments. It is obvious that he translated this debate 
from Hu’s viewpoint. 
Wŏn’s clever criticism of Pan-Asianism did not domi-nate Samchŏlli’s articles. It is juxtaposed in the journal 
with the wartime speeches cheering the Japanese army 
in Northern China and Shanghai. Samch’ŏlli’s October 
1937 issue published the speeches delivered in the Youth Hall (ch’ŏngnyŏn hoegwan), Chongno, Seoul. Yun Ch’iho 
gave the opening remarks and Yi Tonhwa, the Chǒndogyo 
leader, recapped in his speech the Chǒndogyo religion’s earlier Pan-Asianist rhetoric.82 According to Yi, Japan shed blood not only for its own interests but also for the 
peace of East Asia. Yi identifies the “greedy forces of the 
white race” and Red Russia as the enemies who are cre-
ating “chaos” in East Asia. He argues that without the 
Japanese empire, China will be reduced to being a market 
for Westerners because China’s state formation is “not 
yet complete.” Yi denounces the Chinese for rejecting 
Japan’s leadership and demands that Koreans support 
the “cause” of “Japan and Korea as one” and the Japanese 
empire.83 
An Insik, another speaker, claims a “Monroe Doctrine 
for Asia,” since Europeans govern Europe and Americans 
rule America. Unlike other wartime speakers, An identi-
fied himself as a Japanese subject, saying that in Asia, only 
“our Japan” has a long history, a strong national body, and 
preserves the “samurai spirit,” crystallized in the values 
of loyalty and filial piety. An glorifies Japan’s withdrawal 
from the League of Nations as an act to protect “the inde-pendence of Manchuria” and a “great resolution” accord-
ing to the “new East Asianism,” saving Asian comrades (tongji) from the “evil hands of Europeans.” At this early 
stage of the Second Sino-Japanese War, An’s Asianism 
antagonizes Communism, castigating it as “the enemy 
of the human race and a reckless robber.” He warns that 
the Chinese anti-Japanese struggles, “poisoned by Com-
munism,” have disrupted the progress of this East Asian 
“ideal.” He demands that Japan punish the Chinese so as 
to awaken them from such “dismay,” and that Koreans not 
separate Korea from Japan but exert genuine efforts for this “ideal.”84 
Although it printed such war-promoting speeches, 
79 Wŏn Sehun, “Ilchung yangguk aegukchaŭi nonjŏn,” p. 90. 
80 Wŏn Sehun, “Ilchung yangguk aegukchaŭi nonjŏn,” pp. 91-94. 
81 Wŏn Sehun, “Ilchung yangguk aegukchaŭi nonjŏn,” p. 94. 
82 “Chŏnsihaŭi siguk yŏnsŏl,” Samch’ŏlli, October 1937, pp. 6-9.
83  Yi Tonhwa, “Tongyang p’yŏnghwaŭi kŭnbonch’aek,” from “Chŏnsihŭi siguk yŏnsŏl,” p. 6. 
84 An Insik, “Sigukkwa oinŭi kago,” from “Chŏnsihaŭi siguk yŏnsŏl,” p. 8. 
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Samch’ŏlli did not call America the enemy before 1941.85 
Expecting a war with the US, however, such ambigu-
ity disappeared. In March 1941, Mitarai Tatsuo (1895-
1975), the owner of the Japanese settler newspaper Keijō 
Nippō (Seoul Daily), published a Samch’ŏlli column enti-
tled “Tense Political Situation in the Pacific, Recognize the 
Enemy State America!”86 Mitarai argues that the war in 
Europe has transformed world politics and almost over-
thrown Anglo-Saxons’ global domination. Despite the 
Japanese army’s “progress” in China, Mitarai resents the 
fact that Japan has not yet destroyed Chiang Kai-shek’s 
government. He attributes the tenacity of China’s resist-
ance to the military assistance of the UK, US, and USSR, 
calling Chiang a “robot of the three Western powers.” Mit-
arai argues that Germany, Italy, and Japan have become 
allies in order to modify the “exploitative regime of the 
British and Americans” and construct a “fair and new 
world order.” Mitarai calls on the “nation” to make up 
their minds to fight to the death against America’s “arro-
gance, arbitrary and greedy ambition, and its hypocritical 
humanitarianism.”87  
After Pearl Harbor, Samch’ŏlli’s January 1942 issue 
printed a set of several speeches made at war-mobiliz-
ing assemblies. Famous Korean figures had appeared at 
those assemblies and assailed America with aggressive 
words. The report under the title, “Destroy the Invad-
ers of the East, the British and Americans!,” included 
speeches by Yŏ Unhong,88 Yi Kwangsu, Chu Yohan, and 
others. Yŏ scorned America’s racism and imperialism; Yi 
criticized American individualism, commercialism, and 
democracy narrowly centered on their own rights and 
happiness; Chu ridiculed Roosevelt and America’s hypoc-risy.89 Ch’ae P’ilgŭn, the principal of P’yŏngyang Presby-
terian Seminary, called the war a mission for “the Great 
East Asian Restoration,” and for rescuing Asians from the 
Anglo-Saxon racism and imperialism they had suffered 
since the Opium War.90 
The same January 1942 issue of Samch’ŏlli published 
another set of speeches under the title “The Great East 
Asian War and the Armament of the Korean Peninsula.”91 
At this assembly, the speakers included Yun Ch’iho, Chang 
Tŏksu, and Sin Hŭngu,92 famous Korean leaders who had 
once studied in the United States. Yun Ch’iho sounds gen-
uinely excited about this war against America and frames 
Pearl Harbor as a “racial war.” He recalls the humiliation 
of his first visit to Shanghai, 55 years before. When he 
entered the city’s British district, he saw the sign on the 
gate of a park reading, “Dogs and Chinese, do not enter 
here.” Yun excoriates the British, who came to China as guests yet degraded the Chinese people to the level of 
dogs. He also mentions that arrogant Anglo-Saxons in 
Canada erected such signs as “Do not enter, yellow race.” 
In the Pearl Harbor attack, Yun exclaims, we (the yellow 
race?) finally had a chance to wreak vengeance. With 
enthusiasm, he calls the Pacific War the “holy war of holy 
wars” and demands that everyone join this effort. He 
expresses his joy at this “retaliation,” saying that he feels ten years younger than before. 
Chang Tŏksu gave a speech entitled “The Real Face of 
the Enemy State.” Chang was the former editor of Tonga 
Ilbo, and a leader of the Korean Democratic Party after 
liberation. He was assassinated in 1947 by a member of 
the South Korean police.93 Chang’s speech, at least in its 
printed version, does not transmit the enthusiasm of Yun 
Ch’iho but focused on criticizing the British and Ameri-cans for the inconsistency between their liberal values 
and their actual conduct. Chang describes the UK and the 
US as the wealthiest countries in the world, in possession 
of the strongest navies. Chang’s criticism first targets the 
identity of the UK and US as “Christian states” which do not follow the “love of Christ” but regulate their conduct according to the needs of a secular power state.94
 Chang then criticizes the history of slavery and racism 
in the two countries, introducing his own experience of 
85 For example, Pak Indŏk, a female leader who had studied in the United States, published an essay on two black American women educators and their school for black students. Pak Indŏk, “Miju kangyŏn’gi: hŭgin 
hakkyowa widaehan yŏin kyoyukka,” Samch’ŏlli, August 1938, pp. 59-62. 
86 Mitarai Tatsuo, “Kinjanghan t’aep’yŏngnyang hyŏngse, migugŭi chŏksŏngŭl pora,” Samch’ŏlli, March 1941.
87 Mitarai Tatsuo, “Kinjanghan t’aep’yŏngnyang hyŏngse,” pp. 8-15.
88 Yŏ Unhong was Yŏ Unhyŏng’s younger brother. He joined the independence movement in the 1920s but, as shown in this speech, joined various collaborative acts in the wartime colonial period. He graduated 
from a college in Ohio and taught at Posŏng College (Korea University). After liberation, he helped organize a moderate socialist party, the Social Democratic Party (Sahoe Minjudang), and was elected a national 
assemblyman in South Korea. “Yŏ Unhong,” Han’guk Kŭnhyundae Inmul Charyo, in Han’guksa Database, db.history.go.kr. 
89 “Tongyangŭi ch’imnyakcha yŏngmi t’adoŭi taesajahu!” Samchŏlli, January 1942, pp. 44-59. 
90 “Tongaŭi yusin, miyŏng kyŏngmyŏrŭi p’yŏngyang taeyŏnsŏlhoe sokki,” Samchŏlli, January 1942, pp. 38-43. 
91 “Taedonga chŏnjaenggwa pandoŭi mujang; kyŏlchŏn taeyŏnsŏl kirogŭi t’ŭkchip,” Samchŏlli, January 1942, pp. 18-36. 
92 Sin Hŭngu was Christian and studied at the University of Southern California. After the liberation in 1945, he worked as a diplomat in the South Korean government. “Sin Hŭngu,” Han’guk Kŭnhyundae Inmul Charyo, 
in Han’guksa Database, db.history.go.kr.
93  “Chang Tŏksu,” in Han’guk Minjok Munhwa Taebaekkwa Sajŏn, www.encykorea.com.
94 “Taedonga chŏnjaenggwa pandoŭi mujang; kyŏlchŏn taeyŏnsŏl kirogŭi t’ŭkchip,” Samchŏlli, January 1942, pp. 24-27. 
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racial discrimination at a barbershop in Oregon, where 
the barber refused to cut an Oriental’s hair. He continues to question whether countries with a history of slave trad-
ing can truly establish individualism, which cherishes the 
value of each human being, or practice liberalism, with its 
respect for individual freedom. Chang then tells his audi-
ence, “If you deny the value of the human being, you can-
not create a foundation of morality,” and “Where morality 
is destroyed, you cannot build a house for individualism 
or liberalism.” Chang thus argues that individualism and 
liberalism in the UK and US are none other than “selfish-ness” and “self-indulgence.” 
Chang also problematizes British and American indus-
trialism, where workers are seen primarily as the means 
of production rather than as human beings, and capital-
ists function primarily as businessmen rather than as 
citizens. In this circumstance, capitalists and workers 
fight each other over their own interests with no sympa-
thy toward the other side; the stronger survive but the 
weaker collapse. Chang asks, in this “animal society of the 
survival of the fittest,” how one can discover liberalism or 
individualism? He concludes that this “utilitarian civiliza-tion” does not extend virtuous or benevolent hands (to 
others), and that its exploitation and violence have dried 
the blood of the Eastern nations and bent their bones.95 
There Chang finishes his speech. Regardless of its harsh 
rhetoric at the ending, Chang’s speech is nevertheless 
moderate and intelligent, expressing his reflections on 
British and American society. It is difficult to tell whether Chang was forced to support the war or whether he had personally begun to accept the Japanese Pan-Asianist 
messages. Be that as it may, this is a speech in which 
Chang criticizes the UK and US not because he rejects 
their values of Christianity, individualism, and liberalism but because their own history has betrayed such values.
Another speaker, Sin Hŭngu, also spoke along these 
lines, berating the Anglo-Saxons for their racism and 
colonialism. Sin argues that “global chaos” has been insti-
gated by those who have colonized the world over the past several hundred years. They invaded and exploited 
other races and countries with wicked means and bru-
tal violence, yet fancied they were benefitting others. 
Sin depicts Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936) and his term 
“the White Man’s Burden” as symbolizing Anglo-Saxons’ 
“delusion” about being “burdened” with “guiding colored 
races.” Due to this arrogant perception, Sin argues, the 
Anglo-Saxons propagate humanitarianism or democracy 
but actually reject racial equality. Sin criticizes that this 
hypocrisy endangers not just East Asians but all colored races.96
5. conclusIon
John Lewis Gaddis emphasizes “peripheral origins” and 
“inadvertence” in the development of the Cold War in Asia. He argues that the US and USSR had “barely” started 
the Cold War in the region before the Chinese Commu-nist Revolution in 1949.97 He identifies the Korean War 
as a case in which the local civil war, “which would have 
existed in any event,” drew the US and USSR into their “unintended confrontations.”98 Bruce Cumings, in con-
trast, finds an earlier symptom of the Cold War in the 
postwar US intervention in the Far East and its reversal of 
the “Korean revolution,” which he regards as imminent at 
the time of Korea’s liberation in August 1945. The charac-teristics of this “civil war” or “revolution” are still unclear 
because historians have insufficiently examined the tran-
sition from wartime colonial Korea to this postcolonial 
“civil war.” To clarify the nature of this “revolution,” this 
article has made an initial attempt to map out the ideo-
logical landscape of late colonial Korea, reviewing the 
wartime discourse on America. 
Several observations from this investigation modify 
the notion of severe ideological splits in colonial Korea 
and their extension into the postwar era. The Koreans 
who wrote on America during the wartime period main-
tained different ideological positions, but their disagree-
ments were more complicated and ambivalent than the 
antagonism of the 1920s between nationalists and social-
ists. To my own surprise, the wartime Korean imaginaries 
of America strongly countered the Japanese Pan-Asianist 
discourse. While the Japanese expressed the urgent need 
to overcome modernity and the superficiality of Ameri-
canism, some provocative Korean authors called Ameri-
can civilization a “barometer of modernity” or the “future 
of the human race.” Not all leftists gave up their socialist 
criticism of capitalism, but many of them were impressed by the progress for the working class in Rooseveltian 
America. 
95 “Taedonga chŏnjaenggwa pandoŭi mujang,” pp. 24-27. 
96 “Taedonga chŏnjaenggwa pandoŭi mujang,” pp. 28-29.
97 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 55.
98 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 71.
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On the eve of the Pearl Harbor, a sharp ideological split 
was indeed established between this Korean sympathy 
for Rooseveltian America and the wartime Pan-Asianist 
narratives criticizing the British and Americans and their 
exploitation of “colored races.” The Korean speeches for 
Japan’s war effort delivered a mixture of several ideologi-
cal elements, including a Pan-Asianist history framed in 
terms of the strife of East against West, a leftist critique 
of Western capitalism, and a denunciation of America’s 
hypocrisy in not fulfilling its promise of freedom. Loyalty 
to the Japanese emperor and the ideology of “Japan and 
Korea as one body” (naesŏn ilch’e) remained marginal 
in the Korean wartime speeches at least printed in the 
journals analyzed here.  The Koreans who gave these 
speeches drove their points home to their audience pri-
marily by invoking the ways in which American racism 
and exploitation contradicted the notion of a “humanitar-
ian America.” 
Finally, many authors analyzed in this article continued 
their political careers after liberation. The most outspo-
ken writers on America in Chogwang cooperated with 
the American military occupation. Although Ham Sang-
hun had a record of collaborating with the Japanese, Han 
Poyong and Chong Ilhyŏng were silent during the peak 
of wartime mobilization and Han Ch’ijin was jailed at the 
end of the Pacific War. As mentioned earlier, Han Poyong 
worked as the mayor of Taegu, and Chŏng Ilhyŏng was 
high in the administration of the American Military Gov-
ernment in Korea. Han Ch’ijin, the admirer of American 
pragmatism, also worked with the American Military 
Government as a staff member of the public relations 
bureau, edited the bureau’s official journal Minju Chosŏn 
(Democratic Korea), and published his theory of democ-
racy there. Han was later taken to North Korea during 
the Korean War. Chang Tŏksu and Ham Sanghun became 
leading figures of the Korean Democratic Party. Chang 
and Ham could not avoid responsibility for their collabo-
rative acts. Yet they had been more reserved in the lan-
guage they used to promote the war than more enthusias-
tic Pan-Asianist speakers such as Yun Ch’iho, Yi Kwangsu, 
and Chu Yohan. I have yet to consolidate the postcolonial trajectories of 
the socialist authors covered in this article. Hong Sŏngha, 
the economist who wrote on the NRA in Chungang, par-
ticipated in the Korean Democratic Party. I have been 
unable to establish the identity of authors who used the 
pen name “Chaha Sanin” in 1933 or the records of the 
socialists Pae Sŏngnyong and An Pyŏngju in the 1940s and 1950s.99 While these leftists showed ambivalent 
sympathy toward the Rooseveltian America, many other 
Korean socialists faced charges of collaboration, given 
the massive wartime thought-conversion directed by the Japanese colonial authority. This suggests that the splits of the 1920s and early 1930s between nationalists and 
socialists changed their forms during the wartime period and did not straightforwardly transfer into the confron-tation (or “civil war”) between collaborative nationalists and leftist revolutionaries after 1945. 
The wartime discourse on imaginary America did 
not convey the entire range of ideological, political, and 
socio-economic agendas in late colonial Korea. The jour-
nals reviewed here omitted the voices of underground 
revolutionaries within Korea and anti-Japanese guerril-
las abroad. However, this wartime discourse on America 
leads me to question whether Korean nationalists and socialists were indeed on the verge of war with each other 
before 1945. Their discourse on America sounds not so 
much like a call to armed conflict as a sign of intense dia-
logue. I hypothesize that wartime colonial Korea was dif-
ferent from Greece, the Balkans, or mainland China dur-
ing World War II, where rightists and leftists were already 
waging armed conflicts against or in alliance with foreign 
powers. Kim Il Sung’s anti-Japanese guerrillas had only 
limited connections with the political groups within 
Korea, and reflected the civil war situation in China more 
than such a split in Korea itself at the time. If the temper 
of the times, as reflected in the journals reviewed here, was less one of civil war than of an ideological rearrange-
ment within wartime colonial Korea, then it is important 
to revisit the characteristics of postcolonial Korean revo-
lution and the sources of the violence, rebellions, and 
armed conflicts that swept South Korea under the Ameri-
can military occupation.  
99 Pae Sŏngnyong wrote an article in the first issue of Minju Chosŏn that Han Ch’ijin edited and published. See Minju Chosŏn, November 1947.
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Nancy Abelmann
Josie Sohn
Domesticating maternal excess1 
Revisiting the  
Developmentalist Era Mother  
in 2000s South Korean Film
We introduce three South Korean films from the 2000s – Mother (2009), My Mother the Mermaid (2004), and 
Family Ties (2006) – to consider transformations in the 
contemporary social gaze at motherhood. We appreciate 
these films historically in that they offer a re-narration 
of developmentalist era mothers: historically, it is the 
excesses of motherhood that have so easily stood for the 
melodrama of South Korea’s recent past (see also Abel-
mann 2003). Interestingly, however, the developmental-
ist mother has been virtually absent from film, which in 
the 1970s and 1980s turned its primary attention away 
from domestic drama to the sexually charged figures of 
the hostess and the prostitute (see Kim 2000: 196). Into 
the 1990s, moreover, South Korean women were typi-
cally either invisible or depicted as monsters or gangsters 
while male homosociality – army, intelligence agency, 
Mother (2009)
1 The completion of this work was supported by the Academy of Korean Studies Grant funded by the Korean Government (MEST) (AKS-2010-DZZ-2101). Nancy Abelmann is grateful to helpful feedback she received 
at her October 19, 2009 presentation at Leiden University as part of the Korean Historiography as a Social Process Project (funded by the Academy of Korean Studies).
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organized crime syndicate – became the era’s foremost 
protagonist (Kim 2007: 495-7). All three films we discuss 
here take up the image of excessive or even crazy mothers 
from the yesteryear of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
peak of South Korea’s developmentalist modernity. Even 
as they are often vilified, the extremes to which a mother 
will go to nurture, protect, educate, marry, employ, or save 
her child comprise a veritable cultural grammar in devel-
opmentalist and post-developmentalist South Korea. 
We are then interested in the ways in which these three 
films intervene in this pervasive cultural gaze at mater-
nal excess: the near oedipal, penny-pinching, and morally 
compromised. These are the mothers who would go to 
any length to shelter their children from the harsh exter-
nal world, be it murder, crass materialism, or dubious 
relationships that they must resort to.  It is through the 
filmic technique of suture that for each film both the child 
protagonist and the film viewer are made to inhabit an 
intimate gaze at the mother figure. This intimacy is such 
that viewers are able to feel, “yes, that’s me,” the sensibil-
ity of suture as described by Kaja Silverman (1983: 205). 
With this suture, the maternal excess in the lives of an 
acupuncturist, bath attendant, former hostess, and shop-
keeper is rearticulated as the effects of social marginal-
ity and the ravages of developmentalism (see Cho 2005: 
103). Excess then is historicized and what can appear to 
be matters of personal proclivity take on new meaning in 
the light of the social. While we are primarily interested 
in these films’ revisionist approach to developmental-
ist era mothers, we also appreciate their salience for the 
gaze at contemporary motherhood. In the current era of 
ever increasing competition and an ever expanding and 
intensified role for mothers in the raising of competitive 
children, a social gaze at the excesses of motherhood is 
alive and well (see Park 2007). These films’ revision thus 
achieves a critical and contemporary intervention as well.
Previously, some observers however have suggested 
Korean films’ relative tolerance of maternal excess. 
Kathleen McHugh (2005), for example, notes that in 
South Korean Golden Age cinema the figure of a labor-
ing woman stands for the domestic, in contrast with the 
Western image of the bourgeois household in which toil 
is invisible. We agree with this observation in that mater-
nal excess is an entirely legible feature of South Korean 
developmentalism. Nonetheless, we suggest that mater-
nal excess has been vilified in ways that resonate with the 
West. One robust stream of Western feminist film criti-
cism describes the representational contest between a 
dominating “phallic” and an idealized “sacrificial” or 
“nurturing” mother (Kaplan 106). E. Anne Kaplan offers 
that the classical Hollywood maternal melodrama “fore-
grounds the [ideal] familial, the domestic,” as a “rela-
tively ‘innocent’ terrain of individual, familial relations” 
(173). For South Korea, this works somewhat differently 
because the sacrificial mother can be dominating, or 
phallic, because her labor is necessarily social, inextrica-
ble from the work of familial reproduction. Likewise the 
domestic is not so easily innocent in that it is shot through 
with the social. In one sense then there is nothing really 
troubling about maternal excess at all. In another sense, 
however, the romance of the bourgeois family – of the 
innocent domestic and the nurturing mother (beyond the 
social) – is also robust in South Korea’s modernity tropes 
such that, although legible and even culturally validated, 
the excessive mother is not necessarily “pretty” – as the 
mother figures in Family Ties are described – or desirable 
(Abelmann 2003; Kim 2001). Anthropologist Cho Han 
Haejoang (2002), for example, describes the genealogy of 
South Korea’s modern motherhood in which three gen-
erations of women have all vowed – and failed – to live 
differently from their excessive and excessively instru-
mental mothers. We suggest then that the work of these 
films is to domesticate and beautify even these quite leg-
ible women. 
Although the sutured gaze intervenes in pejorative 
portrayals of women, we do not think of these works as 
feminist interventions. We argue instead that it is through 
the spectacularization of “innocent” domesticity as famil-
ial care that maternal excess is revisited. Important to this 
innocent domestic, are the ways in which domestic space 
is staged – at the dining tables, the beds, and the doors 
and gates that demarcate the familial from the external 
world. This demarcation also makes home a survival unit 
where familial care is safe and sound: in contrast when 
care exceeds the domestic things run amuck. For exam-
ple, when a woman takes the place of the law (the police in Mother) or that of another woman (adultery in Family 
Ties), care turns destructive. That public caring roles are 
less troublesome in My Mother the Mermaid is perhaps 
because the mother never leaves the company of women 
both in the sea (as a diver) and at the public bath (as an 
attendant). For Mother and My Mother the Mermaid, we 
conclude that maternal excess is effectively pardoned 
through the (re)constitution of the patriarchal family: 
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ironically, this occurs even though in both cases the father 
is absent. In Mother, an apparently mentally disabled son 
becomes “normal” and as such a “filial son” who in turn 
hails a normal mother. In My Mother the Mermaid, an 
emasculated father is resuscitated so that the viewer wit-
nesses the romance of the normative family. In contrast, in Family Ties, family takes shape outside patriarchy; per 
the film’s original Korean title, “the birth of family,” family 
is born anew, against the patriarchal grain, however, not 
apart from the domesticity that prescribes Korean moth-
erhood. 
Mother
In an interview about Mother (Madŏ, Bong Joon-ho, 2009), 
director Bong Joon-ho explained that the film answered to 
a curiosity of his childhood: the crazed dancing of middle-
aged mothers on tour buses. In his words, “When I was a 
college student I visited Odae Mt. I could not overcome 
my astonishment at the ajumma (middle aged women) 
who spent the whole time dancing on the bus, never com-
ing out to enjoy the beautiful mountain scenery. But as I 
grew older and have witnessed this so often, I have come 
to think that each of those women have their own life 
stories, their own reasons – which saddens me.” Inter-
estingly, the film begins with and comes full circle to the 
same woman – the “mother” dancing on just such a bus. 
It is in fact her body itself – with which the film so poign-
antly begins – that bespeaks her excess: from her nearly 
grossly contorted facial expressions when she dances to 
the extremes to which she hurls her body (see Figure 1) 
such as in the scene when she chases the police car as her 
son, To-jun, is being arrested for the murder of a girl in 
their village. In the course of the film, the viewer is led 
to follow the mother’s sleuthing to absolve her wrongly-
accused son from this crime, only to find out later that the 
mother’s point of view had been, and understandably so, 
distorted and wrong (it was To-jun’s actions that killed 
the girl) (see Figure 2). By the film’s end when the mother 
dances again, the suture in this film has guided the viewer 
to appreciate this very enigmatic dance – the signature 
mark of the mother’s excess – anew as entirely legible and 
even justified.2  
Mother, who remains nameless, is a woman of many 
maternal excesses.  Perhaps most obviously or grossly 
excessive is the film’s flirtation with the sexuality of the 
mother and son. In the immediate aftermath of his mur-
der, for example, To-jun fondles his mother’s breast as he 
falls off to sleep, and again as he wakes the next morning. 
To his buddy Chin-t’ae’s taunting, “Have you ever slept 
with a woman?” he answers that he has – his mother: as he 
does again at the police interrogation, about his activities 
that fateful evening. To-jun’s sexuality then is intimately 
tied to maternal excess. In perhaps the film’s moment of 
greatest (and grossest) maternal and Freudian excess, 
the son pees against a village wall as the mother pours 
Chinese medicine into his mouth and we watch these 
fluids spill together at his feet; and afterwards as she lit-
erally brushes the fluids away (see Figure 3). We watch, 
1. Mother (2009)
2 Compare Kim Kyung-Aae (2010) for an analysis of the close-up of the mother’s face as a psychological space that discloses the process through which the mother is driven to madness and ruin beyond redemption.
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even as we feel we should turn our heads in some sort of 
voyeuristic embarrassment. Ground zero of this film and 
of the crazed mother-as-detective – hell-bent on proving 
her son’s innocence – is the rooftop railing on which To-
jun hung the dead girl’s body after her accidental death.3 
It is from the same building that a junk dealer – a man who 
the mother eventually murders – sees the accident that 
leaves the girl dead. We know that the girl was headed 
there to have paid sex with the junk dealer, another mar-
ginal figure in his own right; living literally on the margins 
of the township in a dilapidated old mill, an icon of yester-
year prosperity. With the mother, we look into the sordid 
social sexual economy of the teen sexual exploitation of 
this rural town where the mother-less victim was pimped 
by her toothless drunkard grandmother to a cadre of teen 
boys and an occasional adult. We are made voyeurs: lis-
tening in to pubescent boys who taunt that it was To-jun, 
a boy who (ironically) didn’t sleep with the victim, who 
ended up getting caught for her murder. We trudge up 
the hill with the mother who has figured out the sexual 
skein and knows that the tell-all cell phone, fixed to make 
no sound when it takes a photo, is with the grandmother 
who for-a-price will relinquish the phone which holds the 
photos of all who have exploited the girl. It is from among 
those photos, we are led to believe, that we will find the 
real criminal and absolve To-jun.
That we would share the mother’s distorted point of 
view, however, is made clear from the opening scene 
in which as aforementioned the mother dances alone 
in a field of golden grass. In a striking pose, she wipes 
her hands across her eyes to leave a blank stare which 
we come to appreciate as the signature look not of the 
mother, but of her son in the film. This opening scene sig-
nals to the viewer that she will be and wills herself to be 
blind to truths (about her son and herself) through the 
course of the film. The long take in the scene establishes 
the viewer’s gaze at the mother and hints at her obstinate 
refusal to accept the truths that lead to her murder of the 
man who claims to be an eye-witness to her son’s crime. 
We argue, however, that the viewer’s identification with 
the Mother’s point of view only lasts for a short while. The 
film’s perhaps most remarkable scene is one in which 
maternal excess and truth are precariously balanced: 
when the mother visits the film’s “other” disabled young 
man, one with Down’s syndrome, who we by then know 
will serve prison time for To-jun’s crime. By this point in 
the film there is in fact no reason for the mother to visit 
this boy as she knows who the real culprit is. The scene, 
instead, deviates from necessary plot development argu-
ably to show the moment in which her falseness/blind-
ness is laid bare. Through the bars of the nameless boy’s 
cell, the Mother asks about his – Mother: “You have par-
ents [her fret mounts, 
she pauses]; no 
mother?!” and he con-
soles her, “Don’t cry.” 
The mother’s query 
about the boy’s filiation 
is rhetorical: we as well 
as she know that he has 
no mother. Hence the 
exchange: this mother-
less child for her son. 
This is also the begin-
ning of the exchange of 
point of view: when she 
visits To-jun in jail, we 
see him over her shoul-
der, through her eyes as 
it were; now we see this 
boy directly from the 2. Mother (2009)
3 See Kim Kyung-Aae (2010) for an analysis of physical space in this film that creates a dystopic vision.
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camera’s point of view 
– and we see her (hers 
is the crime that has 
gone unseen). At first, 
we are anguished with 
her: she is wallowing in 
the extremes to which 
she has been propelled 
in the name of mother-
hood. The temporary 
suture cracked, we cry 
for the injustice suf-
fered by the other disa-
bled boy. We too have 
perhaps been partners 
in crime, mothered 
children or mothers 
ourselves who have 
been protected or pro-
tect in a harsh world, and in a South Korean social real-
ity in which the mothers’ role is itself extreme. We might 
ask, “Who are we to name excess when this is the fate of a 
mother-less child?”  
The moment when we are made to gaze at, not with, the 
Mother, another spell is broken; we are sutured instead 
to To-jun’s no-longer-dumb gaze at his mother who gives 
way to the “law of the father” (in this case, the son). Our 
suture to To-jun’s gaze normalizes her crime and we 
accept her as a mother like any other in the final moments 
of the film. In the penultimate scene of the film, we meet 
To-jun sending his mother on a trip. In a single take, as if it 
were a passing remark, To-jun buys a bagful of snacks and 
hands it to his mother. This is, however, a critical moment 
in which the patriarchal family is reconstituted. To-jun is 
now the one who assumes the role of nurturer unlike the 
night before the trip when the mother served him din-
ner upon his release from prison. We have just learned 
that To-jun who found his way to the charred mill – his 
mother burned it down to hide her crime – found his 
mother’s acupuncture kit there. We know that these are 
his mother’s needles, the tools of her own illicit economy. 
It was with the needles that she coaxed the junk dealer to 
remember what he had seen that evening. To-jun returns 
the needles to his mother – who has just tucked away the 
bag of snacks – the needles that reveal her crime. To-jun 
chides, caringly, that she needs to be more careful. Ironi-
cally, it is in the midst of these sordid crime remnants that 
To-jun enacts a very “normal” role: the loving son who 
chides his forgetful Mom, as if to say, “You are tired Mom – 
it has been quite a stretch and this is a much needed break 
– I am happy to indulge you this little trip.” 
The mother-son dyad normalized, we are readied 
for the film’s final scene in which again the mother has 
become one of those dancing ajumma “with her own life 
story,” the kind who intrigued Bong Joon-ho in his youth. 
In the final scene we witness the mother on the bus, alone, 
unable to join the fray. We then look on as she hikes up her 
skirt to self-administer the acupuncture that will let her 
forget – her crime, her son’s guilt, and her son’s knowl-
edge of the architecture of his freedom. She has joined the 
ranks of apparently “normal” women. We note here, how-
ever, that the mother herself has not changed much from 
when she danced in the aftermath of her murder of the 
junk dealer – in the opening scene in which we first have 
encountered her. She appears as dumb and otherworldly 
as in the first scene. What has changed is our tacit under-
standing that it is permissible for the mother who would 
do anything to save her son to lose herself in wild danc-
ing in the company of other mothers who perhaps also 
desire to be similarly amnesiac. A twisted mother story, if 
ever there was one, has literally faded into the banality of 
mothers dancing (wildly) in public. 
3. Mother (2009)
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My Mother,  
the MerMaid
“My mother, the mer-
maid” (Inŏ kongju, Park 
Heung-sik, 2004) is 
crass and peeved and 
we fill in the pieces: her 
meek and sentimental 
husband, a paragon 
of the handy inepti-tude (munŭngham) of 
Korean men (see Abel-
mann 2003), squan-
dered the family’s hard-
earned possibility of 
passage to middle class 
trappings by secur-
ing a now-departed 
friend’s loan-gone-bad. 
Thereby sacrificed was all that the mother had dreamed 
of for her daughter Na-yŏng, (predictably) foremost her 
education. We meet the mother as near stereotype of her 
social position, a bath house attendant, dammed if she 
will pander to the wealthier among her, some of whose 
backs she must literally scratch, “one at a time,” as her 
daughter once put it, to earn her keep. We wince as we 
witness the grubbiness of it all: how she spits as she 
counts her money, how she hoards sidewalk give-aways, 
how she grubs extra side dishes at a rare evening out, and 
so on. Hers is a familiar portrait of a kind of excess born 
of hard living, and developmentalist desires fostered by 
arguably the very ethos of South Korean modernity. 
The suture in this film is the most radical of the works 
we introduce: the daughter is literally sutured into her 
mother’s past, as are we – transported into an island 
childhood. The body of the film is this suture, and with 
it the daughter’s sustained visit to her mother’s youth-
ful days. Her mother-past, to whom she becomes “elder 
sister” or ŏnni is as charming, youthful, and generous, as 
her mother-present is tough, jaded, and pinched. Work-
ing as notes-towards-the present, the viewer is asked to 
close the arc, to ponder the transformation or, as convinc-
ingly, to revisit the way in which the gaze of the present 
fixes just such a woman. The viewer wonders, en retour, 
about her own lens. Like Mother then, this film revisits 
or rescripts the excess of a developmentalist woman, the 
sort of woman who embodies South Korea’s developmen-
talist project with her: crass materialism, naked mobility 
schemes, and unflinching instrumentality.
The camera sutures Na-yŏng to Yŏn-sun, her child-
hood mother, letting the daughter see her mother as if in 
a mirror. This work of suture is at its most dramatic in the 
scene in which Na-yŏng enters the gate of her mother’s 
old house in the island village in the South. She has come 
to see if her father fled to the village after learning about 
his terminal illness. It is, however, Yŏn-sun, who – looking 
just like the young woman in her photo album – comes to 
greet her across the laundry line that curtains the space 
between them. The camera closes up on Na-yŏng who 
recognizes her mother from her old photographs. The 
reverse shot then follows with her childhood mother who 
fails to recognize the striking resemblance between the 
guest and herself. An ordinary shot-reverse shot then 
reverts to the face of the beholder. Before returning to 
the shot of Na-yŏng, however, the camera turns ninety 
degrees to stage an imaginary mirror that frames the 
mother and daughter – played by a single actress – as if 
in reflection. It is this make-believe mirror (for there is 
nothing in between them) through which Na-yŏng enters 
and identifies with, rather than directly as, her mother.  
Yŏn-sun is a diver, a haenyŏ, which indexes a very par-
ticular homosocial women’s cultural space. Much like 
that of To-jun and his mother in Mother, Yŏn-sun’s house-
hold is a tiny survival unit: Yŏn-sun and her mischievous 
younger brother whose city schooling she is supporting 
4. My mother, the mermaid (2004)
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with her diving. And this young diver now takes a per-
fect stranger into her home where everything – the old 
dresser, photographs, and so on – is too familiar for com-
fort to the guest. When Na-yŏng wakes after spending 
her first night in the village in utter disbelief, Yŏn-sun, as 
real as real can be, enters her room with a small break-
fast table. The seaweed soup that Na-yŏng had refused at 
home and the pickled crab that her mother had embar-
rassingly demanded at the aforementioned evening out 
quietly lets us know that Yŏn-sun is and always has been 
a kind and generous woman.   
The film is propelled, as we wind the exquisite island 
paths of yesteryear (interestingly, entirely different than 
the crime-ridden dusty ways in the village in Mother), by 
the ever-so-innocent love story of Yŏn-sun and the man 
who we know will become Na-yŏng’s father – the island 
postman. In what Korean cinema scholar Steven Chung 
describes as the “spectacularizing enlightenment” (18), 
theirs is an enlightenment story in which the postman 
teaches illiterate Yŏn-sun, opening her world, allowing 
her, literally, to name it (see Figure 4).4 And Na-yŏng is 
there to test her mother from the primers that her father-
to-be has given her mother. In a nearly classical develop-
mentalist spectacle, we look on as Na-yŏng witnesses the 
arrival of the island’s first bus, and we are there to capture 
(in a photograph) Na-yŏng, Yŏn-sun, and, yes, the postman 
who has peeped out 
from behind the bus, 
in the nick of time for 
posterity (see Figure 
5). How then does the 
film allow us to thread 
time: from literacy and 
the first village bus to 
the hardened antics of 
a middle-aged labor-
ing woman? Are we to 
wax nostalgic for the 
days of yore before the 
ravages of advanced 
doggy-dog capitalism 
– times in which the 
Yŏn-sun could inno-
cently marvel at the 
rural postman’s knowl-
edge and worldly ways? Are we to nod knowingly that 
the kindness of Na-yŏng’s father’s variety, a throw-back 
to island days and ways – somehow out of step with the 
times – is enough to drive a woman crazy? Indeed, the film 
opens on the adult mother at the funeral of her husband’s 
buddy who has died leaving her husband the guarantor 
of his debt: we see all of the antics of mourning, but in 
her case the nearly humorous mourning of her husband’s 
ill-founded generosity through which he no doubt squan-
dered her hard earned savings. 
The climax of Na-yŏng’s suture is the moment in which 
Na-yŏng and her child-mother are most integrated, a 
moment in which the time traveler seems to touch, not 
just witness, her mother’s past. This is also the moment 
when Na-yŏng will call Yŏn-sun, “Mom,” instead of her 
name. Yŏn-sun has nearly drowned, diving one too many 
times in the throes of her mourning the news of the 
postman’s relocation. As Na-yŏng nurses her mother at 
the sickbed, Yŏn-sun confides in Na-yŏng that it wasn’t 
until she learned from a neighbor that she had been an 
orphaned child, picked up by her late non-biological 
mother. Yŏn-sun continues that for a time she thought that 
this explained her sometimes hollow heart and frighten-
ing sadness. But she goes on, “[In fact] it wasn’t that at 
all, I felt all that because I wanted to see my [biological] 
mother.” And with the remarks that follow this comment, 
4 We cite this idea from Steven Chung’s 2008 presentation at the University of Illinois Korea Workshop, “Enlightenment Discourse and Korean Peninsular Cinema,” in which he argues that many films from the postwar 
era staged an “enlightenment spectacle.”  A revised version of this presentation is forthcoming as “Modalities of Enlightenment in 20th Century Korean Cinema” in positions.
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the broken relationship between the child and adult 
mother are most seamlessly mended: “If I am born again, I 
don’t want to dive; I just want to go to school like a regular 
kid.” Na-young, of course, is that “regular kid” who Yŏn-
sun has labored so hard to mother. Yŏn-sun then sincerely 
thanks Na-yŏng for being there, and for caring for her; it 
is here that we cannot but think that it is Na-yŏng who 
will need to return the gratitude to this will-be mother/
nurturer. To Yŏn-sun’s moving confession, Na-yŏng offers 
her own soliloquy: 
My mother scours women’s skin for a living. Everyday, 
all day, she makes her living from the ttae [dead skin 
cells] of young women. 10,000 won for one woman, 
100,000 won for ten. What matters most to her is 
money. And she swears. And she knows no embarrass-
ment. And she is harsh with my Dad. That’s my Mom. I 
hate my Mom. And all along I’ve thought, “No matter 
what happens, I don’t want to become like her.” But 
why? My mom is so pitiable, so pathetic. I can’t stop 
thinking about my Mom. [By now we are to assume that 
Yŏn-sun has fallen back to sleep] And even as I am look-
ing at my Mom now, I keep thinking of my Mom. 
By this point in the film, it is the adult mother she misses, 
in all her (resuscitated) humanity. Bared is what we have 
known intuitively: that Na-yŏng’s mother’s intimate 
labor was all along for nothing other than to give Na-yŏng 
that “regular kid’s” life that she never enjoyed. This is a 
kinship or excess that is entirely legible, if not clichéd, in 
South Korea’s developmentalist narrative. There comes a 
moment in the film when Na-yŏng names her extraction: 
her mother’s name, her father’s name, her name. The fili-
ation that she has long tried to turn away from stares her 
in the face: like the words and names that came to life with 
her child mother’s fledgling literacy. Named, the filiation 
is conjoined: and, yes, Na-yŏng can return to the gritty 
present and to her dying father whose final days’ refuge 
to this countryside was what had occasioned Na-yŏng’s 
travels. 
Na-yŏng finds her father and coaxes her mother to 
join him, “Mom, I know you are kind!” she insists on the 
phone. We note, however, that the change of heart toward 
her mother indexes more than her newly found apprecia-
tion of her mother’s labor. Na-yŏng’s return to the present 
likewise allows her as well as us to face once again the 
material realities that had so repelled her in her mother. 
On the boat south, Yŏn-sun nods knowingly to Na-yŏng’s 
boyfriend that he is an orphan – and as such, excluded 
from the web of kinship care – and hardly skips a beat to 
say that to marry Na-yŏng he will need to make money. 
Filiation, care, and money (the instrumental) are con-
joined, as are excessive mothers, like this one, like To-
jun’s in Mother as well. We are no longer distant onlook-
ers on Yŏn-sun’s crass materialism but understand it to 
be a product of familial care. It is as if it is not Yŏn-sun 
who has really changed, but that we have changed our 
view toward the woman who has always been kind and 
generous.  
My Mother, the Mermaid ends with Na-yŏng with a 
small daughter of her own; it is the day of her father’s 
chesa (ancestral services) and she is showing her daugh-
ter the family photo album. They come to the photo of the 
arrival of the village bus and look for Na-yŏng’s father 
there; Na-yŏng’s own presence in that photo, however, is 
gone. Of course this makes sense; the healing has already 
happened. This narrative closure, however, can be read 
doubly for its biological or patriarchal logic in which 
Na-yŏng inserts her daughter in a patrilineal genealogy 
just as she reminds her mother to come home early for 
her late husband’s memorial service. With this scene we 
are also reminded that the mother grieved the lack of a 
son – who would have been in charge of the memorial ser-
vice – at the father’s sickbed. The film’s mirror-imaging 
visual economy is such that the father’s sickbed recalls 
the mother’s own after the drowning incident. In that 
scene Yŏn-sun grieved the loss of the postman, not a son. 
We would submit that the film uses the sickbed – per-
haps a sobering rendition of the marriage bed – to paint 
romance and reality at the same time: the sometimes con-
tradictory values that constitute an ordinary patriarchal 
family. In the time travel, even as the mother and daugh-
ter reconcile, an emasculated father is resuscitated that 
so that we come to observe the romance of the norma-
tive family. While the patriarchal logic of this film remains 
open to interpretation, it is a more difficult task to imag-
ine the working class mothers of Yŏn-sun’s generation as 
anything other than at once phallic and nurturing, both of 
which relied on maternal sacrifice in South Korea’s devel-
opmentalist past.   
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FaMily ties
“The birth of family” (Kajogŭi t’ansaeng, Kim Tae-Yong, 
2006) offers an appealing and at moments playful medi-
tation on “family” as a web of care beyond normative 
or biological reckoning and configures non-biological 
homosocial female care as a veritable post-family. The 
film, perhaps to a fault, effects its own “birth of a family” 
by weaving together three story lines in the mode of omni-
bus film (See Diffrient 2012): that of a twenty-something 
young couple in a serendipitous budding romance; that 
of another twenty-something young professional woman 
and her mother (a shopkeeper in It’aewŏn, a shopping 
and tourist hotspot near an American army base also 
known for its bars and sexual service industry, who is also 
the mistress of a family man and mother of their young 
child together); and finally that of a thirty-something pro-
vincial town spinster whose life is shaken by the sudden 
appearance of her no-good younger brother and his much 
older girlfriend (and with the girlfriend soon after comes 
the young child of her ex-husband from an earlier rela-
tionship). We will discover that the two children in these 
strands – the young professional’s half brother through 
her mother’s apparent dalliances; and the child of the ex-
husband (by another woman) of the provincial woman’s 
younger brother’s girlfriend – are the twenty-something 
romantic couple (of the first strand) on which the movie 
begins. 
As with the other films, we are interested in the work 
this film does to suture 
the viewer into new 
perspectives on mater-
nal figures. We are led 
to identify with the 
perspective of char-
acters in the film who 
themselves gaze upon 
these maternal figures 
anew. At the heart of 
the film are the two 
middle-aged women 
who can be easily type-
cast in relation to their 
sexuality: women who 
share the dispositions 
(the look, the abode, 
the trade) of “loose” 
women. More spe-
cifically, the two older women in question are revisited 
through the radically transformed gaze of women near-
est to them, the daughter in the case of the It’aewŏn mis-
tress and the provincial spinster shopkeeper in the case 
of her brother’s (quite quickly) ex-girlfriend. Through the 
film, these sexually suspicious women are named “pretty 
women” – a code for kind women who care liberally. As 
the film’s streams merge, the viewer feels embraced by 
that very net of care and female sociality. 
We meet the It’aewŏn mistress as the young pro-
fessional (a tour guide) Sŏn-gyŏng’s mother through 
her daughter’s dismissive gaze: a mistress and tainted 
woman, dirtied by her poverty, her connection with the 
American military milieu (and hence sexually tainted), 
and her maternal failure. Our meeting is a cynical one in 
which Sŏn-gyŏng charges that her mother has likely only 
shown up – at her doorstep – because “[yet] another man 
has left her” (see Figure 6). Profoundly, Sŏn-gyŏng even 
refuses to be hailed, named by her mother: when her 
mother utters her name, she quips: “Strange, you were 
even wondering about me!” She pushes her mother out 
the door and subsequently her mother’s lover who has 
come to tell her that her mother is deathly ill. Sŏn-gyŏng 
dismisses that visit as well, “Oh, it is money you have 
come for?” (as with My Mother the Mermaid, here too 
money is at issue). Not long thereafter, we see Sŏn-gyŏng 
visit the humble store, nestled in the sullied landscape 
of the camptown, and demand the thousands of dollars 
6. Family Ties (2006)
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her mother owes her; she is brash with her half-brother 
and crass with her mother and her mother’s lover, shout-
ing that they disgust her. In her dramatic exit, she yells at 
them to “live well!” (a tongue in cheek way in which she 
seems to be offering a final goodbye).
After an ugly and violent scene with her own ex-boy-
friend, however, we find Sŏn-gyŏng visiting her mother 
again. After having virtually cut ties with her family, the 
significance of this visit is that Sŏn-gyŏng has now come 
to see her mother anew as a woman, not merely as her 
mother. Having signed papers with a company to work 
abroad, she goes back to her mother’s shop perhaps for 
the last time. Sŏn-gyŏng, however, witnesses her mother 
having a row with her lover at the door of the shop. 
She hides herself and watches them at a distance but 
her vision – like Na-yŏng’s in My Mother the Mermaid – 
resembles that of the camera that bares all that she had 
not wanted to see, now larger than life. After her own 
episode with her ex-boyfriend earlier that evening, she 
must have revisited her mother as a woman with trou-
bled romances not unlike herself. The next day, fittingly 
we see Sŏn-gyŏng walk through the very door where she 
had seen her mother block her lover from entering; with 
Sŏn-gyŏng we peek in at the quiet scene of her mother 
helping her young son with his coloring book. To Sŏn-
gyŏng’s quip, “Aren’t you ashamed [i.e., of your life],” her 
mother inquires calmly, “Have you been singing these 
days?” From the crass to the sublime, the mother picks up 
what she knows to be her daughter’s love, singing. Sŏn-
gyŏng is furious and announces that she will be leaving 
for a while to which her mother replies, quietly, “That’s 
good; I know you’ve always wanted to do that.” Sŏn-gyŏng 
persists, asking and accusing if her mother’s lover has 
after all only been after her for money. Again she replies 
quietly, “Men don’t come here for my money but because 
I’m pretty.” It is here that affect and instrument are con-
joined. As Sŏn-gyŏng mutters on about her mother’s piti-
ful and disgusting existence, her mother inquires if she 
might go to her half-brother’s kindergarten festival. And 
she does: reaching out to a lovely and needy little boy in a 
beautiful mise en scène of children dressed in sunlight yel-
low, the boy who she eventually takes into her home after 
her mother’s death. 
It is this little boy who years later, as a twenty-some-
thing man, will meet a young woman who hails from an 
even more unconventional household – one with abso-
lutely no blood ties at all. This young woman, Ch’ae-hyŏn, 
we will learn later, has a connection to Mi-ra, the provin-
cial owner of a small snack bar and loving keeper of the 
family home (we guess that her parents are departed). 
We first encounter Mi-ra about to meet her wayward, 
hapless brother after many years (see Figure 7). In much 
the same way that we are sutured to Sŏn-gyŏng’s gaze at 
her mother, we meet the brother’s lover, Mu-shin, through 
Mi-ra’s gaze at a tainted woman, a woman with ribald sen-
sibilities and a “past.” At a restaurant the three are joined 
by Mi-ra’s boyfriend, a 
“company president,” 
and the conversation 
turns off-color: the 
lovers joke about the 
liquor they’ll sell in the 
evening at the hanbok 
store they would like 
to open and Mu-shin 
jests that Mi-ra need 
not worry because it 
won’t be a brothel. It 
is not that long after 
this awkward evening 
that Ch’ae-hyŏn, the 
little girl (the daugh-
ter of Mu-shin’s ex 
by another woman), 
appears at the door. In 7. Family Ties (2006)
NANcy AbElMANN, JoSiE SohN  revisiting tHe Developmentalist era motHer in 2000s soutH Korean Film
44   Korean Histories 3.2   2013
a dramatic sequence, we witness her brother’s absurd 
overtures to the child which we recognize as absurd 
because by then it is so clear that he would not be able 
to care for anyone; Mu-shin’s quiet and resigned decision 
to leave with the girl; and the unspoken solidarity of the 
two women as they knowingly register the irresponsible 
figure of this man-child and become the girl’s “mothers.”
There are several scenes in the film which dissolve 
into slow or fast motion or fantasy: each film-within-a-
film spectacularizes the maternal. In one instance, Mi-ra 
and Mu-shin look out from the dining room table into the 
courtyard where Mi-ra has lovingly tended to the orchids 
– an index of domestic care. As the child is frolicking, the 
scene slows down and fades as if through a screen filter; 
the child plays in slow motion even as the scene races to 
index the passage of several days. In this para-cinematic 
vision, both women envelop this (biologically) unrelated 
child in their maternal gaze. Perhaps more importantly, 
however, they look at each other even as they turn their 
eyes to the child. In the awkward of moment of having to 
eat a meal with strangers, the two women are united and 
dissolved is the gaze at the pretty but unwelcome guest as 
a tainted woman.  
The matter of the pretty or good woman takes on again 
in the next generation of women, with Sŏn-gyŏng and 
Ch’ae-hyŏn. Shortly after Sŏn-gyŏng’s mother dies, she 
informs a cruise ship owner that she will, after all, not be 
traveling with them as a tour guide; the owner then pro-
claims her “crazy” to which she retorts, “You’re telling me 
that I’m crazy!!” incensed, we sense, at having thus herself 
become the object of a demonizing gaze at women. Shortly 
thereafter, we find Sŏn-gyŏng at home, prying open the 
suitcase that her mother had deposited the day that she 
had coldly purged her from her apartment, the scene in 
the movie where we first met her mother. The loving par-
aphernalia of Sŏn-gyŏng’s babyhood spills out of the suit-
case and there begins another scene of film play: together 
with Sŏn-gyŏng we watch the items literally dance on the 
ceiling in a festival of maternal nostalgia – her mother was 
indeed a kind and pretty woman (as her mother had once 
told her how it was that men came her way). The film then 
fast-forwards into the present of now forty-something 
Sŏn-gyŏng and her now twenty-something half brother, 
the yesteryear kindergartner: Sŏn-gyŏng tells him that 
she will be on TV (in her chorus). “Why,” he asks. Wryly 
she replies, “Because I’m pretty” (we smile and think, ‘like 
her mother’). It is moments later that he says, “You’re the 
strange one… you’re just like Mom… Everything about her 
was a mess.” Matter-of-factly Sŏn-gyŏng replies, much as 
her mother had to her, “Not a mess – it was only that she 
had so much love (chŏng).” Here we have come full circle, 
from the strange and messy to the loving, pretty, and nice.
In the film’s final scene, we return to the household 
of the two women, and now we know that Ch’ae-hyŏn is 
Mi-ra’s brother’s ex girlfriend’s daughter – the little girl 
who once danced in the courtyard and made a “family” 
of the two women. Ch’ae-hyŏn has come home with her 
now ex-boyfriend: Sŏn-gyŏng’s little brother, Kyŏng-sŏk. 
Ch’ae-hyŏn is greeted by Mi-ra who is positively mirth-
ful: she warmly, playfully, and even coquettishly insists 
that Kyŏng-sŏk must stay for dinner – all the while call-
ing laughingly to Mu-shin that Ch’ae-hyŏn and her boy-
friend have arrived – even as Ch’ae-hyŏn explains that 
they have broken up. Mi-ra seems to be saying, “Details, 
details, there is young life here, an adorable young boy 
and our precious Ch’ae-hyŏn to be fed, coddled.” Kyŏng-
sŏk is welcomed there as another child, neither linked by 
biology nor necessarily by romance with Ch’ae-hyŏn. In 
the final minutes of the film, the warm, “loose,” and even 
crazy three women nest Kyŏng-sŏk.5 And, as if to finally 
obviate the conventional biological family, Mi-ra has 
occasion to once and for all cut ties with her “real” and 
uncaring brother; he is literally prevented from entering 
the gate even as Ch’ae-hyŏn is welcomed back home at the 
same gate. It is in this fine company and cloth of women 
– a “women’s sphere” (Kim 2007) if ever there were one – 
that Kyŏng-sŏk watches his half-sister Sŏn-gyŏng singing 
with her choir on television.6 As they watch the choir on a 
rooftop framed by a fireworks-lit sky, we all, protagonists 
and viewers alike, come to share Kyŏng-sŏk’s loving gaze 
on his half-sister. In the film’s final film-within-a-film, we 
watch her float away from the chorus into the lit sky, as if 
beatified.  
This saintly figure intervenes in much the same way that 
suture operates in all of these films: celebrating women 
who have been prey to the most pernicious of gazes. In 
Mother which most explicitly features a “crazy” woman, 
5 It is worth noting that this family with two mothers, one of whom has a questionable reputation, has raised the adopted daughter to be “too easy,” the reason why Kyŏng-sŏk breaks up with Ch’ae-hyŏn. 
6 Kim Soyoung’s notion of a “women’s sphere” (yŏsŏngjang) (in which women’s public sphere [-jang] and women’s funeral [-jang] coincide) is an “uncertain zone of political society” (502) which recognizes the socially 
illegitimate and unseen labor of women as well as “a space open to both semiotic experiment and feminist politics” (490).  
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we witness that craziness dissolve in the banality of the 
female sphere of dancing women, the sphere that had 
been anathema to director Bong in his youth. My Mother, 
the Mermaid closes the arc of a mother’s life by suturing 
the daughter into her past, in apologia. In Family Ties we 
come full circle to crazy women, enshrined in their care 
work, for one another, and stretching beyond blood ties. 
As a group, these films offer more than simply narratives 
about the generation of women who championed through 
the developmentalist past of South Korea. More impor-
tantly, they spectacularize a particular way of looking 
at these mothers, one that reminds us of the vilification 
that has been part and parcel of even the highly culturally 
validated portrait of the excessive mother. It is suture, a 
technology essential to film, which works to recast these 
women and in part to appreciate them as the scapegoats 
of developmentalism (even as they are also its authors). 
While we have appreciated these films as important 
revisionist works, particularly as they take up women in 
somewhat marginal social positions, we have argued that 
they cannot so quickly be considered a feminist oeuvre. 
This is because the films at once reconstitute a particular 
“innocent” domesticity within the (patriarchal) famil-
ial space that romanticizes feminine care; this is even 
the case in Family Ties, which steps furthest outside the 
frame of biological, heterosexual family. Although beyond 
the scope of this paper, it is interesting in this regard to 
consider South Korea’s longstanding romance with West-
ern domesticity and the bourgeois family. Indeed, in film 
historiography, we can think of these films in dialogue 
with classic films from late 1950s and 1960s Golden Era 
cinema that imagined a new, modern Korean family. Cen-
tral to those films, such as Romance Papa (Shin Sang-ok, 
1960), The Housemaid (Kim Ki-young, 1960) or Mr. Park 
(Kang Dae-jin, 1960) was the spectacularization of the 
domestic. The visual economy of the three films we have 
discussed here imagines a domestic space in which peo-
ple care together; as we have examined, the mise en scène 
features beds, dining tables, and doors and gates as veri-
table protagonists in family life. 
Taken as a corpus, and remembering the striking 
absence of the family in South Korean feature film until 
quite recently, it is noteworthy indeed that the first dec-
ade of the 2000s became a moment for a transformed 
gaze at the South Korean developmentalist mother figure. 
There are many ways to think about the recent appear-
ance of the maternal figure in contemporary South 
Korean cinema. As Cho Han Haejoang has said of Mother, 
we can consider that these films were born in an era in 
which the family is becoming an ever more important 
survival unit. That these films imagine a more forgiving 
space for excessive women perhaps suggests that cinema 
– and other similar media – are ripe for this cultural work. 
We might also surmise that feminist scholarship and 
cine-feminism, although still marginal, have born fruit in 
films like the ones discussed here. Finally, perhaps more 
prosaically and personally, is the reality that the mothers 
in these movies hail from the generation of the mothers of 
the young directors themselves (My Mother the Mermaid, 
for instance, was somewhat modeled after the director’s 
own mother). Whatever the constellation of reasons, we 
note the powerful constant in the South Korean social 
imaginary: namely that the realm of the personal and 
social are intricately and intimately connected.
FilMography 
Family Ties (Kajogŭi t’ansaeng, Kim Tae-Yong, 2006)
Mother (Madŏ, Bong Joon-ho, 2009)
Mr. Park (Pak Sŏbang, Kang Dae-jin, 1960)
My Mother the Mermaid (Inŏ kongju, Park Heung-Sik, 
2004)
Romance Papa (Romaensŭ Ppappa, Shin Sang-ok, 1960)
The Housemaid (Hanyŏ, Kim Ki-young, 1960) 
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Kenneth Wells
An experiment in historicAl understAnding 
The impact of 1945 on  
a north Korean family  
I. SOURCES AND FRAMEWORKS OF HISTORYWhat does it mean to be a historian? A historian is interested in others: real other people who are not ideas or motifs or tendencies or signifiers or forces or trajectories or texts or mass phenomena or tropes or icons or any sort of represen-tation, but who have lived real lives in real places at specific times. We ask a historical question about historical matters in which historical people are implicated, and then we have to think how we could possibly answer the question. Given that the people are or were real, how can we know whether the imprints they have left are real, and what indeed are these imprints?This is where literary critics have made life more dif-ficult for historians. Literary criticism has for a long time included historical studies, and history, in its English lan-guage tradition, used to be deemed a branch of literature, thanks to such as Macaulay and Carlyle, and perhaps also Gibbon (Herbert Butterfield, History & Human Relations, 1951). And with the rise of New Historicism in literary studies, the two fields became more entwined, and became entirely fused in literary-historical works such as Catherine Gallagher’s 1985 book, The industrial reformation of English 
fiction: social discourse and narrative form, 1832-1867. And whereas previously such a work might have been regarded simply as a literary history, by now the array of ideas, theo-ries and methodologies that had been catergorised with literary critical theory as a distinct discipline began to call historical methods directly into question, and in particular the area of source criticism.And so in my abstract I remarked that one of the many effects of the rise of New Historicism in literary critical 
circles on historians has been to revive in an acute form the question how or whether one can draw boundaries between the contents of what we deem to be archival records and the mindsets and assumptions held by the composers and intended recipients of those records. The question is no longer confined to when, where, by whom and for whom archives are composed. It now includes (or includes once more, since among others 17th-century European thinkers debated this) the questions whether a whole culture or historical unit is a text and if so whether we can continue to make distinctions between texts and their contexts, as assumed in the very idea of representa-tions or interpretations of events. If we make a distinction, is that not clearly an event? What then do we mean by “find-ing out” in history?Now, when it comes to memoirs, diaries, and (auto)biog-raphies we have always tended to consider them less reli-able in telling us about events than government or other official archives, presumably because we view them to be under far less stringent disciplinary or public constraints. And so we give them less probative value when endeav-ouring to find out what might have happened and how and why. But we need to consider the claim that they are simply more obviously representational texts than some others, and the greater value as sources we give the other texts is possibly arbitrary. Why is one representational or interpretive imprint more dependable for historical narra-tives than another? Indeed, the personal testimonies might leave a deeper and more lasting imprint, and influence ideas about and historical responses to the events or situa-tions they claim to recollect than, say, police records about 
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the same things. Even if, perhaps especially if, the personal testimonies are deliberately false, as, in his inimitable way, Umberto Eco shows us in his essay titled “The Force of Fal-sity” (in his Serendipities: Language and Lunacy, 1999).But we have to pause before continuing down this road. After all, the very idea of forgeries and the like in histori-cal studies has depended precisely on drawing heuristic boundaries between historical events and their represen-tations, and we therefore consider source criticism to be an ineluctable item in a responsible attempt to find out things historical. What this means is that whether or not an entire culture or historical unit is a text, we still believe that out of the consequently vast array of historical traces this imposes on our research we must distinguish between texts that are fictitious (whether deliberately or not) and those which might help us find out about events themselves. For the reliable and unreliable texts continue on side by side through all phases and periods, and so it is only in the rare case where we find ourselves studying a period or situation for which there is a sheer dominance of personal testimo-nies that a real problem arises. All texts may be events, and may influence subsequent non-textual events, but not all texts represent other events, whatever their claims. After all, counterfactual histories are a recognized literary genre.To return a moment to Catherine Gallagher, on re-reading the 2001 publication she wrote with Stephen Greenblatt, 
Practicing New Historicism, I am reminded that the impulse behind their creation of New Historicism was a “simulta-neous fascination with theory and resistance to it” when undertaking literary history. They both remained “deeply skeptical of the notion that we should formulate an abstract system and then apply it to literary works” (p. 2). Hayden White attempted just that in his long book, The content of 
the form: narrative discourse and historical representation (1987). I remember when reading it that the further I got the more I wondered where it could possibly lead, and 
was not terribly surprised to find the author concluding, not, I should say, in the spirit of Wittgenstein, that it had changed nothing substantial about doing history and left us all basically where we had started. I prefer Gallagher and Greenblatt: there is no “overarching theory, prior to or independent of individual cases” (p. 3), there remains historical and human value to even the single voice (p. 16), which, even if it is somewhat lone in its particular-ity, cannot be dismissed from the story (p. 17). Therefore, they asserted, one cannot know in advance of immers-ing oneself in research whether the method or approach 
one is following is appropriate (p.18). To this I would add that any narrative a historian produces will not simply be incomplete, as it must be in any case, but also distorted if it does not include the story of resistance to that which is deemed to be the “outcome.”I might possibly go further with the methodological 
ramifications, when I take the position that there is no 
universal method of history that we can find or follow. We 
have to find a way to answer the particular questions we 
ask; that is why a very fluid and open-ended practice of heuristics remains at the heart of doing history.So when we carry out research on memoirs, diaries, and (auto)biographies—and let me here add interviews—we have to work out what we can glean from them as we go. From my experience in the case I wish to talk about today, I have found them to be valuable windows on history in the making and in some instances may be considered a dialectic of text and event. In cases of family histories, they can provide us with a means of studying large events on a small scale and may even compel us to adjust or even revise the generalizations drawn from more established research on the big events.So now I turn to the records of a Korean family, whose members were implicated in and to some degree con-tributed to some of the major historical developments and phenomena that we associate with the Korean pen-insula in the 20th century. The records include court records, two biographies, and one autobiography, as well as many hours of taped interviews of family members. 
These records are difficult to fit within precise bounda-ries. Indeed, they transgress boundaries not only of event and representation but also of individual experience and 
world-historical significance, and compel us to consider whether our appreciation of history is the poorer for put-ting such records in the shadows or distant background of our historical narratives. And although I suggested these sources may be understood as a dialectic of text and event, what this meant in their actual experiences was 
a dialectic of conflict and solidarity: an internal familial 
conflict and solidarity to be sure, but nonetheless for that, thoroughly grounded in and shaping the markers of con-
flict and solidarity in the history of their times.
To this family belongs Kim Sŏnhyŏk, who forms the centre of this talk today. I do not give all the names and some that I give are not their real names, since I am not quite sure whether I have their permission to cite their names at this stage.
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Kim Sŏnhyŏk’s extended family is very extended, glob-ally, and the main reason many of its members seek to maintain solidarity via an internet cousinry web-page is that they are family. Of course, there is alongside this a notion of a Korean national connection, but the princi-ple of desired solidarity is all in all the fact of family. For this family is not a unity on some important fronts: it is divided on lines of religion, politics, and cultural identity.To cite just politics, one of the cousins, who is a UN-
certified simultaneous interpreter between English and Korean, is also admired or disapproved for certain dissi-dent activities that landed her in jail at the end of 1997. To be precise: as a member of a left-wing student organiza-tion in South Korea, she attended an International Youth Festival in Cuba, where she met with delegates from North Korea. I might add that she appears as an interviewee in 
the film, “Rushing to Sunshine,” the sequel to “P’yongyang 
Diaries,” by the Australian free-lance film director Solrun Haas, in the year 2000.But if we jump back in history to 1946, we discover that 
her great-uncle, Kim Sŏnhyŏk, was arrested at the age of 17 for student activities opposing the UN Trusteeship that had been agreed to at the December 1945 Moscow 
Conference, and railroaded off to the USSR prison-camp 
system. His father, her great-grandfather, Kim Hyŏnsŏk, was arrested the following year for similar reasons and 
was executed on the eve of the capture of P’yŏngyang by the South Korean and UN forces in November 1950, dur-ing the Korean War of 1950-53. Moreover in 1981, one of her uncles was arrested for his involvement in student groups opposing the regime of General Chun Doo-Hwan. Does something run in the family? What is their relation to what we generally call history? What relation do they bear towards the wide-ranging sea of change that affected the world from the conclusion of World War II in 1945? How do their experiences relate to both the domestic strands of their nation’s division and the global tensions that framed it?The division of Korea into two states is one of the more serious legacies of the colonial period. It was, of course, 
the direct result of the manner in which the USSR and the USA chose to disarm and expel the Japanese from the pen-insula in August 1945, but the need to disarm the Japa-
nese only arose in the first place from the fact of Japan’s colonial rule over Korea. The manner of the division itself 
can be characterised as artificial and arbitrary, unrelated to the actual conditions on the peninsula. But there has 
been some confusion caused by this accurate observa-tion, for it has been taken by some to infer that there was not a natural ideological division among the Korean peo-ple, no other basis for their participation in the Cold War, and no active complicity in the division by Koreans. None of these common extrapolations is entirely accurate.The year 1945 was of course a matter of considerable moment to much of the world, and ever since there has been a scattering of large numbers of people around the globe. For Korea, the end of W.W.II meant liberation from 36 years of Japanese colonial rule, quickly followed by the political division of the peninsula into two nationalisti-cally and ideologically hostile states, between which Cold War stakes were raised terribly high in a devastating war between 1950 and 1953.August 1945 marks a kind of temporal combustion in 
Korea, and in particular in P’yŏngyang, and the ripples 
became the stuff of life for Kim Sŏnhyŏk’s and a mul-titude of other families. But Kim’s family had already participated in and in some instances initiated some of the profound transformations that the peninsula experi-
enced in the first half of the 20th century: the embrace and energetic propagation of a new religion; advancement of new sources and objectives of education, including for women; a revolution in gender relations; introduction of new industries, occupations, technology and medicine; nationalist and anti-imperialist movements; and ideolog-
ical conflict. Already, well before the year 1945, their own records of this period of transformation are expressed in 
terms of conflict and solidarity.But to return to 1945 and after: two implacably divided states, millions of divided families, now scattered across 
the globe. Kim’s family was reunified, in a sense, partly physically, and partly electronically in 1994. But the 
reunification only occurred in a sense in which the his-tory, the 50 years in between, remained intact, meaning-ful, and consequential.What historical framework should we employ? Nor-mally, an epic framework is assumed: big, even global movements and transformations, the tumult of warfare, the power of armaments, government policies backed by money and police forces, industrial expansion and the spread of mass society, nationalist movements and so on. In this respect, the family’s experiences must be understood in relation to the particular big issue that was 
attached to Kim Sŏnhyŏk’s arrest, his father’s subsequent 
execution, his family’s flight south and their move around 
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the world, namely, the Allied Powers’ Trusteeship Agree-ment and the left-right ideological divide on a grand scale.
II. THE BIOGRAPHIES
Once Kim Sŏnhyŏk was arrested in October 1946 and his 
father Kim Hyŏnsŏk in 1947, the history of the division 
was for them a family affair. In 1982, Kim Hyŏnsŏk’s eld-est surviving son in South Korea wrote his father’s biog-
raphy. And after Kim Sŏnhyŏk’s eldest sister Kwihyŏk met him in Kiev in 1994, she wrote his biography (although it is published under his name as if it were an autobiogra-phy). She had over a decade earlier written her autobi-ography, which refers to related and other family events. These books are: 
Kim Kihyŏk, 김현석장노 전기 (Kim Hyŏnsŏk Changno 
Chŏn’gi [Biography of Elder Kim Hyŏnsŏk]), Seoul, 
MacMillan Press, 1982
Kim Kwihyŏk, 평양에서 서울까지 47년 (P’yŏngyangesŏ 
Sŏulkkaji [From P’yongyang to Seoul], Seoul, 
Hongsŏngsa, 1996
Kim Kwihyŏk, 평양에서 예루살렘까지 (P’yŏngyangesŏ 
Yerusallemkkaji) [From Pyongyang to Jerusalem]), 
Seoul, Yŏnggwang Tosŏ, 1983
The biographies of Kim Hyŏnsŏk, the father, and Kim 
Sŏnhyŏk, the son, tell us the following. The father was born 
in a village near P’yŏngyang, in fact in Man’gyŏngdae, in 1903. He married a woman who had recently converted to Christianity and he too converted soon after marriage. In 1933 he became founding president of the Northwest Christian Youth League, and founded a church the follow-ing year. He managed a rubber company and mosquito 
net factory, basically cottage industries at first, but they expanded and were regarded as new industries. Later he moved into a hosiery manufacturing plant, which devel-oped into a wool textile factory. In 1939, he opened his own textile factory. He was thus considered a “new man,” not in this case by virtue of a new education but of run-
ning new industries. His son Kim Sŏnhyŏk was born on 26 January 1929. He had an elder sister and brother and three younger sisters and one younger brother. They all received a modern education, the eldest daughter going to Seoul for higher education. With the exception of Kim 
Sŏnhyŏk, they all married into families likewise firmly 
identified with the new religious, educational, industrial/professional and national movements of the time.
In spring 1942, Kim Sŏnhyŏk entered Kwangsŏng Mid-
dle School, a private school in P’yŏngyang. When WWII 
started, the Japanese School Board formed the ‘Poguk-tae’ (National Defense Corps) and required all students to engage in many kinds of manual labour as part of the 
war effort. At school, Sŏnhyŏk became a member of anti-colonial associations, conscious of the students’ duty to work for the future of the nation. In the words attributed to him by his sister:
“On 17 August [1945], the South P’yŏngan branch of 
the Reconstruction Preparation Committee [Kŏnguk 
Chunbi Wiwŏnhoe] was formed under the leadership of Kodang Cho Mansik. He had also been an Elder along with 
my father in Sanjŏnghyŏn Church. The committee, not yet capable of exercising any administrative power, pleaded for support through radio broadcasts to all the students in the schools.
“The students in P’yŏngyang worked in a well-organ-ized manner. The city was divided into several segments and was policed by groups of students. We each had a trainer’s gun without bullets. It was better than nothing but it was really our bodies that stood against the unrest. We kept the city in order for 10 days until the so-called 
‘Red Liberation Army’ arrived in P’yŏngyang. The USSR army that had declared war against Japan and started 
moving south in great numbers, entered P’yŏngyang on 25 August. The citizens welcomed the army, giving them 
flowers. General Chitchiakov, who led the 25th Unit of 
the 1st Army of the USSR Far Eastern forces, arrived in 
P’yŏngyang and established ‘The USSR Army Headquar-
ters in North Korea’. As people saw the red flag on top of the headquarters building, certain sentiments of an ill omen were muttered among the crowd. The political 
commander Romanenko formed the ‘P’yŏngnam Peo-
ples’ Political Committee’ [P’yŏngnam Inmin Chŏngch’i 
Wiwŏnhoe] with 16 members each from the two main 
camps. The National camp, P’yŏngnam Kŏnguk Chunbi 
Wiwŏnhoe, was led by Cho Mansik and the Communist 
camp, the Chosŏn Communist Party, by Hyŏn Chun’gŭk.
“On 19 September 1945, Kim Il Sung arrived in Wŏnsan 
on the USSR naval ship, the Pugachev. When he arrived in 
P’yŏngyang, the church members suggested a welcoming service for him at our house. In late September, a big party for the ‘welcome service for Kim Il Sung on his homecom-ing’ took place in our house in Shinyang-ri. Two military 
jeeps arrived. One had USSR army security commander 
Petrov, his interpreter and a few attendants. The other 
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had Kim Il Sung with a shiny medal on his chest, Ch’oe 
Yonggŏn, and a few attendants.”
Kim Sŏnhyŏk recalled that the general mood of the peo-ple was expressed in a saying that was passed around: 
“Don’t be deceived by the USSR and don’t trust the Ameri-cans either.”
sammindang activity
The Sammindang, meaning Three People’s Party, is a name borrowed from the party established in China by Sun Yat-sen during his drive to abolish the Chinese Ch’ing 
monarchy and replace it with a republic. Kim Sŏnhyŏk’s biography does not mention the origin or any other background details of the party, but goes straight to Kim 
Sŏnhyŏk’s account of its purpose: opposition to the Trus-teeship Agreement forged at the December 1945 Mos-cow Conference. “The issue of trusteeship seemed more 
urgent than [preparing for] our university education,” the biography cites him. “Five years of trusteeship sounded so unfair and so long for us young people. We had been waiting for our independence for such a long time and here was the chance, but the unexpected intruders came in, destroying our land and attempting to divide this already small country in two! It was unacceptable.“During the March First commemoration some of the students had been arrested for staging an anti-trustee-ship demonstration. One of my classmates was released 
after three days in the P’yŏngyang police station. He excit-edly shared his experience during a recess at school. ‘You have no idea what it is like to be in captivity. You all need to taste the experience for a few days if you want to be a ‘true man’ in the future.’“Well, it turned out that I ended up following his advice, not just for a few days but for many decades. But I am not 
sure whether I became a ‘true man’. I suppose the defini-tion of ‘true man’ is rather subjective.“But we were young people with hot blood. We thought 
little of death. It was worth dying to fight against the trus-
teeship, to let the world know that Chosŏn youth are not 
afraid to die when fighting against injustice. ‘The patriotic youth in India can do it, why not we?’
“Sammindang members printed out leaflets and made posters opposing the Communist party and Kim Il Sung. 
My job was to distribute the leaflets and to put up the posters. Because we were educated in Japanese it was 
difficult sometimes to think up good slogans in Korean. My father said nothing. He may have guessed what I was 
doing. I felt that he would not oppose me even if he knew about it.”
Arrest
On 5 May 1946, about 4 o’clock in the morning, Sŏnhyŏk was startled from his sleep by persistent banging on his gate along with a dog’s barking. He arose with a sense of 
unease, and was met by his elder brother, Kihyŏk, who 
warned him to flee. Since the roof of the adjacent house 
was joined to theirs, he briefly considered doing so, but changed his mind, thinking that would only prove him guilty and would surely bring harm on the whole family. It 
so happened that his parents had gone to Man’gyŏngdae 
with the youngest boy, Tohyŏk, and only his elder broth-er’s family and three younger sisters were in the house. But the visitors were policemen. “They said that I was needed as a witness for a certain incident and that I would return home that day after a few questions. I put on my school uniform and took an English-Korean dictionary. My brother’s face was grim as he followed us out to the 
gate. ‘Sŏnhyŏk, be careful.’ I looked back at him standing there in dark. That was to be my last memory of him.”There was no trial, but the interrogation accompanied 
by physical violence lasted three months before Sŏnhyŏk and a large number of his fellow students and many he did not know were carried by train across the northern 
border into Russia and its GULAG. He himself was sen-tenced to 7 years’ hard labour, to be followed by 10 years of exile. His prison camp life took him from Khabarovsk to Irkutsk, Novosibirsk, Serov, and, on Christmas Eve 1946, to the notorious camp of Vorkuta in the Arctic Circle.
Fortunately for Sŏnhyŏk, shortly after his arrival in 
Vorkuta, the Russian prison command was ordered not to locate youth under the age of 20 to such places during winter, and he was shuttled south to Yekaterinburg, and thence, over time, to Kamensk-Uralskiy, Nizhniy Tagil, and Nizhniy Novgorod. Nizhniy Novgorod, where he arrived in September 1948, is not too far east of Moscow, conditions were comparatively good for the prisoners, 
and Sŏnhyŏk himself was able to gain a rather privileged 
position in the camp’s supply office. 
Release and rediscovery
In February 1953, his sentence expired, and Sŏnhyŏk was sent to work in exile for 10 years in Yeniseysk and 
Krasnoyarsk in the Central Siberian Plateau. There he worked mainly as a carpenter on numerous construc-
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tion projects. Upon serving out his exile term, he stayed in the region, trained as a motor mechanic, and became 
the operator and maintenance officer of a fire brigade 
truck. Meanwhile, he married a Russian woman, Tatiana, with whom he had three children, of whom two survived, a daughter named Natasha and a son named Alexeyev. In the 1960s he applied successfully for rehabilitation, and 
gained Russian citizenship soon afterwards. On retiring, 
Sŏnhyŏk and his wife bought a bungalow in the town of 
Volsk on the Volga River, some 90 miles upstream of the city of Saratov, which is a 16-hour train-ride southeast of Moscow. In 1989, his wife passed away, and some years 
ago Kim Sŏnhyŏk moved to a retirement village not far north of Moscow.When in 1989 Gorbachev announced the new era of 
perestroika in Russia, two of Kim Sŏnhyŏk’s sisters who were at that time living in LA, decided to search for their lost brother, on the off-chance he was alive and still in 
Russia. To cut this remarkable part of the story short, he 
was finally located late in 1993 and was able to meet his sisters in Kiev. The following year, he traveled to Seoul, where he met his then 90-year-old mother.
III. THE INTERVIEWS
Upon reading Kim Sŏnhyŏk’s eldest sister’s account, one 
finds a great deal of detail about her brother’s experi-ences in the camps and after his release and some refer-ence to the political context. When the broader context does appear, it looms daunting and decisive in its immedi-ate affects. This is perhaps a narrative strategy, for it ren-
ders the denouement—Sŏnhyŏk’s discovery and reunion with his mother and siblings in Seoul—more dramatic 
and thereby more victorious. Yet one finds little attempt to fuse the large and the small scale; rather, the details of 
his life in Russia are a kind of interlude between his arrest and his return, which frame the biographical account and 
give it its providential significance. 
But this biography was read before travelling to Russia 
and staying with Kim Sŏnhyŏk, alone in his home in Volsk 
on the Volga River. It was before observing how he lived and how he remembered, and recording a dozen hours of interviews and taking copious notes; before realising that the 50 years in between was no vacuum in the story. This experience led me to recognize the completeness in themselves of human experiences and the inadequa-cies of the usual categories whereby we attempt to get a handle on history. The circumstances of his life, of which 
we tend to regard him as a victim, were to him the raw materials of his life, and to call the “big events” the condi-tions of his being is probably the strongest sense we may concede to their importance.In order to consider how the records of the interviews relate to and affect our understanding of the big picture, 
let me first briefly remind ourselves of the normal view of events surrounding the trusteeship agreement.
Late in November 1943, Roosevelt from the USA, Churchill from the United Kingdom, and Chiang Kai-shek from China met at what is known as the Cairo Conference, and agreed that in the event of an allied victory, Japan would be stripped of all its colonies. Then at the Tehran Conference in December 1943, at which Stalin agreed to attack Japan once the European war was concluded, the policy of placing Korea under a trusteeship was adopted in principle. But when, at the Yalta Conference of Febru-
ary 1945, Roosevelt suggested a twenty to thirty-year trusteeship over Korea, Stalin countered that the shorter the trusteeship the better. Britain, France and The Neth-erlands, for their part, fumed over the possibility that trusteeships might by extension be applied to their own colonial possessions, so that the trusteeship agreement stood on very shaky ground until it was agreed that only those possessions held by axis powers would be consid-ered. 
At the Potsdam Conference of July 1945, which Truman 
attended in place of Roosevelt, who had died in April, disagreements between Churchill and Stalin over how to deal with colonial territories, especially the Italian colo-nies in Africa, left the question of a trusteeship over Korea hanging once more. But after the USA dropped its atomic bombs on Japan on 6 and 9 August, the Soviets began dis-arming the Japanese in Manchuria with the greatest of ease, whereupon the US State-War-Navy Coordinating 
Committee decided for the first time that it was advis-able to participate more actively in the occupation of Korea and again pressed for a trusteeship. Thus when the Moscow Conference was convened on 16 December, the 
United Kingdom, USSR and USA agreed on a four-power 
trusteeship over Korea for five years, and at the urging 
of the USSR, they agreed also that a Korean government should be put in place before, not after, the trusteeship period ended. As it happened, growing mistrust between 
the USA and USSR in the final stages of the Pacific War prevented either this or any other “agreement” from being carried out. 
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The December Moscow Conference agreement that 
Korea be placed under a four-power trusteeship for five years threw the southern region into political turmoil. The rightists were adamantly opposed to it, as was Gen-eral Hodge himself, and by late January the USA revoked its agreement to the trusteeship proposal—on grounds 
that it favoured USSR expansionism! General Hodge used the widespread Korean antipathy to the trusteeship resolution to portray the communists as anti-national, 
and favoured the new Korea Democratic Party (KDP) led 
by Rhee Syngman, even though the outspoken Rhee by this stage was persona non grata in the US State Depart-ment. In the process, thousands of Koreans suspected of left-wing sympathies were jailed and many were later executed, particularly in relation to armed insurrections in the southern provinces from 1947 and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. In the north, matters were quieter but far from peace-ful. The Soviet and Chinese Communist parties instructed Korean communist leaders to stay north of the thirty-eighth parallel and to support the Trusteeship Agree-
ment. Provisional People’s Committees were established throughout the northern regions, to be centralised under 
a “Democratic National Front” under the leadership of Yŏ 
Unhyŏng and Pak Hŏnyŏng. The non-communist nation-alist bodies, which were numerically stronger than the communists, resisted the order to submit to the trustee-
ship arrangement, and Cho Mansik’s Chosŏn Democratic 
Party doggedly refused to budge on the issue. Throughout 1946 and 1947, Cho and a considerable number of oppo-sition people were imprisoned and later executed, while by some accounts up to 200,000 Koreans were delivered 
into the USSR prison camps, of whom few survived and fewer returned.How important was the trusteeship issue? Bruce Cumings has described the Trusteeship Agreement as a compromise, because a Korean government was to be established before, not after, the trusteeship: “In truth,” he wrote, “ it was barely a trusteeship agreement at all, in the sense that it did not question Korean competency for self-government or suggest that Koreans necessar-ily needed tutelage.” He then adds: “In the north, in con-trast to the actions taken by the Americans in the south, the Soviets had obtained, by whatever means and at the expense of Cho Mansik’s leadership, Korean agreement to the Moscow decisions.” (The origins of the Korean War vol. 1, c1981, pp 217ff)
That the trusteeship agreement was a compromise, “barely a trusteeship agreement at all,” is perhaps techni-cally correct. Yet insofar as the trusteeship agreement had been a compromise, it was far less a compromise between 
the Allied Powers and the Koreans, than between con-
flicting views of the members of the Allied Powers them-selves. The nub of the problem was not whether Koreans were ready for independent self-governance so much as whether demands would arise from colonial possessions of the British and French and Americans that the trustee-ship logic be applied to them. There is here an ironic twist of fate, for the Korean Independence Declaration of 1919 had failed because, Japan at that time being a member of 
the Allied Powers, Wilson’s national self-determination principle was applied only to non-allied nations. 
Whether the USSR and its North Korean friends viewed it as “hardly an agreement at all” is by no means clear. Yet it is clear that this was not how Kim’s family and those who opposed it saw the issue, and most certainly not how they experienced it. According to the interview record, Kim and his father proceeded on the understanding that 
the trusteeship had definitely been agreed to, but was not something the Koreans needed or wanted. Moreover, when we place the judgment that “in the north, in con-trast to the actions taken by the Americans in the south, the Soviets had obtained, by whatever means and at the expense of Cho Mansik’s leadership, Korean agreement to the Moscow decisions,” against the record of this family’s experience of precisely that process of obtaining “agree-ment”, it becomes nigh impossible to characterize this development as a side-issue of only passing importance. Viewed according to what has become accepted as the big picture or the larger epic narrative, the above judgment, again, seems technically correct. But perhaps our broader narrative is at fault and might even radically distort the historical meaning of the process, a meaning that is not 
confined to experiences of some at the time but contin-ues through to the present. Suppression of the resistance of the vanquished has been the hallmark of both regimes in divided Korea, but the memories live on, actively so, and historians should be careful not to aid in their sup-pression. That the Kim family’s experience is replicated in different ways by tens of thousands of Korean families 
suggests that one could justifiably characterize the pro-cess whereby the trusteeship issue was “resolved” as the centerpiece of the national and political struggle that developed in the north. To be sure, it cost Cho Mansik his 
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leadership, but it entailed far more than that: it contrib-uted substantially to creating the momentum that cost Korea the possibility of avoiding the division that was 
finally sealed in 1948.For the position, or intention of the opponents of the trusteeship agreement in the north was that Cho Mansik, 
Yŏ Unhyŏng, and Kim Ku would join hands and prove pre-cisely the point that Cumings attributes to the so-called trusteeship compromise: that Koreans were capable of self-government. As far as the participants of the anti-trusteeship movement were concerned, the trusteeship agreement was an unambiguous statement by the Allied 
Powers that “Koreans necessarily needed tutelage.” The forceful and for many Koreans lethal way in which the 
USSR compelled the northern Koreans to accept the Mos-cow Agreement strongly supported this view. Kim and all his immediate family lend support to the charge that whereas the Japanese wore swords and guns, especially 
during the Pacific War period, they did not fire them off 
nor did they engage in wanton pillage. When the Russians 
came, on the contrary, gunfire was frequently heard, peo-ple were killed, and individuals were stripped openly in the streets of their personal effects. Although this charge is sometimes construed as a post-division rationale for 
their decision concocted by those Koreans who fled south, it is generally known that, as Cumings noted, the early 
behaviour of the occupying Russian troops was deplor-
able (p. 438). The fact that Kim Sŏnhyŏk, who had taken 
no part in the flight south or the development of refugee culture in the south, nor partaken in the Cold War animus 
toward the USSR, recalled this contrast in the Japanese 
and Russian behaviour in his interview, gives the percep-tion considerable authenticity.In short, the interviews and other sources revealed that the anti-trusteeship campaign in the north was not considered to be an anti-people’s movement or even anti-
People’s Republic movement until it was forced into that 
position by the Korean communists and their Russian overseers. Once it was so forced, however, it was too late for the likes of not only Cho Mansik but also the Kim fam-ily and thousands of others. 
Kim Sŏnhyŏk indicated in his interviews that he was under no illusions that it was this contrived casting of the anti-trusteeship movement as an anti-people’s move-ment that was to blame for his arrest, with its life-long consequences. But he is not in any sense a bitter man. He does not regard himself as a victim in any categorical 
sense. The interviews show him also to be refreshingly free from a Cold War atmosphere. They include no smear-ing and no belittling of Kim Il Sung, and almost no politi-cal axe grinding; instead, he shares measured, reasoned, considered judgments. He had, he said, written letters to Stalin at one point. He spoke approvingly of some politi-
cal figures in the former USSR and shared perspectives 
on President Putin (in his first term) that were possible 
only for someone fully in touch with the Russian mind. Whereas he did not appear to hold negative views of the “other side,” to which belonged South Korea as well as America, neither did he express any dissatisfaction with 
his lot in the Russian Federation. On one occasion, when he was stopped and ordered out of his car by a soldier while driving me through Saratov, then a particularly sensitive region because of the troubles in Chechnya and Georgia, he conversed with this soldier in a fully articu-
late and natural manner, with flashes of humour, that 
reminded me how long he had been raised on Russian soil and how at home he was in this environment. The soldier looked through his papers, shared his humour, nodded approvingly at him, and directed him back to the car. 
Kim Sŏnhyŏk indeed came across as a remarkable instance of self-reliance, a whole person, in control, determining his viewpoint, his meaning. He calls himself a lucky man. When asked to come and live in South Korea, he observed that whereas his brothers there seem not to know how to be happy, he, this man with the delightful laugh, knew how to be happy. 
Until contacted by his sisters, Kim Sŏnhyŏk had no knowledge of what had happened to his father. What did the court judgment say of his father, when sentencing him to imprisonment? (My translation of a copy in my pos-session.)
1 April 1948: north Korean (북조선) high court; chief Judge 
Kim sŏnbae (sinbae?) affirmed the finding and the sentence 
of 31 march 1948, regarding Kim hyŏnsŏk (46) and cho 
Yŏnch’ang (26) [曹然昶]
the two are accused of conscious and deliberate opposition 
to the people’s power in north chosŏn, and to the decisions 
made at the moscow conference. they are accused of spear-
heading the anti-trusteeship movement in cahoots with the 
anti-people stance of Kim Ku for the purpose of perpetuat-
ing a political and economic form of government, state 
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power, that differed not one jot from that of the Japanese 
imperial order.
Kim Hyŏnsŏk
in February 1947, as a christian, he went to seoul, where he 
was introduced to Kim Ku through hwang Ŭn’gyun  
[黃殷均] and instructed to engage in the anti-trusteeship 
movement. Kim Ku introduced him to cho sŏnghwan, head 
of the committee for immediate independence  
[독촉위원장], to whom he reported on the situation 
regarding christians in the north, and was charged by cho 
with the mission of inciting christians in p’yŏngyang on 
the anniversary of the march First movement to campaign 
against the trusteeship. Kim hyŏnsŏk was thus given 
responsibility for the campaign in the north.
Kim returned to p’yŏngyang and passed on these matters to 
cho mansik through some leaders there.
on march First, between 7 and 9:30 Am, Kim gathered about 
1000 christians at p’yŏngyang changdaehyŏn church and 
opened an anti-trusteeship speech meeting, which was 
followed by chanting of “taehan tongnip mansei!”
Around the middle of may 1947, Kim again visited seoul, 
where he met Kim Ku and hwang and reported on the 
movement in p’yŏngyang. hwang instructed him to 
continue the movement to the end, and Kim learned that 
through rhee syngman’s diplomacy the usA had been 
persuaded to grant Korea independent statehood.
on 20 may 1947, learning of the opening of the us-ussr 
joint deliberations, and with the object of obstructing 
these deliberations, Kim contacted cho mansik and his 
associates through the Youth society for the Advancement 
of christianity [기독교면려청년회], which included Kim 
tuyŏng.
in June, Kim was a member of the organizing committee 
for a secret society called the Freedom party [자유당] 
and of its funding committee, in order to destroy the joint 
deliberations. he abused his position among the christians, 
as a member of the reconstruction committee of the 
encouragement Youth Association and a presbyterian elder 
in p’yŏngyang, to try and destroy the north Korean people’s 
power. he served as an adviser to a secret society organized 
by the Youth society for the Advancement of christianity 
called the hwalmindang [活民堂], from the liberation to 
July 1947.
Kim Sŏnhyŏk, of course, was already in the Russian gulag when these events, according to the charges, took place. But Kim recalls that it was already a very common idea after the liberation that a good arrangement would be for 
Rhee Syngman to be President, Kim Ku Minister of Home 
Kim sŏnhyŏk in his home in Volsk in 2001
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Affairs, and Kim Il-Sung Minister of Defense. There was a 
generally favourable impression of Rhee at this point. Per-haps we need to place ourselves back at that point, when 
the outcome was unknown, and consider Rhee’s image as the tireless campaigner on the world stage for condemna-tion of Japan’s colonial rule of Korea, and indeed his book published in 1942, titled Japan Inside Out, in which he went so far as to accuse Americans who had advocated a soft approach to the expanding Japanese empire of being 
fifth columnists in their own country. Rhee was not, as should be reasonably well known by now, a person the Americans particularly liked: they ended up supporting him with clenched teeth. 
What of Kim Il Sung? According to Kim Sŏnhyŏk, dis-illusionment began to set in when he proved unable or unwilling to do anything about the looting and violence the Soviet Army indulged in. But here again, Kim’s view is a considered one: he noted that Kim Il Sung was probably in an impossible position, for had he tried to do anything about it, his standing with the Soviets would have plum-meted and he would have possibly gone the way of Cho Mansik.It was, in fact, a time of little trust, when trusting some-one could be fatal. Kim himself learned early not to trust anyone too much. At the time of his arrest, it dawned on him with some shock that he might have been betrayed to the police by stooges within the anti-trusteeship movement, even in the Sammindang, a suspicion he now holds as a high probability, and regrets his youthful trust. 
Although it appears that the Russians had a policy of restricting communications between ethnic or language groups inside the prison camps by separating them out into different camps, Kim quickly learned not to trust other Koreans in camp. On his release into his ten years of exile, his caution was only deepened by attempts by North Korean agents to contact him and lure him into vague meetings. Despite the loneliness it caused, he made it a principle, which he kept assiduously, never to enter into any “understandings” with Koreans who approached him. Even after his rehabilitation by the Soviet authorities 
following his freedom from exile, agents from the DPRK Embassy in Moscow vainly approached him to join a pro-ject that on the surface appeared completely innocuous. Such caution, vigilance and solitude was the price of sur-vival, and survive he did.Kim’s caution and suspicion affected his family. On hearing the news that Kim’s sisters had found him, his 
daughter found it hard to believe. Even after she saw the letters from his brother, her uncle, in Seoul (the Korean language of which she was not in any case able to read), it did not seem real and her suspicions lingered. Kim, of course, had always told his children, as he believed, that his family were in North Korea. He harboured a feeling of guilt that because of him they might have suffered badly, perhaps been killed. Was this a trap? Nevertheless, his 
daughter confided, she always believed that if he kept at it he would one day make contact with his family. As it hap-
pened, it was his sisters who made contact first. 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONSWe can learn a number of things from the combined record of the biographies and interviews. 
The nearly fifty years between Kim Sŏnhyŏk’s arrest and his discovery by his sisters are decisive years. They are his life, a life he forged from what most would regard as the worst of raw materials but which he regarded as an environment sprinkled with tests and signs from 
God. He is very Russian in his outlook. He views folk like 
Brezhnev, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin from an informed 
and sympathetic Russian perspective. He has refused all urgings from his family to move to Seoul or the USA. He is 
a remarkable instance of self-sufficiency, banished from the land whose central dogma is self-reliance. 
How does Kim Sŏnhyŏk regard his place in history? Only those who succeed in history, he demurred, should proffer opinions on history. Is history the record of those that succeed, who manage to catch hold of the hem of the coat of history as it rustles past, as Bismarch is supposed to have put it? Is it true, as Hans Hillerbrand maintained back in 1969, that those “who fail are hardly ever attrac-
tive figures in the narratives of history,” and that “success is, after all, what counts in history”? (Hans J. Hillerbrand, 
Men and Ideas in the Sixteenth Century, 1969, pp 37 & 18-19) Yet after reading Kim’s biography and the record of his 
interviews, one loses confidence in such easy and sup-posedly telling phrases as “casualties of history,” that are commonly applied to such people. The category slips through the lines of his narrative. He is an outstandingly successful individual. What then the relation between this individual and that totality we call history? How in this case can we relate microhistory – which in so many ways is the substance of meaning for human life – to mac-rohistory?
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In his preface to the biography of their father written 
by Kim Sŏnhyŏk’s elder brother, the academic and family 
friend Kim Kisŏk ponders this same question of an indi-vidual’s place in the unfolding of what we call history. Let me summarize him.
Who constructs history?
Many think that certain leaders construct history.
But not a few leaders destroy history…
There is also the view that history is constructed by 
the masses. This may be a sounder position than that 
which makes history revolve around specified leaders, 
but there is also the possibility that a foolish crowd may 
drive history along an unfortunate path.
We have certainly seen numerous cases of this.
Then, who are they that construct history?
They are those who seek truth amidst falsehood, who 
oppose injustice and abide by justice, who reject glam-
orous evil and strive after unseen good…
At times they are sacrificed because of their pursuit of 
truth and liberty.
[Kim Kihyŏk, Kim Hyŏnsŏk changno chŏn’gi, Preface by 
Kim Kisŏk]
And so the words victim and casualty still exist, along with 
their normal import. Kim Sŏnhyŏk certainly feels that his father was a victim of Kim Il Sung’s rise to power, even a casualty of the trusteeship confrontation. Nevertheless, the words lose their effect as categories in which to place people we deem unimportant and by which to frame our understanding of history. History does not consist of his-tory-makers at one pole and casualties of history at the 
other. Kim Sŏnhyŏk certainly was a maker of history and so even was his father, whose choices, positions and activ-ities and, indeed, his death, were socially and historically consequential in their time, and remain so now. In history we often speak broadly of change and con-tinuity, but what comes through in the biographies and 
interviews I have used is usually a matter of conflict and solidarity. But individual lives and their varied relation-ships to other individuals, communities, institutions and 
events present conflicts and solidarities along so many 
axes that construction of a model is very difficult. That 
during war axes are more definable and fewer might be because proper human activities are suspended and because war is a brutal thing, and a whole variety of motives and hopes of those involved is submerged under 
a logic that is practically irrelevant to whatever is being fought over, and irrelevant to the ways in which humans should work to a conclusion, through reasoning, mutual learning, and so on. Yet even in wartime, and certainly during the virtual wartime of the 1945-48 period on the Korean peninsula, 
the record of individual lives, such as that of Kim Sŏnhyŏk 
and his father Kim Hyŏnsŏk, resist a single explanatory 
framework. Paradoxically, perhaps, it is the singularity of the individual experience, an experience that forms a complete whole in itself, that is too large for any theory to encompass. A look at individual lives is not simply or even funda-
mentally a matter of filling in the big picture with infor-mation about various individuals’ personal experiences of the grand developments. My brief look at these individ-
ual lives is not at all a matter of filling in with a personal account what we claim that we already know of the trajec-tory of history on the Korean peninsular after 1945. At the very least, it should encourage us to encompass all the heterogeneous outcomes, and hesitate to consign them to some trapdoor of history or minimalize them as atten-dant features of political results. To be sure, for a micro-history, one needs to examine as many individuals at the starting point as possible. But this is a start, and a family 
that within an era of extraordinary conflicts and change maintains or regains solidarity and continuity is by no means a small matter. Individually and together, they are what make this world.In this regard it is of some importance that I have cho-sen a family in which the father is executed and his son is shipped off to the Soviet prison-camp and exile sys-
tem and remains in Russia. For what could seem more a non-result, a story of passive recipients of history? But neither in the one’s death nor the other’s life is it quite this way. If one wishes, or if one prefers a kind of liter-ary interpretation of this case, one can contrast the North Korean theory of chuch’e with an individual exemplar of it, contrast the totality of the North Korean ideological hold with the totality of a family’s experience, and of one man’s triumph. But for all that, we can see that in post-W.W.II Korean society and beyond its political borders, there were instances of importance – matters of moment – and these were the conditions, the raw materials out of which people molded their present, made the times what they were. An adventure of 55 years, the details of which are highly particular, evinces the plurality but neverthe-
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less representative experiences of this era—the ways of thought, of acting on convictions, of placing selves in rela-tion to events – and perhaps we can see in the non-con-spicuous, non-self-publicizing or self-aggrandizing par-ticularity of one family, an enactment of history that not only contributes to the nature of the modern world, but creates the conditions which the dominant forces, too, must use as raw materials in their choices, limiting them.Finally, I return to the question how we might evaluate the relation of biographies and interviews to the task of 
creating historical narratives. I do believe we can profit-ably understand this relation if we consider these sources in terms of an ongoing dialectic between historical text 
and historical event, reflecting in part the fixed, chang-ing, or envisioned social and cultural environments of the authors of these texts, and no less of the historians who encounter them. Understanding this dialectic, by which I mean also perceiving the dual nature of these sources as text and event, may help us work out a reasonably responsible use of them.From time to time during the interviews of Kim 
Sŏnhyŏk, disagreements arose between his accounts and those already written in his biography. For example, he cast doubt on the claim made in his biography that a wel-come dinner was held at his house for Kim Il Sung soon after he returned to Korea with the Soviet armed forces. 
He certainly recalled the welcome in P’yŏngyang, and con-
firmed his father’s presence at it, but explained it was an outdoor event and involved far too many people to host in his or any other house. Nor did he support the claim that his parents were closely acquainted with the parents of Kim Il Sung. One further clear difference is the place given 
to religion, particularly the Protestant faith of his fam-ily, in the unfolding of his story. Whereas his elder sister made religion almost an organizing theme in her biogra-
phy of him, Kim Sŏnhyŏk made very little of it, and it was clear that though he subscribed to the general tenets of Christianity he had hardly darkened the door of a church 
of any persuasion even after the relaxation of the official 
disfavour of religion in the USSR after the mid-1960s.The biographies of the father and his son, by the elder brother and eldest sister, need to be seen as formalized ritual accounts in the realist tradition, in this case, the tra-dition of religious rights of passage. The biographies are both a record of a pilgrimage and a testimony to the provi-dential workings of the Christian God through the lives of faithful believers. The biographies are lives of saints. But 
they have a national and political edge to them, as they 
reflect the experiences and social positions of Protestants in South Korea who belong to the tradition surrounding 
the flood of Protestant refugees from the north between 1946 and 1953 (possibly 80% of the Christians in the 
north), who identify with the late Reverend Han Kyŏngjik, a former pupil at Osan College under Cho Mansik.
The titles of Kim Kwihyŏk’s autobiography and her 
subsequent biography of Kim Sŏnhyŏk explicitly evoke 
pilgrimages: hers from P’yŏngyang to Jerusalem (where she made her pilgrimage in the early 1980s), and his from 
P’yŏngyang to Seoul, a belated completion of his fam-ily’s move there and an example of the recent “Christian passage” of growing numbers of North Korean refugees to Seoul. A pilgrimage is a ritual, and so is formalized; in written form it has certain accepted and expected modes of expression. They must testify to God’s power, plans, grace, and promise of restitution of all things and recon-
ciliation of all people. Hence in her writings, Kim Kwihyŏk is writing the testimony of her family, whose fortunes have been related in a direct and costly way with the poli-tics of a divided nation. The passage claiming her father put on a welcome dinner for Kim Il Sung at their house, though she might genuinely believe it to be factual (she was not there: she was at school in Seoul), is a required passage, as are the countless allusions to God’s guidance, her brother’s piety, and so on. When it comes to testimo-nies, these also are part of life narratives, and in their ritu-alized form they certainly take on elements of hagiogra-phy. But they are no less real for that: they are part of the process of belonging, not false, certainly very meaningful.When encountering the subjectivity of religious peo-ple, it is important to consider that they might in fact believe their beliefs and attach primary meaning to their 
rituals, in relation to which other matters must find their place or meaning. In these biographies, we discover that the author holds to a religious perception of the structure of the world and has a religiously inspired expectation of outcomes within it; rather than seeing religion politically, she sees politics religiously.Yet in their ritual realism, one can hardly mark these sources out as peculiar. The summary of the court judg-
ment on Kim Hyǒnsŏk that led to his execution is of a similarly ritual nature and engages in its own species of socio-political realism. The summary abounds with the 
expected and required phrases. It testifies to the purity of the regime and its causes, its protective relation to the 
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people, and to the righteousness of its indictment of the accused. As in the case of the biographical writings, much of its content is a forced construction, but it too, is histori-cally real.Both the biographies and the court record clash with 
the interviews. Kim Sŏnhyŏk endows his father with a dif-ferent purpose and places him on a higher moral plane than the court or the regime, and his memories of his father from his youth are a story I cannot include here. But the break with his sister’s biography is more emphatic and relates directly to the question of history. His journey to Seoul fails to complete his family’s pilgrimage; in a way, he breaks it. How might we understand this break? It is not possible to dismiss 50 years of one’s personal history by recourse 
to a desired fulfillment of an assumed providential order held by persons whose lives have taken a radically dif-ferent course and who regard those 50 years on his part to be nothing but loss, an aberration, at best a marking of time. Many ends remain untied and it would be rash indeed to pretend to know how the weave will end up. 
The Korean story on the big scale is also unfinished busi-ness. And even those of us who might pride ourselves on a less ritualized framework and a more open-ended 
perspective have to acknowledge that in the final analysis even the best-documented life remains a mystery.
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Pierre-Emmanuel Roux, La 
croix, la baleine et le canon: 
la France face à la Corée au 
milieu du XIXe siècle (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2012), 460 pp., ISBN 978-2-204-09508-2, ISSN 0769-2633.
French-Korean relations in the nineteenth century, the topic of this book by Pierre-Emmanuel Roux, most likely will call to mind the French missionaries who illegally entered the country and had to pay for this with their lives, as well as the 1866 French attack on Kanghwa-do that is supposed to have been a reprisal for their deaths. Yet, as Roux shows, there was more to the relations between the two countries, and that is why in his title to the cross he has added the whale (la baleine) and the cannon. In his book, the whale stands more generally for commercial interests and the cannon for geo-political interests pro-moted through diplomacy backed up by military force. Roux’s study is based on extensive and thorough research with the help of materials in Korean, Chinese, Japanese and English, and above all, of course, in French (includ-ing the archives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, and of the French missionaries). 
The book is divided in three parts, of which the first, enti-
tled “the first disillusionments,” deals with the early rela-tions of Korea with Europe in general, and France in par-
ticular. The first chapter analyzes several failed attempts to open up Korea in the 1840s and 1850s by the French navy. These attempts were motivated by the French 
desire to strengthen its influence in East Asia in order to gain commercial and geo-political advantage, in competi-tion with other occidental powers. Korea was but one of the possible targets of these policies and, luckily, failed to receive as much attention as Indo-China, which ended up as a French colony. The execution of three French mis-sionaries in Korea in 1839 had little to do with French efforts to establish relations with the Koreans and mainly served as a pretext to enter into a dialogue. On the Korean side, however, the missionaries were seen as agents of the French government preparing for French interference in Korean affairs. Therefore any reference to the missionar-
ies by the French would tend to confirm these fears. The missionaries for their part were quite eager to make use of French military might to further their purposes. The result of all this was that the French approaches to the Korean government, far from aiding the Korean Catho-lics, whose religious practice often was tacitly condoned, rather prompted renewed persecutions, because suspi-cions that the western religion was a menace to the state 
seemed to be confirmed. This is also what happened in 1866.In a groundbreaking second chapter Roux draws atten-tion to the importance of whale hunting in the global economy until the middle of the nineteenth century, at a time when the oil extracted from whales had not yet been replaced by mineral oil extracted from the earth. The whalers of the western powers increasingly transferred 
their hunting grounds to the Pacific and consequently the Korean government noted a disturbingly large number of foreign ships near the Korean coast. Western nations felt the need for ports where whalers could take in water and food, and sought assurances that whalers in distress would receive assistance from the East-Asian powers. 
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The French also were engaged in this industry and the supposed presence of large numbers of whales in the waters around Korea (partly based on the narratives of Hamel and the other Dutch castaways in the seventeenth century!) encouraged efforts to open up Korean harbors. Whale hunting, Roux points out, was the only real com-mercial purpose pursued by the French in the efforts to establish relations with Korea, but the opening of Japa-nese harbors that provided an alternative in 1854 (par-ticularly Hakodate) and the decline of the French whal-ing industry soon after that meant that this motive for opening Korea disappeared before any result had been achieved.     The second part of the book is entitled “a failed inva-
sion” and reconsiders and contextualizes the dramatic events of 1866, when nine French missionaries were executed and the French naval force attacked Kanghwa-do, the island at the mouth of the Han River that might be considered to be the entrance to the capital. The con-
textualization continues in the third part (“the hidden 
side of the cards”), which focuses on the larger interna-tional context, while the second part concentrates on the background of the events of 1866, on the events them-selves and on the divergent ways they were seen from the French and Korean points of view. Sarcastically calling it 
“a course in applied civilization” Roux highlights the bar-
barity of the attack, which was justified with the noblest motives but ended in the pillaging of the Royal Library and the destruction of precious cultural artifacts and burning down an entire village. The interpretation Roux presents is quite different from the standard versions. The invasion was not simply punishment for the killing of the missionaries (although this argument was used as 
a justification), the first step toward the colonization of Korea or a maladroit attempt at opening up Korea. Roux convincingly argues that geo-political considerations in which Korea did not play a central role were to a large extent responsible for the actions undertaken on the pen-insula. First of all there was the French desire to check the expansion of Russia, which had already extended to Alaska and recently had made Russia a direct neighbor 
of Korea. There is a parallel here with the “Great Game,” the rivalry of Great Britain and Russia for dominance in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Secondly, there was the idea that an intimidating show of French force was needed to protect French residents of China, who at the time were confronted with a menacing rise in virulent anti-foreign 
sentiments among the population. (Not surprisingly, the invasion had exactly the opposite effect.) In other words, a proper understanding of the events, Roux contends, is impossible if one only looks at the bilateral relations between France and Korea, which also applies to earlier phases in the relations between Korean and France. He also adds nuance to the usual interpretations by care-fully delineating different attitudes and interests on the 
French side and significant changes in these over time. The book is very well-written and nicely illustrated. It is a most welcome addition to our understanding of the establishing of relations between the western world and 
Korea, making clear that the “opening of Korea” was not an event, but a gradual process, with many nuances that 
do not easily fit idées reçues. More generally, this study 
invites reflection on the motives behind western imperi-alistic expansion.
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